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Supreme Court of the United States
Washington, D. C. 20543

CHAMBERS OF
JUSTICE WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS

March 21, 1973

Dear Potter:

Please join me in your opinion in 72-75, Georgia v. United States.

WOD

William O. Douglas

Mr. Justice Stewart

cc: The Conference

To: The Chief Justice
Mr. Justice Douglas
Mr. Justice Brennan
Mr. Justice White
Mr. Justice Marshall
Mr. Justice Blackmun
Mr. Justice Powell
Mr. Justice Rehnquist

1st DRAFT

From: Stewart, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Circulated: MAR 21 1973

No. 72-75

Recirculated: ________

Georgia et al., Appellants, v. United States. | On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.

[March —, 1973]

MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Attorney General of the United States brought this suit under § 12 (d) of the Voting Rights Act as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973j (d), to enjoin the State of Georgia from conducting elections for its House of Representatives under the 1972 legislative reapportionment law. A three-judge federal court in the Northern District of Georgia agreed that certain aspects of the reapportionment law came within the ambit of § 5 of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c, and that the State, which is subject to the provisions of § 5,[1] had not obtained prior clearance from either the Attorney General or the District Court for the District of Columbia. Accordingly, and without reaching the question whether the reapportionment plan had the purpose or effect of "denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color,"

[1] A State is subject to § 5 if it qualifies under § 4 (b), 42 U. S. C. § 1973b (b). Covered States are those which on November 1, 1964, employed any of several enumerated tests or devices as a prerequisite to voting, and in which less than 50% of eligible voters were registered to vote or actually voted in the November 1964 presidential election. States that meet identical criteria with respect to the 1968 presidential election are also covered under the amended Act. It is stipulated that Georgia is covered under § 4 (b).

42 U. S. C. § 1973c, the District Court issued the requested injunction.[2] The State brought this appeal. We noted probable jurisdiction, staying enforcement of the District Court judgment pending disposition of the appeal. 409 U. S. 911.

Following the 1970 Census, the Georgia Legislature set out to reapportion its State House of Representatives, State Senate, and federal congressional electoral districts. We are here concerned only with the reapportionment plan for the State House of Representatives.[3] The result of the Legislature's deliberations was a plan (hereinafter the 1971 plan) that, as compared with the prior 1968 scheme, decreased the number of districts from 118 to 105, and increased the number of multi-member districts from 47 to 49. Whereas the prior apportionment plan had generally preserved county lines, the 1971 plan did not: 31 of the 49 multi-member districts and 21 of the 56 single-member districts irregularly crossed county boundaries. The boundaries of nearly all districts were changed, and in many instances the number of representatives per district was altered. Residents of some 31 counties formerly in single-member districts were brought into multi-member districts. Under continuing Georgia law, a candidate receiving less than a majority of the votes cast for a position was required to participate in a majority runoff election. Ga. Code § 34-1513. And in the multi-member districts, each candidate was required to designate the seat for which he was running, referred to as the "numbered post." Ga. Code § 34-1015.

Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act forbids States subject to the Act from implementing any change in a "voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting" without

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first obtaining a declaratory judgment from the District Court for the District of Columbia that the proposed change "does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color," *or* submitting the plan to the Attorney General of the United States and receiving no objection within 60 days. 42 U. S. C. § 1973c. Pursuant to this requirement, the State of Georgia submitted the 1971 plan to the Attorney General on November 5, 1971. Two weeks later, a representative of the Department of Justice wrote to the State Attorney General, requesting further information needed to assess the racial impact of the tendered plan.[4] This information was received on January 6, 1972, and on March 3, 1972, the Attorney General of the United States formally objected to the State's plan. The objection letter cited the combination of multi-member districts, numbered posts, majority run-off elections, and the extensive departure from the State's prior policy of adhering to county lines. On the basis of these changes plus particular changes in the structure of potential black majority single-member districts, the Attorney General was "unable to conclude that the plan does not have a discriminatory racial effect on voting." The letter stated that the Attorney General therefore felt obligated to "interpose an objection to changes submitted by the reapportionment plans."

The State Legislature immediately enacted a new reapportionment plan and repealed its predecessor. The 1972 plan increased the number of districts from 105 to 128, and decreased the number of multi-member districts

[4] The Justice Department asked for census maps of the 1964 and 1968 House districts; the distribution of white and nonwhite population within the 1964, 1968, and 1971 districts; a history of the primary and general elections in which Negro candidates ran; data, including race, with respect to all elected state representatives; and the legislative history of all redistricting bills.

from 49 to 32. Twenty-two of the multi-member districts and 37 of the single-member districts still crossed county boundaries.

This 1972 plan was submitted to the Attorney General on March 15, and he objected on March 24. The Assistant Attorney General's letter stated, in part:

> "After a careful analysis of the Act redistricting the Georgia House of Representatives, I must conclude that this reapportionment does not satisfactorily remove the features found objectionable in your prior submission, namely, the combination of multi-member districts, numbered posts, and a majority (runoff) requirement discussed in my March 3, 1972 letter to you interposing an objection to your earlier Section 5 submission. Accordingly, and for the reasons enunciated in my March 3, 1972 letter I must, on behalf of the Attorney General, object to S. B. 690 reapportioning the Georgia House of Representatives."

When the Georgia Legislature resolved that it would take no further steps to enact a new plan, the Attorney General brought the present lawsuit.

The State of Georgia claims that § 5 is inapplicable to the 1972 House plan, both because the Act does not reach "reapportionment" and because the 1972 plan does not constitute a change from procedures "in force or effect on November 1, 1964." If applicable, the Act is claimed to be unconstitutional as applied. The State also challenges two aspects of the Attorney General's conduct of the § 5 objection procedure, claiming first that the Attorney General cannot object to a state plan without finding that it in fact has a discriminatory purpose or effect, and second that the Attorney General's objection to the 1971 plan was not made within the 60-day time period allowed for objection under the Act.

I

Despite the fact that multi-member districts, numbered posts, and a majority runoff requirement were features of Georgia election law prior to November 1, 1964, the changes that followed from the 1972 reapportionment are plainly sufficient to invoke § 5 if that section of the Act reaches the substance of those changes. Section 5 is not concerned with a simple inventory of voting procedures, but rather with the reality of changed practices as they affect Negro voters. It seems clear that the extensive reorganization of voting districts and the creation of multi-member districts in place of single-member districts in certain areas amounted to substantial departures from the electoral state of things under previous law. The real question is whether the substance of these changes undertaken as part of the state reapportionment are "standards, practices, or procedures with respect to voting" within the meaning of § 5.

The prior decisions of this Court compel the conclusion that changes of the sort included in Georgia's 1972 House reapportionment plan are cognizable under § 5. In *South Carolina* v. *Katzenbach*, 383 U. S. 301, we upheld the basic constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act. Mr. Justice Black dissented from that judgment, precisely describing the broad sweep of § 5:

> "Section 5 goes on to provide that a State covered by § 4 (b) can in no way amend its constitution or laws relating to voting without first trying to persuade the Attorney General of the United States or the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia that the new proposed laws do not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying the right to vote to citizens on account of their race or color." 383 U. S., at 356 (concurring and dissenting opinion).

The applicability of § 5 to election law changes such as those enacted by Georgia in its 1972 plan was all but conclusively established by the opinion of this Court in *Allen* v. *State Board of Elections*, 393 U. S. 544. The *Allen* opinion, dealing with four companion cases, held that § 5 applied to a broad range of voting law changes, and was constitutional as applied. With respect to the reach of § 5, we held that "[t]he legislative history on the whole supports the view that Congress intended to reach any state enactment which altered the election law of a covered State in even a minor way." *Id.*, at 566. One of the companion cases, *Fairley* v. *Patterson*, involved a claim that a change from district to at-large voting for county supervisor was a change in a "standard, practice or procedure with respect to voting." The challenged procedure was held to be covered by § 5. We noted that "[t]he right to vote can be affected by a dilution of voting power as well as by an absolute prohibition on casting a ballot. See *Reynolds* v. *Sims*, 377 U. S. 533, 555 (1964)." In holding that § 5 reached voting law changes that threatened to dilute Negro voting power, and in citing *Reynolds* v. *Sims*, we implicitly recognized the applicability of § 5 to similar but more sweeping election law changes arising from the reapportionment of state legislatures. 393 U. S., at 565–566, 583–586 (concurring and dissenting opinion of Harlan, J.).

Had Congress disagreed with the interpretation of § 5 in *Allen*, it had ample opportunity to amend the statute. After extensive deliberations in 1970 on bills to extend the Voting Rights Act, during which the *Allen* case was repeatedly discussed,[5] the Act was extended for five years,

[5] See, *e. g.*, Hearings before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 4249, H. R. 5538, and Similar Proposals, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 1, 4, 18, 83, 130–131, 133, 147–149, 154–155, 182–184, 402–454; Hearings before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary

without any substantive modification of § 5. Pub. L. 91-285, 85 Stat. 314, 315 (1970). We can only conclude, then, that *Allen* correctly interpreted the congressional design when it held that "the Act gives a broad interpretation to the right to vote, recognizing that voting includes 'all action necessary to make a vote effective.'" 393 U. S., at 565-566.

Another measure of the decisiveness with which *Allen* controls the present case is the actual practice of covered States since the *Allen* case was decided. Georgia, for example, submitted its 1971 plan to the Attorney General because it clearly believed that plan was covered by § 5. Its submission was "made pursuant to § 5," and the State Attorney General explained in his submission that the 1968 reapportionment of the Georgia House of Representatives "was not submitted because at that time, prior to *Allen* v. *Board of Elections*, . . . it was believed to be unnecessary to submit reapportionment plans to the United States Attorney General pursuant to the Voting Rights Act of 1965." When the Attorney General objected, Georgia changed its House plan and resubmitted it pursuant to § 5. Other States covered by the Act have also read *Allen* as controlling. The brief for the United States advises us that as of December 1, 1972, 381 post-*Allen* reapportionment plans had been presented to the Attorney General by various States for § 5 approval.

In the present posture of this case, the question is not whether the redistricting of the Georgia House, including extensive shifts from single- to multi-member districts,

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on Bills to Amend the Voting Rights Act, 91st Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., at 48, 195-196, 369-370, 397-398, 426-427, 469. David L. Norman, then Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, testified that, "from court decisions, all these redistricting plans are going to have to be submitted to the Attorney General for his approval because they are voting changes." Senate Hearings, *supra*, at 507.

in fact had a racially discriminatory purpose or effect. The question, rather, is whether such changes have the potential for diluting the value of the Negro vote and are within the definitional terms of § 5. It is beyond doubt that such a potential exists, cf. *Whitcomb* v. *Chavis*, 403 U. S. 124, 141–144. In view of the teaching of *Allen*,[6] reaffirmed in *Perkins* v. *Matthews*, 400 U. S.

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[6] The appellant points to language in the *Allen* opinion that, it says, left open the question of the applicability of § 5 to a state reapportionment law. The cited passage in *Allen* is as follows:

"Appellees in No. 25 [*Fairley* v. *Patterson*] also argue that § 5 was not intended to apply to a change from district to at-large voting, because application of § 5 would cause a conflict in the administration of reapportionment legislation. They contend that under such a broad reading of § 5, enforcement of a reapportionment plan could be enjoined for failure to meet the § 5 approval requirements, even though the plan had been approved by a federal court. Appellees urge that Congress could not have intended to force the States to submit a reapportionment plan to two different courts.

"We must reject a narrow construction that appellees would give to § 5 . . . . The argument that some administrative problem might arise in the future does not establish that Congress intended that § 5 have a narrow scope; we leave to another case a consideration of any possible conflict." 393 U. S., at 564–565, 569.

The caveat implicit in this language would support the appellant's position only if practical problems of administration had emerged in the period that has elapsed since *Allen* was decided. This does not appear to have been the case. The brief of the United States advises us that the Department of Justice has adopted procedures designed to minimize any conflicts between § 5 administrative review and federal court litigation based on Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment attacks upon state reapportionment plans. Where a reapportionment plan has been prescribed by federal judicial decree, the Attorney General does not review it. See *Conner* v. *Johnson*, 402 U. S. 690, 691. Where a plan has been submitted to the Attorney General and is at the same time being litigated with respect to a Fifteenth Amendment claim, the Attorney General has deferred to the judicial determination regarding racial discrimination. Finally, the number of instances presenting an administrative-judicial overlap has been small. Of the 381 reapportionments submitted to the At-

379, we hold that the District Court was correct in deciding that the changes enacted in the 1972 reapportionment plan for the Georgia House of Representatives were within the ambit of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act. And for the reasons stated at length in *South Carolina* v. *Katzenbach,* 383 U. S. 301, 308–337, we reaffirm that the Act is a permissible exercise of congressional power under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment.

