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Branzburg v. Hayes

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2/23/72 BRANZBURG v. HAYES 70-85 mr. Zingman (for Brangburg) Contener that mere appearance ty reporter violater his threader (200) (1046, 47) Contand that 4th IF of order (200) (1046, 47) Haker away all protection granted in first 3 parspopher. (The Qs ac to possession of manysona - p6 - would have to be answered) This is a manual from the stipping with good protection for the protection of the pr

Trugman (cont-p2) What is meant by "compelling & over noting "need ? IT's answer - as menun get 1. Probable cause as to need 2. no other means availably on this 3. necessary to prevent unredicte commensue of a mojor come Den hearing in "essential" to Same provilege should exist in a crimical tread as with respect to a grand gury proceeding 5. Schroering (for Ky) Proposed "tests" of IT would handisop G/Juny. an open hearing would deating secrecy of grand Juny my question, he expressed disagreement with Judge Maigs The actual and the set of a qualified provided (A 46). 9 and group

No70-85 (43)

Reynolds (SG - amere)

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See Brief america

Newsmen have no exclusive interest the provelege - if granted - ment to apply There to anyone who writes (any where) or lecturies, 1st award protects sight to "accounte" ar well or refresh & press. Thus, augered nuget claim privilege - of it recognized (But this strekber argument too fer).

Query - In the privilege of lawyer anything more than a nule of eidener ?

See S.G. Brief -p7 - on to minpreson of a felowy. (also get Eng. cose - Dennig)

S. G. suggests that the prairie position I have in not in interact of freedom of press - 7,8 UNITED STATES V. CALDWELL 70-57 IN RE PAUL PAPPAS 70-94 BRANZBURG V. HAYES & MEIGS 70-85 Argued 2/23/72

Tentative Lapressions*

Although the facts in these cases differ, counsel for the media in the principal briefs and in the briefs amicus - are asserting a First Amendment right - a right of constitutional proportions - to a privilege against disclosing - in judicial or other proceedings - sources of information or confidential information.

Statements of this position vary. That in the brief on behalf

of Branzburg (at p. 9) is typical:

"The First Amendment provides newsmen a privilege against compulsory appearances in closed proceedings and against compulsory disclosure of confidential information. In order to overcome this privilege, the state has the heavy burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that the testimony of the reporter is absolutely necessary to prevent direct, immediate andirreparable prospective damage to the national security, human life or liberty. Any lesser burden does not adequately protect the press from state action which endangers the freedom of the press guaranteed by the First Amendment. "

*These impressions are dictated on the afternoon following argument to record my initial and tentative impressions. I will have read, in proparation for the arguments, the principal briefs, some of the cases and the bench memo. I hope to do further study before the Conference. My views are subject to change and to the discussion at the Conference. other media, states their position as follows:

"The First Amendment demands . . . that the reporter be protected. The standard of protection can be defined by objective criteria, and made self limiting in practice.

"A reporter cannot, consistently with the Constitution, he made to divulge confidences to a governmental investigative body unless three minimal tests have all been met. L. The government must clearly show that there is probable cause to believe that the reporter possesses information which is specifically relevant to a specific probable violation of law. 2. The government must clearly show that the information it seeks cannot be obtained by alternative means, which is to say, from sources other than the reporter. 3. The government must clearly demonstrate a compelling and overriding interest in the information."

The decisions of the three courts differed materially. In <u>Caldwell</u>, the Ninth Circuit agreed substantially with the press – although its decision was narrowly drawn in light of the specific facts (the government had not introduced any evidence to show a need for the testimony).

In <u>Branzburg</u>, the court reached a different result from <u>Caldwell</u>. It decided that the reporter would have to testify before the grand jury, and it express grave doubt as to whether there was any constitutional privilege. The reporter had not shown, as was true in <u>Caldwell</u>, that he had no information - other than stories already published - to disclose. In <u>Pappas</u>, the Massachusetts court held finity that there was no First Amendment privilege, qualified or absolute, available to newsmen.

SL.

My Tenintive Views:

<u>Caldwell</u>: I would reverse <u>Caldwell</u>, as it went too far in establishing a constitutional right not even to testify at all.

Branzburg: I would affirm the holding, although I would not accept all of the reasoning of the court.

<u>Pappas</u>: It seems to me that the Massachusetts court may have been right in holding that there is no privilege as a matter of constitutional right, either absolute or qualified. But the Court did not give due weight to the importance of balancing First Amendment interests against the other interests involved. I would be inclined to reverse <u>Pappas</u> for reconsideration in light of the principles and guidelines established in this Court's opinion.

As to the conrolling principles, I am tentatively inclined to share the view expressed by Justice Stewart in <u>Garland v. Torre</u>, 259 F. 2d 545, namely, that there is no constitutional privilege

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specifically available to newsmen. Mr. Justice Stewart also declined to recognize - as I read his opinion - even an "evidentiary privilege" (such as that available to a lawyer). He did emphasize the important First Amendment interest involved, and concluded that these needed to be balanced against the interest being served by the administration of justice (in the <u>Garland</u> case the need to have the testimony of a critical witness).