II

By way of implementing the performance of his obligation to pass on state submissions under § 5, the Attorney General has promulgated and published in the Federal Register certain administrative regulations, 28 CFR § 51. The appellant claims these regulations are without legislative authorization, and objects in particular to the application in the present case of two regulations which set forth the standards for decision on submissions and more fully define the 60-day time period provided in the Act.

It is true, as the appellant contends, that § 5 itself does not authorize the Attorney General to promulgate any regulations. But § 5 is also silent as to the procedures the Attorney General is to employ in deciding whether or not to object to state submissions, as to the standards governing the contents of those submissions, and as to the meaning of the 60-day time period in which the Attorney General is to object, if at all. Rather than reading the statute to grant him unfettered discretion as to procedures, standards, and administration in this sensitive area, the Attorney General has chosen instead to formulate and publish objective ground rules. If these regulations are reasonable and do not conflict with the Voting Rights Act itself, then 5 U. S. C. § 301, which gives to

torney General, only 19 of the objected-to submissions were involved in litigation when submitted.

"[t]he head of an Executive department" the power to "prescribe regulations for the government of his department, . . . [and] the distribution and performance of its business . . . ," is surely ample legislative authority for the regulations. See *United States* v. *Morehead*, 243 U. S. 607, *Smith* v. *United States*, 170 U. S. 372.

In 28 CFR § 51.19, the Attorney General has set forth the standards to be employed in deciding whether or not to object to a state submission. The regulation states that the burden of proof is on the submitting party, and that the Attorney General will refrain from objecting only if his review of the material submitted satisfies him that the proposed change does not have a racially discriminatory purpose or effect. If he is persuaded to the contrary, or if he cannot within the 60-day time period satisfy himself that the change is without a discriminatory purpose or effect, the regulation states that the Attorney General will object to the submission.[7] In objecting to the 1971 plan, the Assistant Attorney General wrote that he was "unable to conclude that the plan does not have a discriminatory racial effect on voting." The objection letter to the 1972 plan did not specify a

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[7] 28 CFR § 51.19, in pertinent part, states that: ". . . the burden of proof on the submitting authority is the same in submitting changes to the Attorney General as it would be in submitting changes to the District Court for the District of Columbia. . . . If the Attorney General is satisfied that the submitted change does not have a racially discriminatory purpose or effect, he will not object to the change and will so notify the submitting authority. If the Attorney General determines that the submitted change has a racially discriminatory purpose or effect, he will enter an objection and will so notify the submitting authority. If the evidence as to the purpose or effect of the change is conflicting, and the Attorney General is unable to resolve the conflict within the 60-day period, he shall, consistent with the above-described burden of proof applicable in the District Court, enter an objection and so notify the submitting authority."

degree of certainty as to the plan's discriminatory impact, but instead stated that the new plan had not remedied the features found objectionable in its predecessor.

Although both objections were consistent with the Attorney General's regulations, the appellant in effect attacks the legitimacy of the regulation described above in contending that the Attorney General is without power to object unless he has actually found that the changes contained in a submission have a discriminatory purpose or effect.

In assessing this claim, it is important to focus on the entire scheme of § 5. That portion of the Voting Rights Act essentially freezes the election laws of the covered States unless a declaratory judgment is obtained in the District Court for the District of Columbia holding that a proposed change is without discriminatory purpose or effect. The alternative procedure of submission to the Attorney General "merely gives the covered State a rapid method of rendering a new state election law enforceable." *Allen* v. *State Board of Elections, supra,* at 549.

It is well established that in a declaratory judgment action under § 5, the plaintiff State has the burden of proof.[8] What the Attorney General's regulations do is to place the same burden on the submitting party in a § 5 objection procedure. Though the choice of language in the objection letter sent to the State of Georgia was not a model of precision, in the context of the promulgated regulations the letter surely notified the State with sufficient clarity that it had not sustained its burden of

[8] The very effect of § 5 was to shift the burden of proof with respect to racial discrimination in voting. Rather than requiring affected parties to bring suit to challenge every changed voting practice, States subject to § 5 were required to obtain prior clearance before proposed changes could be put into effect. The burden of proof is on "the areas seeking relief." *South Carolina* v. *Katzenbach,* 383 U. S. 301, 335.

proving that the proposed changes were free of a racially discriminatory effect. It is not necessary to hold that this allocation of the burden of proof by the Attorney General was his only possible choice under the Act, in order to find it a reasonable means of administering his § 5 obligation. Any less stringent standard might well have rendered the formal declaratory judgment procedure a dead letter by making available to covered States a far smoother path to clearance. The Attorney General's choice of a proof standard was thus at least reasonable and consistent with the Act, and we hold that his objection pursuant to that standard was lawful and effective.

The appellant's final contention is that the Attorney General's objection to the 1971 plan was untimely, and so the submitted plan should have been held by the District Court to have gone into effect. It is far from clear that this claim is not simply moot, since the state enactment establishing the 1972 plan explicitly repealed the 1971 plan,[9] and the objection to the 1972 plan was clearly within the statutory time period. In any event, the claim is without merit.

In promulgating regulations, the Attorney General dealt with several aspects of the 60-day time limit established by § 5 of the Act. The regulations provide that all calendar days count as part of the allotted period, that parties whose submissions are objected to may seek reconsideration on the basis of new information and obtain a ruling within 60 days of that request, and that the 60-day period shall commence from the time the Department of Justice receives a submission satisfying the enumerated requirements. 28 CFR § 51.3 (c), (d), (b).

In the present case, the Attorney General found the initial submission of the 1971 plan incomplete under the regulations. Two weeks after receiving it, he requested

[9] See Ga. Senate Bill 690, March 9, 1972.

additional information.[10] His letter referred to 28 CFR § 51.18, a regulation providing for a request for additional information, and noted the additional regulatory provision that the 60-day period would not commence until the information was received. The State did not submit the requested data until January 6, 1972. Under the above mentioned regulation the 60-day period commenced on that date, and the Department of Justice made its objection within 60 days—on March 3.

The appellant argues that the Attorney General has granted himself more time than the statute provided by promulgating regulations suspending the time period until a complete submission is received. Here again, the question is whether the regulation is a reasonable administrative effectuation of § 5 of the Act. The judgment that the Attorney General must make is a difficult

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[10] The letter sent to the Attorney General of Georgia stated that a "preliminary examination" of the materials submitted led the Department of Justice to conclude "that the data sent to the Attorney General are insufficient to evaluate properly the changes you have submitted. In accordance with Sections 51.10 (a) (6) and 51.18 (a) of the Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 . . . would you please assist us by providing this Department the following additional information. . . ."

The promulgated regulations define in 28 CFR § 51.10 the contents of a submission. § 51.10 (a) (6) states:

"With respect to redistricting, annexation, and other complex changes, other information which the Attorney General determines is required to enable him to evaluate the purpose or effect of the change. Such other information may include items listed under paragraph (b) of this section. When such other information is required, the Attorney General shall notify the submitting authority in the manner provided in § 51.18 (a)."

Section 51.10 (b) "strongly urges" submitting authorities to produce the information enumerated to the extent it is available and relevant to the submitted changes. Virtually all of the information requested in this case, see n. 4, *supra*, falls within the enumerated categories of § 51.10 (b).

and complex one, and no one would argue that it should be made without adequate information. There is no serious claim in this case that the additional information requested was unnecessary or irrelevant to § 5 evaluation of the submitted reapportionment plan.[11] Yet if the Attorney General were denied the power to suspend the 60-day period until a complete submission were tendered, his only plausible response to an inadequate or incomplete submission would be simply to object to it. He would then leave it to the State to submit adequate information if it wished to take advantage of this means of clearance under § 5. This result would only add acrimony to the administration of § 5. We conclude, therefore, that this facet of the Attorney General's regulations is wholly reasonable and consistent with the Act.[12]

III

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is affirmed. Since, however, elections were conducted under the disputed 1972 plan by reason of this Court's stay order, it would be inequitable to require new elections at this time.

[11] See n. 4, *supra*.

[12] The appellant contends that to allow the Attorney General to promulgate this regulation is to open the way to frivolous and repeated delays by the Justice Department of laws of vital concern to the covered States. No such conduct by the Attorney General is presented here, and by upholding the basic validity of the regulation we most assuredly do not prejudge any case in which such unwarranted administrative conduct may be shown. Furthermore, a submission to the Attorney General is not the exclusive mode of preclearance under § 5. If a State finds the Attorney General's delays unreasonable, or if he objects to the submission, the State "may still enforce the legislation upon securing a declaratory judgment in the District Court for the District of Columbia." *Allen* v. *State Board of Elections*, 393 U. S. 544, 549.

The case is remanded to the District Court with instructions that any future elections under the Georgia House reapportionment plan be enjoined unless and until the State pursuant to § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, tenders to the Attorney General a plan to which he does not object, or obtains a favorable declaratory judgment from the District Court for the District of Columbia.

It is so ordered.

March 21

Justice Stewart's opinion in Georgia v. United States is straightforward and in accordd with your vote at conference. It relies almost solely on Allen rather than on Perkins, the annexation case with which you disagree. I recommend that you join the opinion.

Bill

Have voted.

Supreme Court of the United States
Washington, D. C. 20543

CHAMBERS OF
JUSTICE WM. J. BRENNAN, JR.

March 22, 1973

RE: No. 72-75 Georgia v. United States

Dear Potter:

I agree.

Sincerely,



Mr. Justice Stewart

cc:The Conference

Supreme Court of the United States
Washington, D. C. 20543

CHAMBERS OF
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

March 22, 1973

Re: No. 72-75 - Georgia v. United States

Dear Potter:

Please join me.

Sincerely,

T.M.

Mr. Justice Stewart

cc: Conference

CHAMBERS OF
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

March 22, 1973

Re: No. 72-75 - Georgia, et al. v. United States

Dear Potter:

Please join me.

Sincerely,

H. A. B.

Mr. Justice Stewart

Copies to the Conference

Supreme Court of the United States
Washington, D. C. 20543

CHAMBERS OF
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

March 22, 1973

Re: No. 72-75 - Georgia v. United States

Dear Potter:

As presently advised, I plan to circulate a dissent in this case.

Sincerely,



Mr. Justice Stewart

Copies to Conference

p.9

To: The Chief Justice
Mr. Justice Douglas
Mr. Justice Brennan
Mr. Justice White
Mr. Justice Marshall
Mr. Justice Blackmun
Mr. Justice Powell
Mr. Justice Rehnquist

2nd DRAFT

From: Stewart, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Circulated: ______

No. 72-75

Recirculated: MAR 23 1973

Georgia et al., Appellants, v. United States.	On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.

[March —, 1973]

MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Attorney General of the United States brought this suit under § 12 (d) of the Voting Rights Act as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973j (d), to enjoin the State of Georgia from conducting elections for its House of Representatives under the 1972 legislative reapportionment law. A three-judge federal court in the Northern District of Georgia agreed that certain aspects of the reapportionment law came within the ambit of § 5 of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c, and that the State, which is subject to the provisions of § 5,[1] had not obtained prior clearance from either the Attorney General or the District Court for the District of Columbia. Accordingly, and without reaching the question whether the reapportionment plan had the purpose or effect of "denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color,"

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42 U. S. C. § 1973c, the District Court issued the requested injunction.[2] The State brought this appeal. We noted probable jurisdiction, staying enforcement of the District Court judgment pending disposition of the appeal. 409 U. S. 911.

Following the 1970 Census, the Georgia Legislature set out to reapportion its State House of Representatives, State Senate, and federal congressional electoral districts. We are here concerned only with the reapportionment plan for the State House of Representatives.[3] The result of the Legislature's deliberations was a plan (hereinafter the 1971 plan) that, as compared with the prior 1968 scheme, decreased the number of districts from 118 to 105, and increased the number of multi-member districts from 47 to 49. Whereas the prior apportionment plan had generally preserved county lines, the 1971 plan did not: 31 of the 49 multi-member districts and 21 of the 56 single-member districts irregularly crossed county boundaries. The boundaries of nearly all districts were changed, and in many instances the number of representatives per district was altered. Residents of some 31 counties formerly in single-member districts were brought into multi-member districts. Under continuing Georgia law, a candidate receiving less than a majority of the votes cast for a position was required to participate in a majority runoff election. Ga. Code § 34-1513. And in the multi-member districts, each candidate was required to designate the seat for which he was running, referred to as the "numbered post." Ga. Code § 34-1015.

Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act forbids States subject to the Act from implementing any change in a "voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting" without

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first obtaining a declaratory judgment from the District Court for the District of Columbia that the proposed change "does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color," *or* submitting the plan to the Attorney General of the United States and receiving no objection within 60 days. 42 U. S. C. § 1973c. Pursuant to this requirement, the State of Georgia submitted the 1971 plan to the Attorney General on November 5, 1971. Two weeks later, a representative of the Department of Justice wrote to the State Attorney General, requesting further information needed to assess the racial impact of the tendered plan.[4] This information was received on January 6, 1972, and on March 3, 1972, the Attorney General of the United States formally objected to the State's plan. The objection letter cited the combination of multi-member districts, numbered posts, majority run-off elections, and the extensive departure from the State's prior policy of adhering to county lines. On the basis of these changes plus particular changes in the structure of potential black majority single-member districts, the Attorney General was "unable to conclude that the plan does not have a discriminatory racial effect on voting." The letter stated that the Attorney General therefore felt obligated to "interpose an objection to changes submitted by the reapportionment plans."

The State Legislature immediately enacted a new reapportionment plan and repealed its predecessor. The 1972 plan increased the number of districts from 105 to 128, and decreased the number of multi-member districts

[4] The Justice Department asked for census maps of the 1964 and 1968 House districts; the distribution of white and nonwhite population within the 1964, 1968, and 1971 districts; a history of the primary and general elections in which Negro candidates ran; data, including race, with respect to all elected state representatives; and the legislative history of all redistricting bills.

from 49 to 32. Twenty-two of the multi-member districts and 37 of the single-member districts still crossed county boundaries.

This 1972 plan was submitted to the Attorney General on March 15, and he objected on March 24. The Assistant Attorney General's letter stated, in part:

> "After a careful analysis of the Act redistricting the Georgia House of Representatives, I must conclude that this reapportionment does not satisfactorily remove the features found objectionable in your prior submission, namely, the combination of multi-member districts, numbered posts, and a majority (runoff) requirement discussed in my March 3, 1972 letter to you interposing an objection to your earlier Section 5 submission. Accordingly, and for the reasons enunciated in my March 3, 1972 letter I must, on behalf of the Attorney General, object to S. B. 690 reapportioning the Georgia House of Representatives."

When the Georgia Legislature resolved that it would take no further steps to enact a new plan, the Attorney General brought the present lawsuit.

The State of Georgia claims that § 5 is inapplicable to the 1972 House plan, both because the Act does not reach "reapportionment" and because the 1972 plan does not constitute a change from procedures "in force or effect on November 1, 1964." If applicable, the Act is claimed to be unconstitutional as applied. The State also challenges two aspects of the Attorney General's conduct of the § 5 objection procedure, claiming first that the Attorney General cannot object to a state plan without finding that it in fact has a discriminatory purpose or effect, and second that the Attorney General's objection to the 1971 plan was not made within the 60-day time period allowed for objection under the Act.

I

Despite the fact that multi-member districts, numbered posts, and a majority runoff requirement were features of Georgia election law prior to November 1, 1964, the changes that followed from the 1972 reapportionment are plainly sufficient to invoke § 5 if that section of the Act reaches the substance of those changes. Section 5 is not concerned with a simple inventory of voting procedures, but rather with the reality of changed practices as they affect Negro voters. It seems clear that the extensive reorganization of voting districts and the creation of multi-member districts in place of single-member districts in certain areas amounted to substantial departures from the electoral state of things under previous law. The real question is whether the substance of these changes undertaken as part of the state reapportionment are "standards, practices, or procedures with respect to voting" within the meaning of § 5.

The prior decisions of this Court compel the conclusion that changes of the sort included in Georgia's 1972 House reapportionment plan are cognizable under § 5. In *South Carolina* v. *Katzenbach*, 383 U. S. 301, we upheld the basic constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act. Mr. Justice Black dissented from that judgment, precisely describing the broad sweep of § 5:

> "Section 5 goes on to provide that a State covered by § 4 (b) can in no way amend its constitution or laws relating to voting without first trying to persuade the Attorney General of the United States or the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia that the new proposed laws do not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying the right to vote to citizens on account of their race or color." 383 U. S., at 356 (concurring and dissenting opinion).

The applicability of § 5 to election law changes such as those enacted by Georgia in its 1972 plan was all but conclusively established by the opinion of this Court in *Allen* v. *State Board of Elections,* 393 U. S. 544. The *Allen* opinion, dealing with four companion cases, held that § 5 applied to a broad range of voting law changes, and was constitutional as applied. With respect to the reach of § 5, we held that "[t]he legislative history on the whole supports the view that Congress intended to reach any state enactment which altered the election law of a covered State in even a minor way." *Id.,* at 566. One of the companion cases, *Fairley* v. *Patterson,* involved a claim that a change from district to at-large voting for county supervisor was a change in a "standard, practice or procedure with respect to voting." The challenged procedure was held to be covered by § 5. We noted that "[t]he right to vote can be affected by a dilution of voting power as well as by an absolute prohibition on casting a ballot. See *Reynolds* v. *Sims,* 377 U. S. 533, 555 (1964)." In holding that § 5 reached voting law changes that threatened to dilute Negro voting power, and in citing *Reynolds* v. *Sims,* we implicitly recognized the applicability of § 5 to similar but more sweeping election law changes arising from the reapportionment of state legislatures. 393 U. S., at 565–566, 583–586 (concurring and dissenting opinion of Harlan, J.).

Had Congress disagreed with the interpretation of § 5 in *Allen,* it had ample opportunity to amend the statute. After extensive deliberations in 1970 on bills to extend the Voting Rights Act, during which the *Allen* case was repeatedly discussed,[5] the Act was extended for five years,

[5] See, *e. g.,* Hearings before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 4249, H. R. 5538, and Similar Proposals, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 1, 4, 18, 83, 130–131, 133, 147–149, 154–155, 182–184, 402–454; Hearings before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary

without any substantive modification of § 5. Pub. L. 91-285, 85 Stat. 314, 315 (1970). We can only conclude, then, that *Allen* correctly interpreted the congressional design when it held that "the Act gives a broad interpretation to the right to vote, recognizing that voting includes 'all action necessary to make a vote effective.'" 393 U. S., at 565-566.

Another measure of the decisiveness with which *Allen* controls the present case is the actual practice of covered States since the *Allen* case was decided. Georgia, for example, submitted its 1971 plan to the Attorney General because it clearly believed that plan was covered by § 5. Its submission was "made pursuant to § 5," and the State Attorney General explained in his submission that the 1968 reapportionment of the Georgia House of Representatives "was not submitted because at that time, prior to *Allen* v. *Board of Elections*, . . . it was believed to be unnecessary to submit reapportionment plans to the United States Attorney General pursuant to the Voting Rights Act of 1965." When the Attorney General objected, Georgia changed its House plan and resubmitted it pursuant to § 5. Other States covered by the Act have also read *Allen* as controlling. The brief for the United States advises us that as of December 1, 1972, 381 post-*Allen* reapportionment plans had been presented to the Attorney General by various States for § 5 approval.

In the present posture of this case, the question is not whether the redistricting of the Georgia House, including extensive shifts from single- to multi-member districts,

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on Bills to Amend the Voting Rights Act, 91st Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., at 48, 195-196, 369-370, 397-398, 426-427, 469. David L. Norman, then Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, testified that, "from court decisions, all these redistricting plans are going to have to be submitted to the Attorney General for his approval because they are voting changes." Senate Hearings, *supra*, at 507.

in fact had a racially discriminatory purpose or effect. The question, rather, is whether such changes have the potential for diluting the value of the Negro vote and are within the definitional terms of § 5. It is beyond doubt that such a potential exists, cf. *Whitcomb* v. *Chavis*, 403 U. S. 124, 141-144. In view of the teaching of *Allen*,[8] reaffirmed in *Perkins* v. *Matthews*, 400 U. S.

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[8] The appellant points to language in the *Allen* opinion that, it says, left open the question of the applicability of § 5 to a state reapportionment law. The cited passage in *Allen* is as follows:

"Appellees in No. 25 [*Fairley* v. *Patterson*] also argue that § 5 was not intended to apply to a change from district to at-large voting, because application of § 5 would cause a conflict in the administration of reapportionment legislation. They contend that under such a broad reading of § 5, enforcement of a reapportionment plan could be enjoined for failure to meet the § 5 approval requirements, even though the plan had been approved by a federal court. Appellees urge that Congress could not have intended to force the States to submit a reapportionment plan to two different courts.

"We must reject a narrow construction that appellees would give to § 5 . . . . The argument that some administrative problem might arise in the future does not establish that Congress intended that § 5 have a narrow scope; we leave to another case a consideration of any possible conflict." 393 U. S., at 564-565, 569.

The caveat implicit in this language would support the appellant's position only if practical problems of administration had emerged in the period that has elapsed since *Allen* was decided. This does not appear to have been the case. The brief of the United States advises us that the Department of Justice has adopted procedures designed to minimize any conflicts between § 5 administrative review and federal court litigation based on Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment attacks upon state reapportionment plans. Where a reapportionment plan has been prescribed by federal judicial decree, the Attorney General does not review it. See *Conner* v. *Johnson*, 402 U. S. 690, 691. Where a plan has been submitted to the Attorney General and is at the same time being litigated with respect to a Fifteenth Amendment claim, the Attorney General has deferred to the judicial determination regarding racial discrimination. Finally, the number of instances presenting an administrative-judicial overlap has been small. Of the 381 reapportionments submitted to the At-

379, we hold that the District Court was correct in deciding that the changes enacted in the 1972 reapportionment plan for the Georgia House of Representatives were within the ambit of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act.[7] And for the reasons stated at length in *South Carolina* v. *Katzenbach*, 383 U. S. 301, 308–337, we reaffirm that the Act is a permissible exercise of congressional power under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment.

II

By way of implementing the performance of his obligation to pass on state submissions under § 5, the Attorney General has promulgated and published in the Federal Register certain administrative regulations, 28 CFR § 51. The appellant claims these regulations are without legislative authorization, and objects in particular to the application in the present case of two regulations which set forth the standards for decision on submissions and more fully define the 60-day time period provided in the Act.

It is true, as the appellant contends, that § 5 itself does not authorize the Attorney General to promulgate any regulations. But § 5 is also silent as to the procedures the Attorney General is to employ in deciding whether or not to object to state submissions, as to the standards governing the contents of those submissions, and as to

torney General, only 19 of the objected-to submissions were involved in litigation when submitted.

[7] Georgia has argued that § 5 approval is needed only with respect to those electoral districts in which a change in a "standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting" occurred. In an appropriate case a State might establish that a reapportionment plan left some districts unaffected by even a minor change with the potential for diluting the value of the Negro vote. We do not decide whether Georgia could show the existence of any unaffected districts in this case, and we leave that issue for consideration by the District Court on remand.

the meaning of the 60-day time period in which the Attorney General is to object, if at all. Rather than reading the statute to grant him unfettered discretion as to procedures, standards, and administration in this sensitive area, the Attorney General has chosen instead to formulate and publish objective ground rules. If these regulations are reasonable and do not conflict with the Voting Rights Act itself, then 5 U. S. C. § 301, which gives to "[t]he head of an Executive department" the power to "prescribe regulations for the government of his department, . . . [and] the distribution and performance of its business . . . ," is surely ample legislative authority for the regulations. See *United States* v. *Morehead*, 243 U. S. 607, *Smith* v. *United States*, 170 U. S. 372.

In 28 CFR § 51.19, the Attorney General has set forth the standards to be employed in deciding whether or not to object to a state submission. The regulation states that the burden of proof is on the submitting party, and that the Attorney General will refrain from objecting only if his review of the material submitted satisfies him that the proposed change does not have a racially discriminatory purpose or effect. If he is persuaded to the contrary, or if he cannot within the 60-day time period satisfy himself that the change is without a discriminatory purpose or effect, the regulation states that the Attorney General will object to the submission.[8] In

[8] 28 CFR § 51.19, in pertinent part, states that: ". . . the burden of proof on the submitting authority is the same in submitting changes to the Attorney General as it would be in submitting changes to the District Court for the District of Columbia. . . . If the Attorney General is satisfied that the submitted change does not have a racially discriminatory purpose or effect, he will not object to the change and will so notify the submitting authority. If the Attorney General determines that the submitted change has a racially discriminatory purpose or effect, he will enter an objection and will so notify the submitting authority. If the evidence as to the purpose or effect of the change is conflicting, and the Attorney General is unable to resolve the conflict within the 60-day period, he shall,

objecting to the 1971 plan, the Assistant Attorney General wrote that he was "unable to conclude that the plan does not have a discriminatory racial effect on voting." The objection letter to the 1972 plan did not specify a degree of certainty as to the plan's discriminatory impact, but instead stated that the new plan had not remedied the features found objectionable in its predecessor.

Although both objections were consistent with the Attorney General's regulations, the appellant in effect attacks the legitimacy of the regulation described above in contending that the Attorney General is without power to object unless he has actually found that the changes contained in a submission have a discriminatory purpose or effect.

In assessing this claim, it is important to focus on the entire scheme of § 5. That portion of the Voting Rights Act essentially freezes the election laws of the covered States unless a declaratory judgment is obtained in the District Court for the District of Columbia holding that a proposed change is without discriminatory purpose or effect. The alternative procedure of submission to the Attorney General "merely gives the covered State a rapid method of rendering a new state election law enforceable." *Allen* v. *State Board of Elections, supra,* at 549.

It is well established that in a declaratory judgment action under § 5, the plaintiff State has the burden of proof.[9] What the Attorney General's regulations do is

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consistent with the above-described burden of proof applicable in the District Court, enter an objection and so notify the submitting authority."

[9] The very effect of § 5 was to shift the burden of proof with respect to racial discrimination in voting. Rather than requiring affected parties to bring suit to challenge every changed voting practice, States subject to § 5 were required to obtain prior clearance before proposed changes could be put into effect. The burden of proof is on "the areas seeking relief." *South Carolina* v. *Katzenbach,* 383 U. S. 301, 335.

to place the same burden on the submitting party in a § 5 objection procedure. Though the choice of language in the objection letter sent to the State of Georgia was not a model of precision, in the context of the promulgated regulations the letter surely notified the State with sufficient clarity that it had not sustained its burden of proving that the proposed changes were free of a racially discriminatory effect. It is not necessary to hold that this allocation of the burden of proof by the Attorney General was his only possible choice under the Act, in order to find it a reasonable means of administering his § 5 obligation. Any less stringent standard might well have rendered the formal declaratory judgment procedure a dead letter by making available to covered States a far smoother path to clearance. The Attorney General's choice of a proof standard was thus at least reasonable and consistent with the Act, and we hold that his objection pursuant to that standard was lawful and effective.

The appellant's final contention is that the Attorney General's objection to the 1971 plan was untimely, and so the submitted plan should have been held by the District Court to have gone into effect. It is far from clear that this claim is not simply moot, since the state enactment establishing the 1972 plan explicitly repealed the 1971 plan,[10] and the objection to the 1972 plan was clearly within the statutory time period. In any event, the claim is without merit.

In promulgating regulations, the Attorney General dealt with several aspects of the 60-day time limit established by § 5 of the Act. The regulations provide that all calendar days count as part of the allotted period, that parties whose submissions are objected to may seek reconsideration on the basis of new information and obtain a ruling within 60 days of that request, and that

[10] See Ga. Senate Bill 690, March 9, 1972.

the 60-day period shall commence from the time the Department of Justice receives a submission satisfying the enumerated requirements. 28 CFR § 51.3 (c), (d), (b).

In the present case, the Attorney General found the initial submission of the 1971 plan incomplete under the regulations. Two weeks after receiving it, he requested additional information.[11] His letter referred to 28 CFR § 51.18, a regulation providing for a request for additional information, and noted the additional regulatory provision that the 60-day period would not commence until the information was received. The State did not submit the requested data until January 6, 1972. Under the above mentioned regulation the 60-day period commenced on that date, and the Department of Justice made its objection within 60 days—on March 3.

The appellant argues that the Attorney General has granted himself more time than the statute provides by

[11] The letter sent to the Attorney General of Georgia stated that a "preliminary examination" of the materials submitted led the Department of Justice to conclude "that the data sent to the Attorney General are insufficient to evaluate properly the changes you have submitted. In accordance with Sections 51.10 (a) (6) and 51.18 (a) of the Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 . . . would you please assist us by providing this Department the following additional information. . . ."

The promulgated regulations define in 28 CFR § 51.10 the contents of a submission. § 51.10 (a) (6) states:

"With respect to redistricting, annexation, and other complex changes, other information which the Attorney General determines is required to enable him to evaluate the purpose or effect of the change. Such other information may include items listed under paragraph (b) of this section. When such other information is required, the Attorney General shall notify the submitting authority in the manner provided in § 51.18 (a)."

Section 51.10 (b) "strongly urges" submitting authorities to produce the information enumerated to the extent it is available and relevant to the submitted changes. Virtually all of the information requested in this case, see n. 4, *supra*, falls within the enumerated categories of § 51.10 (b).

promulgating regulations suspending the time period until a complete submission is received. Here again, the question is whether the regulation is a reasonable administrative effectuation of § 5 of the Act. The judgment that the Attorney General must make is a difficult and complex one, and no one would argue that it should be made without adequate information. There is no serious claim in this case that the additional information requested was unnecessary or irrelevant to § 5 evaluation of the submitted reapportionment plan.[12] Yet if the Attorney General were denied the power to suspend the 60-day period until a complete submission were tendered, his only plausible response to an inadequate or incomplete submission would be simply to object to it. He would then leave it to the State to submit adequate information if it wished to take advantage of this means of clearance under § 5. This result would only add acrimony to the administration of § 5. We conclude, therefore, that this facet of the Attorney General's regulations is wholly reasonable and consistent with the Act.[13]

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[12] See n. 4, *supra*.

[13] The appellant contends that to allow the Attorney General to promulgate this regulation is to open the way to frivolous and repeated delays by the Justice Department of laws of vital concern to the covered States. No such conduct by the Attorney General is presented here, and by upholding the basic validity of the regulation we most assuredly do not prejudge any case in which such unwarranted administrative conduct may be shown. Furthermore, a submission to the Attorney General is not the exclusive mode of preclearance under § 5. If a State finds the Attorney General's delays unreasonable, or if he objects to the submission, the State "may still enforce the legislation upon securing a declaratory judgment in the District Court for the District of Columbia." *Allen* v. *State Board of Elections*, 393 U. S. 544, 549.

III

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is affirmed. Since, however, elections were conducted under the disputed 1972 plan by reason of this Court's stay order, it would be inequitable to require new elections at this time.

The case is remanded to the District Court with instructions that any future elections under the Georgia House reapportionment plan be enjoined unless and until the State pursuant to § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, tenders to the Attorney General a plan to which he does not object, or obtains a favorable declaratory judgment from the District Court for the District of Columbia.

It is so ordered.

wck/ss lcc 4/24/73

No. 72-75 GEORGIA v. UNITED STATES

MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.

For the reasons stated in his opinion, I agree with MR. JUSTICE WHITE that the Attorney General did not comply with § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c, and that therefore Georgia's reapportionment act should have been allowed to go into effect. It is indeed a serious intrusion, incompatible with the basic structure of our system, for federal authorities to compel a State to submit its legislation for advance review. As a minimum, assuming the constitutionality of the Act, the Attorney General should be required to comply with it explicitly and to invoke its provisions only when he is able to make an affirmative finding rather than an ambivalent one.

More fundamentally, I believe that the Court should reconsider its decision in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301 (1966), upholding the constitutionality of § 5. As Mr. Justice Black stated so forcefully in his dissent in that case, the power vested in federal

officials to veto state laws in advance of their effectiveness "distorts our constitutional structure of government." 383 U. S., at 358.[1] Nothing in the Fifteenth Amendment serves to overturn the underlying premise of the federal system that the State legislative process is an independent one. The results of that process are of course subject to challenge in federal court and under federal law, but the requirement of prior screening by federal officials, executive or judicial, works a "revolutionary innovation in American government" Allen v. Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 585 (196) (opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan), an innovation which hobbles the State lawmaking process.

The constitutional infirmities of § 5 have become ever more clear as this Court has expanded its scope. Mr. Justice Harlan had the better of the argument, it seems to me, when in Allen he contended that by its language and legislative history § 5 was directed only against "those techniques that prevented

disagreed, and in Fairley v. Patterson, 393 U. S. 544 (1969), a companion case to Allen, ruled § 5 applicable to a change from district to at-large election of county supervisors. Two years later, in Perkins v. Mathews, 400 U. S. 379 (1971), § 5 was held to apply to changes in the location of polling places, to municipal annexation of adjacent areas, and to a change from ward to at-large election of aldermen.[2]

Whatever the merit in the position that Congress had constitutional authority to order federal screening of such non-essential "devices" and poll taxes or literacy tests, federal screening of the location of polling places, of reapportionment, and particularly of annexation is markedly more intrusive. The selection of polling places and the drawing of district boundaries are necessary aspects of a democratic electoral system - a State or political subdivision may move polling places for convenience or technological necessity; it may redraw boundaries to reflect shifts in population; and a municipality may annex outlying lands

in order to secure the tax base necessary to cope with urban problems. Unlike the adoption of a poll tax or a literacy test, each of these changes is commonplace and some are unavoidable, both in the Statds and subdivisions covered by the Act and in those not covered.[3]

Because subsequent development vindicate the wisdom of Mr. Justice Black's view in Katzenbach, I would hold § 5 of the Act unconstitutional.

FOOTNOTES

1. More fully, Mr. Justice Black stated:

> "Section 5, by providing that some of the States cannot pass state laws or adopt state constitutional amendments without first being compelled to beg federal authorities to approve their policies, so distorts our constitutional structure of government as to render any distinction drawn in the Constitution between state and federal power almost meaningless." South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, 383 U.S., at 358.

2. While, as the majority points out, ante, p. 6-7, Congress may be thought to have acquiesced in Allen by reenacting the Voting Rights Act in 1970, I submit that the Court's 1971 decision in Perkins placing annexation within the scope of § 5 merits reexamination as a matter of legislative intent.

3. In Allen, supra, Mr. Justice Black addressed the punitive nature of a federal statute which singles out a few states in a manner which he described as "reminiscent of old reconstruction days," going on to say that: "I had thought that the whole nation had long since repented of the application of this 'conquered province' concept." 393 U.S., at 595.

To: The Chief Justice
Mr. Justice Douglas
Mr. Justice Brennan
Mr. Justice Stewart
Mr. Justice Marshall
Mr. Justice Blackmun
Mr. Justice Powell
Mr. Justice Rehnquist

1st DRAFT

From: White, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Circulated: 3-27-73

No. 72-75

Recirculated:

Georgia et al., Appellants, v. United States. | On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.

[April —, 1973]

Reviewed. I am inclined to join, but will still write separately

MR. JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting.

Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 provides that a State may not put into effect any change in voting qualifications or voting standards, practices or procedures until it either procures a declaratory judgment from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to the effect that the alteration does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color or submits the alteration to the Attorney General and an objection has not been interposed by that official during the ensuing 60 days. In this case, the Attorney General interposed an objection on March 24, 1972, to the March 9 reapportionment plan of the Georgia House of Representatives and shortly thereafter sued to enjoin the use of that plan on the ground that the State had obtained neither the approval of the Attorney General nor that of the District Court. The District Court held § 5 was applicable to changes in state apportionment plans and that the section prevented the March 9 reapportionment from going into effect.

I agree that in the light of our prior cases and congressional reenactment of § 5, that section must be held to reach state reapportionment statutes. Contrary to the Court, however, it is my view that the Attorney General did not interpose an objection contemplated by § 5

and that there was therefore no barrier to the March 9 reapportionment going into effect.

It is arguable from the sparse language of the Act, which merely says that the State's modification will go into effect unless the Attorney General enters an objection, that any objection whatsoever filed by that official will suffice to foreclose effectiveness of the new legislation and force the State into the District Court with the burden of proving that its law is not unconstitutional. I cannot believe, however, that Congress intended to visit upon the States the consequences of such uncontrolled discretion in the Attorney General. Surely, objections by the Attorney General would not be valid if that officer considered himself too busy to give attention to § 5 submissions and simply decided to object to all of them, to one out of 10 of them or to those filed by States with governors of a different political persuasion. Neither, I think, did Congress anticipate that the Attorney General would play dog in the manger and refuse or plead his inability to make up his mind as to whether a proposed change in election procedures would have the forbidden discriminatory effect. It is far more realistic and reasonable to assume that Congress expected the Attorney General to give his careful and good faith to § 5 submissions and within 60 days after receiving all information he deems necessary, to make up his mind as to whether the proposed change did or did not have a discriminatory purpose or effect and if it did, to object thereto.