I have been interested in the protective order entered by Judge Meigs in the <u>Branchurg</u> case (Appendix 46) which purported to protect confidential sources and information, but required the witnesses to appear before the grand jury and to answer questions "which concern or pertain to any criminal act, the commission of which was actually observed by <u>Branzburg</u>. "

Some elaboration and refinement of Judge Meigs approach might make sense. His qualification, for example, with respect to crimes "actually observed" is not broad enough. Crimes which might be planned or discussed in his presence should not be privileged.

Some of the "safeguards" proposed by counsel for the media such as imposing a heavy burden on the state to show a "compelling and overriding interest", and to guarantee a public hearing prior to the newsmap being required to answer any question, go much too far.

L, F. P., Jr.

COIII. 6/20/12

Voted on....., 19... Assigned, 19... Announced, 19...

BRANZBURG

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Powell, J														
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MARSHALL, J. Reverle Equen with Kreman DOUGLAS, J. Kevene There is a court. privilege . BRENNAN, J. Vocate & Remand BLACEMUN, J. affin in accord with his want of a 12 amend. Priveye (Revence) STEWART, J. Revene Two cover - two stores Powell, J. affin an 9 do not - the Frankfurt story should be protected (Ky statute) (chief agrees with mis) Thuck there is a coust. privilege Anna RRHNQUIET, J. affini WHITE, J. affinin MEMO: Chief - Ceck Broughy withend a crimmel act,

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67		Chief J	
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No. 70-94 In the Matter of Paul Papas Mr. Justice Rein No. 70-57 U.S. v. Caldwell From: Powell, J.

No. 70-85 Branzburg v. Hayes

Circulated: JUN 4 3 1972

MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring, in the opinion

of the Court,

S. T. PMP

I add this brief statement to emphasize what seems to me to be the limited nature of the Court's holding. The Court does not hold that newsmen, subpoensed to testify before a grand jury, are without constitutional rights with respect to the gathering of news or in safeguarding their sources. Certainly, we do not hold, as suggested in the dissenting opinion, that state and federal authorities are free to "annex" the news media as "an investigative arm of government. " The solicitude repeatedly shown by this Court for First Amendment freedoms should be sufficient assurance against any such effort, even if one seriously believed that the media - basically free and untrammelled in the fullest sense of these torms - were not able to protect themselves.

As indicated in the concluding portion of the opinion, the Court states that no harassment of newsmen will be tolerated. If a newsman believes that the grand jury investigation is not being conducted in good faith he is not without remedy. Indeed, if the newsman is called upon to give information bearing only a remote and tenuous relationship to the subject of the investigation, or if he has some other reason to believe that his testimony implicates confidential source relationships without a legifimate need of law enforcement, he will have access to the Court on a motion to quash and an appropriate protection order may be intered. The asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts by the striking of a proper balance between freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to eriminal conduct. The balance of these vital constitutional and societal interests on a case-by-case basis accords with the tried and traditional way of adjudicating such questions.

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In short, the Court merely holds that a newsman (newsder


right under the Constitution. We do not hold that the protection of the Courts is unavailable to newsmen under circumstances

where legitimate First Amendment interests require protection.

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Mr. Justice White Mr. Justice Karshal Mr. Justice Elacksw Mr. Justice Rehnquis

Recirculated:

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

From: Powell, J. Nos. 70-85, 70-94, AND 70-57 Circulated; ESH & 4 1978

Paul M. Branzburg, Petitioner, On Writ of Certiorari to 70-85 the Court of Appeals of ν, Kentucky. John P. Hayes, Judge, etc., et al.

In the Matter of Paul Papas, Petitioner. 70-94

) On Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

United States, Petitioner, On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court 70-57 27. of Appeals for the Ninth Earl Caldwell. Circuit.

[June -, 1972]

MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring, in the opinion of the Court.

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70-85, 70-94, & 70-57-CONCUR

BRANZBURG v. HAYFS

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"It is to be remembered that Caldwell asserts a constitutional privilege not even to appear before the grand jury unless a court decides that the government has made a showing that meets the three pre-conditions specified in the dissenting optimion of Ma. Journes STEWART. To be sure, this would require a "balancing" of interests by the Court, but under circumstances and constraints significantly different from the balancing that incomportate under the Court's desision. The newsman witness, like all other witnesses, will have to appear; he will not be ha position to litigato at the threshold the State's very authority to subpoen him. Moreover, absent the constitutional pre-conditions that Caldwell and the dissenting optimic would impose as heavy burdens of proof to be carried by the State, the court—when estiled upon to protect a newsman from improper or projudicial questioning—would be free to balance the constitutional rule endersted by the dissenting optimon would, as a practical matter, defect such a fair balancing and the essential sociatal interests on the merits in the particular case. The new constitutional rule endersted by the dissenting optimon would, as a practical matter, defect such a fair balancing and the essential sociatal interest in the detection and prosecution of crime would by habardinated.

70-85, 70-94, & 70-57-CONCUR

BRANZBURG #. HAYES

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In short, the Court merely holds that a newsman has no testimonial privilege as a matter of right under the Constitution. We do not hold that the protection of the courts is unavailable to newsmen under circumstances where legitimate First Amendment interests requira protection.