Although the constitutionality of § 5 has long since been upheld, *South Carolina* v. *Katzenbach*, 383 U. S. 301 (1966), it remains a serious matter that a sovereign State must submit its legislation to federal authorities before it may take effect. It is even more serious to insist that it initiate litigation and carry the burden of proof as to constitutionality simply because the State has employed a particular test or device and a sufficiently

low percentage of its citizens has voted in its elections. And why should the State be forced to shoulder that burden where its proposed change is so colorless that the country's highest legal officer professes his inability to make up his mind as to its legality? If he is to object, must he not himself conclude that the proposed change will have the forbidden purpose or effect? Given such a proper objection, the matter would take on a familiar adversary cast; and there would then appear to be solid basis—at least the probable cause that a federal charge usually imports—for insisting on judicial clearance. Moreover, the issues between the State and the United States, as well as the litigative burden the State would have to bear, could be known and examined and intelligent decision made as to whether to institute suit in the District Court. As it is, the State may be left more or less at sea; for the Attorney General need merely announce, rather grandly, that he is not at all convinced that the law submitted to him is not discriminatory.

My idea as to the obligation of the Department of Justice with respect to a submission under § 5 is similar to what Congress itself has provided in § 4. Under that provision, a State otherwise covered by the Act can terminate coverage as to it by securing a declaratory judgment that no discriminatory test or device has been used during the past 10 years. In that litigation, the section goes on to provide, the Attorney General must consent to the entry of such a judgment if "he has no reason to believe" that a discriminatory test or device has been used during the 10 years preceding the filing of the action. Thus, in even the far more important context of determining whether a State is in any respect covered by the Act, the Attorney General, if he is to object to a decree favorable to the State, must have reason to believe, and so state, that tests or devices with the prohibited effect have been employed in the past.

Surely, where the issue is not termination, *vel non*, but the purpose and effect of a single statute, regulation or other modification of voting procedures, it is not untoward to insist that the Attorney General not object to the implementation of the change until and unless he has reason to believe that the amendment has the prohibited purpose or effect. He should not be able to object by simply saying that he cannot make up his mind or that the evidence is in equipoise.

March 30, 1973

No. 72-75 Georgia v. United States

Dear Potter:

I write merely to say that I have not yet decided what to do in this case.

As I have stated on more than one occasion, I consider the Voting Rights Act of 1965 - limited as it is to a handful of states rather than applying to the entire country - to be discriminatory and indefensible sectional rather than national legislation. I agree with Justice Black's dissent in Katzenbach. I have even stronger feelings as to Perkins, which extended - quite without justification in my opinion - the Act to annexation in a way that does grievous harm to the orderly development of urban communities, certainly in states like Virginia.

Yet, these are established precedents and in the end I will either join Byron's narrow dissent, or concur in the result reached in your opinion accompanied by a brief statement that I do so only by virtue of feeling bound by decisions with which I totally disagree.

I will only add, lest I be misunderstood, that I would have no objection (constitutionally or from the viewpoint of protecting the rights of all citizens to vote) to a carefully drawn Voting Rights Act which applied uniformly to all fifty states. It should exclude apportionment and annexation, and also should eliminate the offensive requirement that - as Byron suggests - states, hat in hand, obtain the consent of the Attorney General or run the gauntlet of the federal court here in the District before an act of the state legislature may go into effect. The normal procedures available for testing the validity of state statutes should have sufficed.

Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Stewart

cc: The Conference

lfp/ss lcc 3/31/73

No. 72-75 GEORGIA v. UNITED STATES

MR. JUSTICE POWELL concurring in dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE WHITE.

For the reasons stated in his opinion, I agree with Mr. Justice White that the Attorney General did not comply with § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and that therefore Georgia's reapportionment act should have been allowed to go into effect. It is indeed a serious intrusion, incompatible in the most fundamental sense with the basic structure of our federal system, to compel a state to submit its legislation for review by federal authorities in advance of its effectiveness. As a minimum, assuming the constitutionality of the Act, the Attorney General should be required to comply with it explicitly and only when he makes an affirmative evidentiary finding rather than an ambivalent one.

The constitutionality of this act, and particularly § 5 thereof has been upheld. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301 (1966).

Subsequent decisions have extended the applicability of § 5 far beyond what rationally may have been thought to be its original intendment: To legislative reapportionments in Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544 (196_), and even to annexation, the racially neutral method long used (and often the only method available) of extending the boundaries of a city to ameliorate the inevitable economic and social problems of locking an urban community within a prescribed area. Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379 (197_) Until such time as there may be a disposition of the Court to reconsider these far reaching decisions, they are precedents of this Court binding upon the states singled out by this Act and courts called upon to enforce the Act. As this is my first opportunity as a Justice of this Court to consider this Act, and particularly § 5 thereof, I nevertheless deem it appropriate to record my deep conviction that Mr. Justice Black was profoundly right in his view that § 5 "distorts" the fundamental structure of the federal system so clearly prescribed by the Constitution. While his entire dissenting opinion is commended

for those who wished to be reminded of the system of government

intended to be established by the Constitution, I quote only the

following brief exerpts:

> "Section 5, by providing that some of the States cannot pass state laws or adopt state constitutional amendments without first being compelled to beg federal authorities to approve their policies, so distorts our constitutional structure of government as to render any distintion drawn in the Constitution between state and federal power almost meaningless.
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> "Moreover, it seems to me that § 5 which gives federal officials power to veto state laws they do not like is in direct conflit with the clear command of our Constitution that 'The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government.' I cannot help but believe that the inevitable effect of any such law which forces any one of the State to entreat federal authorities in far-away places for approval of local laws before they can become effective is to create the impression that the State or States treated in this way are little more than conquered provinces." 383 U. S. at 358-360. *

* Mr. Justice Black made the relevant comment in one of his footnotes that: "The requirement that States come to Washington to their laws judged is reminiscent of the deeply resented practices used by the English Crown in dealing with the American colonies." 383 U. S. at 359, note 2.

Lest I be misunderstood by some, I emphasize that I have no doubt whatever as to the power of the Congress under the Fifteenth Amendment to enact appropriate legislation to assure that the rights of citizens to vote shall not be denied, abridged or infringed in any way "on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude." Indeed, in my view there is more than the power to enact such legislation, indeed there is a duty. Nor am I insensitive to the fact that various means, both overt and more subtle, have been employed to deny voting rights on racial grounds, and these indefensible practices have been more prevalent in some states and section of our country than in others.

My conviction that this particular act is unconstitutional is not, therefore, in any respect related to disagreement with the professed objective of assuring full equal opportunity to vote in every state and political subdivision thereof. Rather, my objections are based solely on the constitutional infirmities in the way this

not as the type of national legislation applicable to all states one would expect from the federal Congress, but to impose on a few states deemed to be the worst offenders limitations not made applicable to other states.* In addition, as eloquently stated by Mr. Justice Black, § 5 of the Act is unprecedented in the sense of compelling the few states against which the Act is directed to seek, in advance, what in effect is an advisory opinion from the federal government:

> "It is hard for me to believe that a ~~justificab~~ justiciable controversy can arise in the constitutional sense from the desire by the United States government or some of its officials to determine in advance what legislative provisions a state may enact or what constitutional amendments it may adopt." 383 U. S. at 357.

*In the subsequent case of Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, at 595, Mr. Justice Black addressed specifically the punitive nature of a federal statute which singles out a few states in a manner which he described as "reminiscent of old reconstructions days", going on to say that: "I had thought that the whole nation had long since repented of the application of this 'conquered province' concept." Speaking more affirmatively, no one can doubt the correctness of Mr. Justice Black's further statement that the Constitution would never have been ratified, nor the original colonies "willing to agree to a constitution that gave the federal government power to force one colony to go through such onerous procedure while all the other former colonies, now supposedly its sister states were allowed to retain their full sovereignty. Ibid at 596.

Moreover, opinions of this Court have added gloss to the act hardly intended by the Congress. Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Allen, spoke of the "revolutionary innovation in American government" accomplished by the Court's construction of § 5. Allen v. State Board of Education, supra at 585. He went on to say:

> "In moving against 'tests and devices' in § 4 [the Act] Congress moved only against those techniques that prevented Negroes from voting at all. Congress did not attempt to restructure state governments. The Court now reads § 5, however, as vastly increasing the sphere of federal intervention beyond that contemplated by § 4, despite the fact that the two provisions were designed k simply to interlock.
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In Perkins v. Matthews, a majority of the Court, following the logic of the earlier decisions, further extended the Act to apply to changes (i) in location of polling of places; (ii) from ward to at-large election of town aldermen, and (iii) in municipal boundaries

through annexation, bringing into the city of Canton, Mississippi, a negligible number of new voters.*

Harlan commented that "the Court's opinions case are devoid of evidence of a legislative intent to state's election law and to reach matters such as annexati affect voting only incidentally and peripherally." Perkins, supra, at 398.

Even in cases involving close and difficult questions of constitutional law, I normally feel ~~fxxx~~ bound to follow decisions of the Court with which I disagree unless and until at least a majority of the Court wished to reexamine and reconsider a constitutional question. There is often merit to finality of decision even with

*Three separate, and minor changes, in the city's boundaries by annexation, were found to violate the Act. One of these added 46 Negro voters, and no white voters; the second added 28 Negro voters and 187 white voters; and the final annexation added 8 Negro voters and 144 whites - making total of 82 new Negro voters and 331 new white voters in a city the voting population of which totaled 2,794 Negro voters and 2,052 white voters, resulting - in fact - in no alteration of the racial balance of voting strength. Perkins, supra, dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black, at 403, 404.

respect to a dubious resolution of a constitutional question, especially where - by legislation or ~~xxxxx~~ otherwise - our nation has adjusted to the decision. But it seems to me, for the reasons expressed and never adequately answered by Justices Black and ~~xxxxx~~ Harlan that the sustaining of § 5 of this Act, and its expanded interpretation, do constitute such a "revolutionary innovation in American government"*. and that a reconsideration of these cases is overdue.

*Mr. Justice Harlan dissenting, Allen v. State Board of Elections, supra at 585.

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No. 72-75 GEORGIA v. UNITED STATES

MR. JUSTICE POWELL concurring in dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE WHITE.

For the reasons stated in his opinion, I agree with Mr. Justice White that the Attorney General did not comply with § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and that therefore Georgia's reapportionment act should have been allowed to go into effect. It is indeed a serious intrusion, incompatible in a fundamental sense with the basic structure of our system, for federal authorities to compel a state to submit its legislation for advance review. As a minimum, assuming the constitutionality of the Act, the Attorney General should be required to comply with its explicitly and to invoke its provisions only when he is able to make an affirmative finding rather than an ambivalent one.

The constitutionality of this Act, and particularly § 5 thereof, has been upheld by a divided Court. South Carolina v. Katzenbach,

383 U. S. 301 (1966). Subsequent decisions have extended the applicability of § 5 far beyond what reasonably may have been thought to be its original intendment. See, e. g., Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544 (196_). And in Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379 (197_), the reach of § 5 was stretched to include annexation, the racially neutral method long used (and often the only method available) of extending the boundaries of a city ~~mk~~ to ameliorate the inevitable economic problems resulting from locking an urban community within a prescribed area. Until such time as the Court may be disposed to reconsider these far reaching decisions, they are precednts binding upon the courts called upon to enforce ~~and~~ the Act and upon the states singled out by ~~the Act.~~ its terms. ¶ As this is my first opportunity as a Justice of this Court to consider this Act, and particularly § 5 thereof, I deem it appropriate to record my conviction that Mr. Justice Black was right in his view ~~mk~~ that § 5 "distorts" the fundamental structure of the federal system so clearly prescribed by the Constitution. 11

~~While his dissenting opinion is commendable~~

to those who wish to refresh their understanding of the dual structure of government established by the Constitution. Lest I be misunderstood, I emphasize that I have no doubt as to the power of the Congress under the Fifteenth Amendment to enact appropriate legislation to assure that the rights of citizens to vote shall not be denied, abridged or infringed in any way "on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude." Indeed, in my view there is more than the power to enach such legislation, there is a duty. Nor am I insensisitive to the fact that various means, both overt and subtle, have been employed to deny voting rights on racial grounds, and these indefensible practices have been more prevalent in some states and sections of our country than in others.

My conviction that § 5 of this Act is egregiously unconstitutional is not, therefore, in any respect related to disagreement with the objective of assuring full equal opportunity to vote in every state and political subdivision thereof. Rather, my objections are

based solely on the constitutional infirmities in the way this Act was drafted and the way it has been construed. It was written, in certain of its provisions, not as the type of national legislation applicable to all states one would expect from the Federal Congress, but to impose on a few states deemed to be the worst offenders limitations and restraints not made applicable to other states.[2]

Moreover, in Perkins, supra, a majority of of the Court extended the Act to apply to changes (i) in location of polling places, (ii) from ward to at-large election of town aldermen, and (iii) in municipal boundaries through annexation, bringing into the city of Canton, Mississippi, a negligible number of new voters.[3] In dissenting, Mr. Justice Harlan commented that "the Court's opinions in both Allen and this case are devoid of evidence of a legislative intent to go beyond the state's election law and to reach matters such as annexations, which affecting voting only incidentally and peripherally." Perkins, supra, at 398.

I would have thought, until the Court spoke in <u>Allen</u> and <u>Perkins</u>, that Mr. Justice Harlan's point was unanswerable. The Act, by its language and history, was directed against the "tests and devices" and other techniques (notably "literacy tests" and "poll taxes") employed most frequently, but not solely, in some of the southern states to deny the right of minorities to vote. But § 5 has now been held to apply to conduct which is common to <u>all</u> of the states; to annexation and reapportionment, most significantly; but also to relocating polling places (a necessity as population shifts within a city or county), to changes from ward to at-large elections of city or town councilmen (a reform in municipal government long recommended by leading authorities, especially for small and medium size communities), and to any shift from single to multi-member elections of state legislators. These commonplace changes, often essential to meet neutral and non-racial needs, are not unique to the few states targeted by discriminatory legislation. They are as national in usage as state and local government itself.[4]

I normally feel ~~x~~ bound to follow prior decisions of the Court with which I disagree unless and until at least a majority wishes to reexamine and reconsider a constitutional issue. There is merit to finality of decision even with respect to a dubious resolution of a constitutional question, especially where - by ~~legsx legisx~~ legislation or otherwise - our nation has adjusted to the decision. But it seems to me, for the reasons expressed by Justices Black and Harlan, and never adequately answered, that the ~~substanx~~ sustaining of § 5 of this Act, and its expanded interpretation, do constitute a ~~x~~ "revolutionary innovation in American government".[5] A reconsideration of these cases is overdue.[6]

FOOTNOTES

1. The essence of Mr. Justice Black's reasoning ~~xx~~ is contained in the following excerpts from his opinion:

> "Section 5, by providing that some of the States cannot pass state laws or adopt state constitutional amendments without first being compelled to beg federal authorities to approve their policies, so distorts our constitutional structure of government as to render any distinction drawn in the Constitution between state and federal power almost meaningless.
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> "Moreover, it seems to me that § 5 which gives federal officials power to veto state laws they do not like is in direct conflict with the clear command of our Constitution that 'The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government.' I cannot help but believe that the inevitable effect of any such law which forces any one of the States to entreat federal authorities in far-away places for approval of local laws before they can become effective is to create the impression that the State or States treated in this way are little more than conquered provinces." 383 U. S. at 358-360.[1]

Mr. Justice Black also ~~xxxxxxxx~~ commented in one of his footnotes that: "The requirement that States come to Washington to have their laws judged is reminiscent of the deeply resented practices used by the English Crown in dealing with the American colonies." 383 U. S. at 359, note 2.

2. Three separate, and minor changes, in the city's boundaries by annexation, were found to violate the Act. One of these added 46 Negro voters, and no white voters; the second added 28 Negro voters and 187 white voters; and the final annexation added 8 Negro voters and 144 whites - making a total of 82 new Negro voters and 331 new white voters in a city the voting population of which totaled 2,794 Negro voters and 2,052 white voters. The xxx result, held to be invalid, was no alteration of the racial balance of voting strength. Perkins, supra, dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black, at 403, 404.

3. In Allen, Mr. Justice Harlan already had spoken of the "revolutionary innovation in American government" accomplished by the Court's construction of § 5. Allen v. State Board of Education, supra, at 585. He went on to say:

> "In moving against 'tests and devices' in § 4 [the Act] Congress moved only against those techniques that prevented Negroes from voting at all. Congress did not attempt to restructure state governments. The Court now reads § 5, however, as vastly increasing the sphere of federal intervention beyond that contemplated by § 4, despite the fact that the two provisions were designed simply to interlock.

* * * *

"The Court's construction of § 5 is even more surprising in light of the Act's regional application. For the statute, as the Court now construes it, deals with a problem that is national in scope. I find it especially difficult to believe that Congress would single out a handful of states as requiring stricter federal supervision concerning their treatment of a problem that may well jx be just as serious in parts of the North as it is in the South." 383 U. S. at 585, 586. (Italics supplied)

4. Who could suggest seriously, for example, that annexation or changing a pxxxxxk precinct polling location in Cairo, Illinois, or Gary, Indiana - or indeed in almost any other city - might not "have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race" (§ 5) to the same extent as such an event might have in the few states selected for this unique federal overseeing of state and local legislative action.

5. Mr. Justice Harlan dissenting, Allen v. State Board of Elections, supra at 585.

6. Mr. Justice Douglas, in his Cardozo Lecture fromx befromx before the Association of the Bar of the City of New York spoke of the duty of new Justices in relation to stare decisis:

> "The place of stare decisis in constitutional law is even more tenuous. A judge looking at a constituational decision may have compulsions to revere past history and accept what was once written. But he remembers above all else that it is the Constitution which he swore to support and defend, not the gloss which his predecessors may have put on it. So he comes to formulate his own views, rejecting some earlier ones as false and embracing others. He cannot do otherwise unless he lets men long dead and unaware of the problems of the age in which he lives do his thinking for him.
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> "This re-examination of precedent in constitutional law is a personal matter for each judge who comes along. When only one new judge is appointed during a short period; the unsettling effect in constitutional law may not be great. But when a majority of a Court is dxxxsuddenlyx suddenly reconstituted, there is likely to be a substantial unsettlement. There will be unsettlement until the new judges have taken their positions on constitutional doctrine. During that time - which may extend a decade or more - constitutional law will be in a flux. This is the necessary consequence of our system and to my mind a healthy one." The Record of the Association, Vol. 4 (1949), pp. 152-179.

lfp/ss 1cc 4/2/73

No. 72-75 GEORGIA v. UNITED STATES

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For the reasons stated in his opinion, I agree with Mr. Justice White that the Attorney General did not comply with § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and that therefore Georgia's reapportionment act should have been allowed to go into effect. It is indeed a serious intrusion, incompatible in a fundamental sense with the basic structure of our system for federal authorities to compel a state to submit its legislation for advance review. As a minimum, assuming the constitutionality of the Act, the Attorney General should be required to comply with its explicitly and to invoke its provisions only when he is able to make an affirmative finding rather than an ambivalent one.

The constitutionality of this Act, and particularly § 5 thereof, has been upheld by a divided Court. South Carolina v. Katzenbach,

383 U. S. 301 (1966). Subsequent decisions have extended the applicability of § 5 far beyond what reasonably may have been thought to be its original intendment. See, e. g., Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544 (196_). And in Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379 (197_), the reach of § 5 was stretched to include annexation, the racially neutral method long used (and often the only method available) of extending the boundaries of a city to ameliorate the inevitable economic problems resulting from locking an urban community within a prescribed area. Until such time as the Court may be disposed to reconsider these far reaching decisions, they are precednts binding upon the courts called upon to enforce and Act and upon the states singled out by the Act. As this is my first opportunity as a Justice of this Court to consider this Act, and particularly § 5 thereof, I deem it appropriate to record my conviction that Mr. Justice Black was right in his view that § 5 "distorts" the fundamental structure of the federal system so clearly prescribed by the Constitution. While his entire dissenting opinion is commended

to those who wish to refresh their understanding of the dual structure of government established by the Constitution. I will quote only the following excerpts:

> "Section 5, by providing that some of the States cannot pass state laws or adopt state constitutional amendments without first being compelled to beg federal authorities to approve their policies, so distorts our constitutional structure of government as to render any distinction drawn in the Constitution between state and federal power almost meaningless.
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> "Moreover, it seems to me that § 5 which gives federal officials power to veto state laws they do not like is in direct conflict with the clear command of our Constitution that 'The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government.' I cannot help but believe that the inevitable effect of any such law which forces any one of the States to entreat federal authorities in far-away places for approval of local laws before they can become effective is to create the impression that the State or States treated in this way are little more than conquered provinces." 383 U. S. at 358-360.[1]

Lest I be misunderstood, I emphasize that I have no doubt whatever as to the power of the Congress under the Fifteenth Amendment to enact appropriate legislation to assure that the rights of citizens to vote shall not be denied, abridged or infringed in any way "on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude."

Indeed, in my view there is more than the power to enact such legislation, there is a duty. Nor am I insensitive to the fact that various means, both overt and subtle, have been employed to deny voting rights on racial grounds, and these indefensible practices have been more prevalent in some states and sections of our country than in others.

My conviction that this § 5 of this Act is egregiously unconstitutional is not, therefore, in any respect related to disagreement with the objective of assuring full equal opportunity to vote in every state and political subdivision thereof. Rather, mym objections are based solely on the constitutional infirmities in the way this Act was drafted and the way it has been construed. In was written, in certain of its provisions, not as to type of national legislation applicable to all states one would expect from the Federal Congress, but to impose on a few states deemed to be the worst offenders limitations and restraints not made applicable to other states.[2]

which the Act is directed to seek, in advance, what in effect is an advisory opinion from the federal government as to validity of their legislative acts:

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Moreover, opinions of this Court have added gloss to the Act hardly intended by the Congress. In <u>Perkins</u> v. <u>Matthews</u>, a majority of the Court, following the logic of the earlier decisions, extended the Act to apply to changes (i) in location of polling places, (ii) from ward to at-large election of town alderman, and (iii) in municipal boundaries through annexation, bringing into the city of Canton, Mississippi, a negligible number of new voters.[3] In dissenting Mr. Justice Harlan commented that "the Court's opinions in both <u>Allen</u> and this case are devoid of evidence of a legislative intent to go beyond the state's election law and to reach matters such as annexations, which affecting voting only incidentally and peripherally." <u>Perkins</u>, <u>supra</u>, at 39[illegible].

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> "In moving against 'tests and devices' in § 4 [the Act] Congress moved only against those techniques that prevented Negroes from voting at all. Congress did not attempt to restructure state governments. The Court now reads § 5, however, as vastly increasing the sphere of federal intervention beyond that contemplated by § 4, despite the fact that the two provisions were designed simply to interlock.
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employed most frequently, but not soley, in some of the southern states to deny the right of minorities to vote. But § 5 has now been held to apply to conduct which is common to all of the states; annexation and reapportionment, most significantly; but also to relocating polling places (a necessity as population shifts within a city or county), to changes from ward to at-large elections of city or town concilmen (a reform in municipal government long recommended by leading authorities, especially for small and medium size communities), and to any shift from single to multi-member elections of state legislators. These commonplace changes, often essential to meet neutral and non-racial needs, are not unique to the few states singled out as the targets of this discriminatory legislation. They are as national in usage as state and local government itself.[4]

In cases involving close and difficult questions of constitutional law, I normally feel bound to follow prior decisions of the Court with which I disagree unless and until at least

a majority wishes to reexamine and reconsider the constitutional xxxxxx issue. There is often merit to finality of decision even with respect to a dubious resolution of a constitutional question, especially where - by legislation or otherwise - our nation has adjusted to the decision. But it seems to me, for the reasons expressed by Justices Black and Harlan, and never adequate answered, that the sustaining of § 5 of this Act, and its expanded interpretation, do constitute a "revolution innovation in American government".[5] A reconsideration of these cases is overdue.[6]

FOOTNOTES

1. Mr. Justice Black also ~~xxxxxxxx~~ commented in one of his footnotes that: "The requirement that States come to Washington to have their laws judged is reminiscent of the deeply resented practices used by the English Crown in dealing with the American colonies." 383 U. S. at 359, note 2.

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My conviction that ~~this~~ § 5 of this Act is egregiously unconstitutional is not, therefore, in any respect related to disagreement with the objective of assuring full equal opportunity to vote in every state and political subdivision thereof. Rather, my~~s~~ objections are based solely on the constitutional infirmities in the way this Act was drafted and the way it has been construed. In was written, in certain of its provisions, not as ~~to~~ the type of national legislation applicable to all states one would expect from the Federal Congress, but to impose on a few states deemed to be the worst offenders limitations and restraints not made applicable to other states.[2]

In addition, as stated by Mr. Justice Black, § 5 of the Act is unprecedented in ~~the sense of compelling the~~ a its requirement that these few states ~~against~~

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Moreover, opinions of this Court have added gloss to the Act hardly intended by the Congress. In Perkins v. Matthews, a majority of the Court, following the logic of the earlier decisions, extended the Act to apply to changes (i) in location of polling places, (ii) from ward to at-large election of town alderman, and (iii) in municipal boundaries through annexation, bringing into the city of Canton, Mississippi, a negligible number of new voters. In dissenting Mr. Justice Harlan commented that "the Court's opinions in both Allen and this case are devoid of evidence of a legislative intent to go beyond the state's election law and to reach matters such as annexations, which affecting voting only incidentally and peripherally." Perkins, supra, at 398.

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No. 72-75 GEORGIA v. UNITED STATES

MR. JUSTICE POWELL concurring in dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE WHITE.

For the reasons stated in his opinion, I agree with Mr. Justice White that the Attorney General did not comply with § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and that therefore Georgia's reapportionment act should have been allowed to go into effect. It is indeed a serious intrusion, incompatible in a fundamental sense with the basic structure of our system, for federal authorities to compel a state to submit its legislation for advance review. As a minimum, assuming the constitutionality of the Act, the Attorney General should be required to comply with it explicitly and to invoke its provisions only when he is able to make an affirmative finding rather than an ambivalent one.

The constitutionality of this Act, ~~and particularly § 5 thereof,~~ has been upheld by a divided Court, South Carolina v. Katzenbach,

383 U. S. 301 (1966). Subsequent decisions have extended the applicability of § 5 far beyond what reasonably may have been thought to be its original intendment. See, e. g., Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544 (196__). ~~And~~ In Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379 (197__), the reach of § 5 was stretched to include annexation, the racially neutral method long used (and often the only method available) of extending the boundaries of a city ~~of~~ to ameliorate the inevitable economic problems resulting from locking an urban community within a prescribed area. Until such time as the Court may be disposed to reconsider these far reaching decisions, they are precednts binding upon the courts called upon to enforce ~~and~~ Act and upon the states singled out by ~~the Act~~. As this is my first opportunity as a Justice of this Court to consider this Act, and particularly § 5 thereof, I deem it appropriate to record my conviction that Mr. Justice Black was right in his view ~~of~~ that § 5 "distorts" the fundamental structure of the federal system so clearly prescribed by the Constitution. ~~While his entire dissenting opinion is commended~~

~~to those who wish to refresh their understanding of the dual structure of government established by the Constitution.~~

Lest I be misunderstood, I emphasize that I have no doubt as to the power of the Congress under the Fifteenth Amendment to enact appropriate legislation to assure that the rights of citizens to vote shall not be denied, abridged or infringed in any way "on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude." Indeed, in my view there is more than the power to enact such legislation, there is a duty. Nor am I insensisitive to the fact that various means, both overt and subtle, have been employed to deny voting rights on racial grounds, and these indefensible practices have been more prevalent in some states and sections of our country than in others.

My conviction that § 5 of this Act is egregiously unconstitutional is not, therefore, in any respect related to disagreement with the objective of assuring full equal opportunity to vote in every state and political subdivision thereof. Rather, my objections are

based solely on the constitutional infirmities in the way this

Act was ~~drafted~~ structured and the way it has been construed. It was written,

LFP,Jr.:psf 4/19/73 Rider A, p. 4 Ga. v. U.S.

As Mr. Justice Black stated, the power vested in federal officials to veto state laws in advance of their effectiveness "distorts our constitutional structure of government." Allen, supra, at 358. Moreover, the Act is unprecedented in the sense that it imposes on a few selected states, deemed to be the worst offenders, limitations and prior restraints not made applicable to other states.[2]

of new voters.[2] In dissenting Mr. Justice Harlan commented that "the Court's opinions in both Allen and this case are devoid of evidence of a legislative intent to go beyond the state's election law and to reach matters such as annexations, which affected voting only incidentally and peripherally." Perkins, supra, at 398.

I would have thought, until the Court spoke in Allen and Perkins, that Mr. Justice Harlan's ~~point~~ analysis was unanswerable. The Act, by its language and history, was directed against the "tests and devices" and other techniques (notably "literacy tests" and "poll taxes") employed most frequently, but not solely, in some of the southern states to deny or abridge the right of minorities to vote. But § 5 has now been held to apply to conduct which is common to all of the states; to annexation and reapportionment, most significantly; but also to relocating polling ~~k~~ places (a necessity as ~~opx~~ population shifts within a city or county), to changes from ward to at-large elections of city or town councilmen (a reform in municipal government long recommended by leading authorities, especially for small and medium size communities), and to any shift from single to multi-member elections ~~sx~~ of state legislators. These commonplace changes, often essential to meet neutral and non-racial needs, are not unique to the few states targeted by this discriminatory legislation. They are as national in usage as state and local government itself.[4]

I normally feel x bound to follow prior decisions of the Court with which I disagree unless and until at least a majority wishes to reexamine and reconsider a constitutional issue. There is merit to finality of decision even with respect to a dubious resolution of a constitutional question, especially where - by legex legis legislation or otherwise - our nation has adjusted to the decision. But it seems to me, for the reasons expressed by Justices Black and Harlan, and never adequately answered, that the substain sustaining of § 5 of this Act, and its expanded interpretation, do constitute a x "revolutionary innovation in American government".[5]

A reconsideration ~~of these cases~~ of the validity of this innovation is overdue.[6]

3. Three separate, and minor changes, in the city's boundaries by annexation, were found to violate the Act. One of these added 46 Negro voters, and no white voters; the second added 28 Negro voters and 187 white voters; and the final annexation added 8 Negro voters and 144 whites - making a total of 82 new Negro voters and 331 new white voters in a city the voting population of which totaled 2, 794 Negro voters and 2, 052 white voters. The xxx result, held to be invalid, was no alteration of the racial balance of voting strength. Perkins, supra, dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black, at 403, 404.

4. In Allen, Mr. Justice Harlan already had spoken of the "revolutionary innovation in American government" accomplished by the Court's construction of § 5. Allen v. State Board of Education, supra, at 585. He went on to say:

> "In moving against 'tests and devices' in § 4 [the Act] Congress moved only against those techniques that prevented Negroes from voting at all. Congress did not attempt to restructure state governments. The Court now reads § 5, however, as vastly increasing the sphere of federal intervention beyond that contemplated by § 4, despite the fact that the two provisions were designed simply to interlock.

Footnote

* * * *

"The Court's construction of § 5 is even more surprising in light of the Act's regional application. For the statute, as the Court now construes it, deals with a problem that is national in scope. I find it especially difficult to believe that Congress would single out a handful of states as requiring stricter federal supervision concerning their treatment of a problem that may well ~~jx~~ be just as serious in parts of the North as it is in the South." 383 U. S. at 585, 586. (Italics supplied)

5 Who could suggest seriously, for example, that annexation or changing a ~~pxxxxxk~~ precinct polling location in Cairo, Illinois, or Gary, Indiana - or indeed in almost any other city - might not "have the effect of denying or abriding the right to vote on account of race" (§ 5) to the same extent as such an event might have in the few states selected for this unique federal overseeing of state and local legislative action.

6 8. Mr. Justice Harlan dissenting, Allen v. State Board of Elections, supra at 585.

7 8. Mr. Justice Douglas, in his Cardozo Lecture ~~from~~ ~~before~~ before the Association of the Bar of the City of New York spoke of the duty of new Justices in relation to stare decisis:

> "The place of stare decisis in constitutional law is even more tenuous. A judge looking at a constituational decision may have compulsions to revere past history and accept what was once written. But he remembers above all else that it is the Constitution which he swore to support and defend, not the gloss which his predecessors may have put on it. So he comes to formulate his own views, rejecting some earlier ones as false and embracing others. He cannot do otherwise unless he lets men long dead and unaware of the problems of the age in which he lives do his thinking for him.
>
> "This re-examination of precedent in constitutional law is a personal matter for each judge who comes along. When only one new judge is appointed during a short period; the unsettling effect in constitutional law may not be great. But when a majority of a Court is ~~suddenly~~ suddenly reconstituted, there is likely to be a substantial unsettlement. There will be unsettlement until the new judges have taken their positions on constitutional doctrine. During that time - which may extend a decade or more - constitutional law will be in a flux. This is the necessary consequence of our system and to my mind a healthy one." The Record of the Association, Vol. 4 (1949), pp. 152-179.

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Kelly
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Dissent (A)

No. 72-75 GEORGIA v. UNITED STATES

MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.

For the reasons stated in his opinion, I agree with MR. JUSTICE WHITE that the Attorney General did not comply with § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c, and that therefore Georgia's reapportionment act should have been allowed to go into effect. It is indeed a serious intrusion, incompatible with the basic structure of our system, for federal authorities to compel a State to submit its legislation for advance review.* As a minimum, assuming the constitutionality of the Act, the Attorney General should be required to comply with it explicitly and to invoke its provisions only when he is able to make an affirmative finding rather than an ambivalent one.

GEORGIA v. UNITED STATES

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* As Mr. Justice Black stated, the power vested in federal officials under § 5 of the Act to veto state laws in advance of their effectiveness "distorts our constitutional structure of government." South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 358 (1966) (dissenting opinion). A similar appraisal was made by Mr. Justice Harlan, who characterized § 5, as construed by the Court, as "a revolutionary innovation in American government." Allen v. Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 585 (1969) (concurring in part and dissenting in part). I have no doubt as to the power of the Congress under the Fifteenth Amendment to enact appropriate legislation to assure that the rights of citizens to vote shall not be denied, abridged or infringed in any way "on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." Indeed, in my view there is more than a power to enact such legislation, there is a duty. My disagreement is with the unprecedented requirement of advance review of state or local legislative acts by federal authorities, rendered the more noxious by its selective application in only a few states.

2, 3

To: The Chief Justice
Mr. Justice Douglas
Mr. Justice Brennan
Mr. Justice Stewart
Mr. Justice Marshall
Mr. Justice Blackmun
Mr. Justice Powell
Mr. Justice Rehnquist

2nd DRAFT

From: White, J.

Circulated: ________

Recirculated: 4-19-73

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 72-75

Georgia et al., Appellants, v. United States. | On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.

[April —, 1973]

MR. JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting.

Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 provides that a State may not put into effect any change in voting qualifications or voting standards, practices or procedures until it either procures a declaratory judgment from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to the effect that the alteration does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color or submits the alteration to the Attorney General and an objection has not been interposed by that official during the ensuing 60 days. In this case, the Attorney General interposed an objection on March 24, 1972, to the March 9 reapportionment plan of the Georgia House of Representatives and shortly thereafter sued to enjoin the use of that plan on the ground that the State had obtained neither the approval of the Attorney General nor that of the District Court. The District Court held § 5 was applicable to changes in state apportionment plans and that the section prevented the March 9 reapportionment from going into effect.

I agree that in the light of our prior cases and congressional reenactment of § 5, that section must be held to reach state reapportionment statutes. Contrary to the Court, however, it is my view that the Attorney General did not interpose an objection contemplated by § 5

and that there was therefore no barrier to the March 9 reapportionment going into effect.

It is arguable from the sparse language of the Act, which merely says that the State's modification will go into effect unless the Attorney General enters an objection, that any objection whatsoever filed by that official will suffice to foreclose effectiveness of the new legislation and force the State into the District Court with the burden of proving that its law is not unconstitutional. I cannot believe, however, that Congress intended to visit upon the States the consequences of such uncontrolled discretion in the Attorney General. Surely, objections by the Attorney General would not be valid if that officer considered himself too busy to give attention to § 5 submissions and simply decided to object to all of them, to one out of 10 of them or to those filed by States with governors of a different political persuasion. Neither, I think, did Congress anticipate that the Attorney General could discharge his statutory duty by simply stating that he had not been persuaded that a proposed change in election procedures would not have the forbidden discriminatory effect. It is far more realistic and reasonable to assume that Congress expected the Attorney General to give his careful and good faith to § 5 submissions and within 60 days after receiving all information he deems necessary, to make up his mind as to whether the proposed change did or did not have a discriminatory purpose or effect and if it did, to object thereto.

Although the constitutionality of § 5 has long since been upheld, *South Carolina* v. *Katzenbach*, 383 U. S. 301 (1966), it remains a serious matter that a sovereign State must submit its legislation to federal authorities before it may take effect. It is even more serious to insist that it initiate litigation and carry the burden of proof as to constitutionality simply because the State has employed a particular test or device and a sufficiently

low percentage of its citizens has voted in its elections. And why should the State be forced to shoulder that burden where its proposed change is so colorless that the country's highest legal officer professes his inability to make up his mind as to its legality? If he is to object, must he not himself conclude that the proposed change will have the forbidden purpose or effect? Given such a proper objection, the matter would take on a familiar adversary cast; and there would then appear to be solid basis—at least the probable cause that a federal charge usually imports—for insisting on judicial clearance. Moreover, the issues between the State and the United States, as well as the litigative burden the State would have to bear, could be known and examined and intelligent decision made as to whether to institute suit in the District Court. As it is, the State may be left more or less at sea; for the Attorney General need merely announce that he is not at all convinced that the law submitted to him is not discriminatory.

My idea as to the obligation of the Department of Justice with respect to a submission under § 5 is similar to what Congress itself has provided in § 4. Under that provision, a State otherwise covered by the Act can terminate coverage as to it by securing a declaratory judgment that no discriminatory test or device has been used during the past 10 years. In that litigation, the section goes on to provide, the Attorney General must consent to the entry of such a judgment if "he has no reason to believe" that a discriminatory test or device has been used during the 10 years preceding the filing of the action. Thus, in even the far more important context of determining whether a State is in any respect covered by the Act, the Attorney General, if he is to object to a decree favorable to the State, must have reason to believe, and so state, that tests or devices with the prohibited effect have been employed in the past.

Surely, where the issue is not termination, *vel non,* but the purpose and effect of a single statute, regulation or other modification of voting procedures, it is not untoward to insist that the Attorney General not object to the implementation of the change until and unless he has reason to believe that the amendment has the prohibited purpose or effect. He should not be able to object by simply saying that he cannot make up his mind or that the evidence is in equipoise.

As Mr. Justice Black stated, the power vested in federal officials to veto state laws in advance of their effectiveness "distorts our constitutional structure of government." Allen, supra, at 358. Moreover, the Act is unprecedented in the sense that it imposes on a few selected states, deemed to be the worst offenders, limitations and prior restraints not made applicable to other states.[2]

2. In Allen, supra, at 595, Mr. Justice Black addressed the punitive nature of a federal statute which singles out a few states in a manner which he described as "reminiscent of old reconstruction days," going on to say that: "I had thought that the whole nation had long since repented of the application of this 'conquered province' concept."

No. 72-75 GEORGIA v. UNITED STATES

MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.

For the reasons stated in his opinion, I agree with MR. JUSTICE WHITE that the Attorney General did not comply with § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c, and that therefore Georgia's reapportionment act should have been allowed to go into effect. It is indeed a serious intrusion, incompatible with the basic structure of our system, for federal authorities to compel a State to submit its legislation for advance review.* As a minimum, assuming the constitutionality of the Act, the Attorney General should be required to comply with it explicitly and to invoke its provisions only when he is able to make an affirmative finding rather than an ambivalent one.

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Supreme Court of the United States
Washington, D. C. 20543



CHAMBERS OF
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

April 19, 1973

Re: No. 72-75 - Georgia v. United States

Dear Byron:

Please join me.

Sincerely,

WR

Mr. Justice White

Copies to the Conference

Memo to: William C. Kelly

From: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. April 19, 1973

No. 72-75 Georgia v. United States

Here is a draft of a proposed opinion concurring in Mr. Justice White's dissent in the above case.

I would welcome your comments and suggestions.

I have not checked citations and quotations since dictating the draft.

L. F. P., Jr.

LFP,Jr.:psf
cc: Messrs. Hammond and Wilkinson

April 26, 1973

Re: No. 72-75 Georgia v. United States

Dear Byron:

Please join me in your dissent, which I am supplementing by a brief additional statement being circulated today.

Sincerely,

Mr. Justice White

cc: The Conference

To: The Chief Justice
Mr. Justice Douglas
Mr. Justice Brennan
Mr. Justice Stewart
Mr. Justice White
Mr. Justice Marshall
Mr. Justice Blackmun
Mr. Justice Rehnquist

From: Powell, J.

Circulated: APR 26 1973

Recirculated: ________

1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 72-75

Georgia et al., Appellants, v. United States. | On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.

[May —, 1973]

MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.

For the reasons stated in his opinion, I agree with MR. JUSTICE WHITE that the Attorney General did not comply with § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c, and that therefore Georgia's reapportionment act should have been allowed to go into effect. It is indeed a serious intrusion, incompatible with the basic structure of our system, for federal authorities to compel a State to submit its legislation for *advance* review.*

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APR 26 1973

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Mr. Justice [illegible]as
Mr. Justice [illegible]an
Mr. Justice [illegible]rt
Mr. Justice [illegible]e
Mr. Justice [illegible]all
Mr. Justice [illegible]mun
Mr. Justice [illegible]quist

From: Powell, J.

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pp 1, 2

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3rd DRAFT

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No. 72-75

Georgia et al., Appellants, v. United States. | On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.

[April —, 1973]

MR. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom MR. JUSTICE POWELL and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, dissenting.

Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 provides that a State may not put into effect any change in voting qualifications or voting standards, practices or procedures until it either procures a declaratory judgment from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to the effect that the alteration does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color or submits the alteration to the Attorney General and an objection has not been interposed by that official during the ensuing 60 days. In this case, the Attorney General interposed an objection on March 24, 1972, to the March 9 reapportionment plan of the Georgia House of Representatives and shortly thereafter sued to enjoin the use of that plan on the ground that the State had obtained neither the approval of the Attorney General nor that of the District Court. The District Court held § 5 was applicable to changes in state apportionment plans and that the section prevented the March 9 reapportionment from going into effect.

I agree that in the light of our prior cases and congressional reenactment of § 5, that section must be held to reach state reapportionment statutes. Contrary to the Court, however, it is my view that the Attorney Gen-

eral did not interpose an objection contemplated by § 5 and that there was therefore no barrier to the March 9 reapportionment going into effect.

It is arguable from the sparse language of the Act, which merely says that the State's modification will go into effect unless the Attorney General enters an objection, that any objection whatsoever filed by that official will suffice to foreclose effectiveness of the new legislation and force the State into the District Court with the burden of proving that its law is not unconstitutional. I cannot believe, however, that Congress intended to visit upon the States the consequences of such uncontrolled discretion in the Attorney General. Surely, objections by the Attorney General would not be valid if that officer considered himself too busy to give attention to § 5 submissions and simply decided to object to all of them, to one out of 10 of them or to those filed by States with governors of a different political persuasion. Neither, I think, did Congress anticipate that the Attorney General could discharge his statutory duty by simply stating that he had not been persuaded that a proposed change in election procedures would not have the forbidden discriminatory effect. It is far more realistic and reasonable to assume that Congress expected the Attorney General to give his careful and good faith consideration to § 5 submissions and within 60 days after receiving all information he deems necessary, to make up his mind as to whether the proposed change did or did not have a discriminatory purpose or effect and if it did, to object thereto.

Although the constitutionality of § 5 has long since been upheld, *South Carolina* v. *Katzenbach*, 383 U. S. 301 (1966), it remains a serious matter that a sovereign State must submit its legislation to federal authorities before it may take effect. It is even more serious to insist that it initiate litigation and carry the burden of proof as to constitutionality simply because the State

has employed a particular test or device and a sufficiently low percentage of its citizens has voted in its elections. And why should the State be forced to shoulder that burden where its proposed change is so colorless that the country's highest legal officer professes his inability to make up his mind as to its legality? If he is to object, must he not himself conclude that the proposed change will have the forbidden purpose or effect? Given such a proper objection, the matter would take on a familiar adversary cast; and there would then appear to be solid basis—at least the probable cause that a federal charge usually imports—for insisting on judicial clearance. Moreover, the issues between the State and the United States, as well as the litigative burden the State would have to bear, could be known and examined and intelligent decision made as to whether to institute suit in the District Court. As it is, the State may be left more or less at sea; for the Attorney General need merely announce that he is not at all convinced that the law submitted to him is not discriminatory.

My idea as to the obligation of the Department of Justice with respect to a submission under § 5 is similar to what Congress itself has provided in § 4. Under that provision, a State otherwise covered by the Act can terminate coverage as to it by securing a declaratory judgment that no discriminatory test or device has been used during the past 10 years. In that litigation, the section goes on to provide, the Attorney General must consent to the entry of such a judgment if "he has no reason to believe" that a discriminatory test or device has been used during the 10 years preceding the filing of the action. Thus, in even the far more important context of determining whether a State is in any respect covered by the Act, the Attorney General, if he is to object to a decree favorable to the State, must have reason to believe, and so state, that tests or devices with

the prohibited effect have been employed in the past. Surely, where the issue is not termination, *vel non*, but the purpose and effect of a single statute, regulation or other modification of voting procedures, it is not untoward to insist that the Attorney General not object to the implementation of the change until and unless he has reason to believe that the amendment has the prohibited purpose or effect. He should not be able to object by simply saying that he cannot make up his mind or that the evidence is in equipoise.

To: The Chief Justice
Mr. Justice Douglas
Mr. Justice Brennan
Mr. Justice Stewart
Mr. Justice White
Mr. Justice Marshall
Mr. Justice Blackmun
Mr. Justice Rehnquist

From: Powell, J.
Circulated: APR 26 1973
Recirculated:

1st DRAFT

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[May —, 1973]

MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.

For the reasons stated in his opinion, I agree with MR. JUSTICE WHITE that the Attorney General did not comply with § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c, and that therefore Georgia's reapportionment act should have been allowed to go into effect. It is indeed a serious intrusion, incompatible with the basic structure of our system, for federal authorities to compel a State to submit its legislation for *advance* review.*

*As Mr. Justice Black stated, the power vested in federal officials under § 5 of the Act to veto state laws in advance of their effectiveness "distorts our constitutional structure of government." *South Carolina* v. *Katzenbach*, 383 U. S. 301, 358 (1966) (dissenting opinion). A similar appraisal was made by Mr. Justice Harlan, who characterized § 5, as construed by the Court, as "a revolutionary innovation in American government." *Allen* v. *Board of Elections*, 393 U. S. 544, 585 (1969) (concurring in part and dissenting in part). I have no doubt as to the power of the Congress under the Fifteenth Amendment to enact appropriate legislation to assure that the rights of citizens to vote shall not be denied, abridged or infringed in any way "on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." Indeed, in my view there is more than a power to enact such legislation, there is a duty. My disagreement is with the unprecedented requirement of advance review of state or local legislative acts by federal authorities, rendered the more noxious by its selective application in only a few States.

As a minimum, assuming the constitutionality of the Act, the Attorney General should be required to comply with it explicitly and to invoke its provisions only when he is able to make an affirmative finding rather than an ambivalent one.

To: Mr. Justice Douglas
Mr. Justice Brennan
Mr. Justice Stewart
Mr. Justice White
Mr. Justice Marshall
Mr. Justice Blackmun
Mr. Justice Powell
Mr. Justice Rehnquist

From: The Chief Justice

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[May —, 1973]

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, concurring.

I concur in the result reached by the Court but I do so under the mandate of *Allen* v. *State Board of Elections*, 393 U. S. 544 (1969). I have previously expressed my reservations as to the correctness of that holding. See *Perkins* v. *Matthews*, 400 U. S. 379, 397 (1971) (BLACKMUN, J., concurring).

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[May 7, 1973]

MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.

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THE C. J.	W. O. D.	W. J. B.	P. S.	B. R. W.	T. M.	H. A. B.	L. F. P.	W. H. R.
			3/5/73					
Concurring 5/4/73 1st draft	Join PS 3/21/73	Join PS 3/21/73	Circulated 3/21/73 1st draft	will dissent 3/22/73 1st draft 3/27/73	Join PS 3/22/73	Join PS 3/22/73	Join BRW 4/26/73	Join BRW 4/19/73
			2nd draft 3/23/73	2nd draft 4/19/73 3rd draft 4/27/73			Concurring dissent	

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[n.d.]

1. Law to reapportionment
see Allen 393 U.S. at 569

2. Black's dissent in Allen - p 595
("Reconstruction days")