The Medical Assumption at the Foundation of \textit{Roe v. Wade} and Its Implications for Women's Health

Clarke Forsythe

\textit{Americans United for Life}

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The Medical Assumption at the Foundation of *Roe v. Wade* & Its Implications for Women’s Health

Clarke Forsythe*

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I. Introduction

The Supreme Court's abortion decisions in *Roe v. Wade*[^1] and *Doe v. Bolton*[^2] have been subjected to extensive criticism over the past forty years.[^3] Scholars have criticized the Court’s mistreatment of: common law history,[^4] American legal history,[^5] the abortion

[^5]: See *STEPHEN KRAVEN, ABORTION: POLITICS, MORALITY, AND THE CONSTITUTION* 91 (1984) (“The Court tried to cut out any historical basis for its critics to object to its holding. . . . Believing it adequately demonstrated a liberty of abortion at common law, it now established the basis for that liberty within the unique confines of the written Constitution . . . .”); John Keown, *Back to the Future of Abortion Law: Roe’s Rejection of America’s History and Traditions*, 22 Issues L. & Med. 3, 3 (2006) (questioning Justice Blackmun’s conclusion “that a constitutional right to abortion was consistent with [the history of abortion in
statutes of the nineteenth century, the use of sociological evidence that was not part of any record, the Hippocratic Oath, existing prenatal injury, wrongful death and fetal homicide law, existing state and federal court decisions on a right to abortion.


7. See Henry J. Friendly, The Courts and Social Policy: Substance and Procedure, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 21, 36–37 (1978) (providing that "no evidence was offered at the hearing before the three-judge court" in Roe and that the Court's conclusion in Roe "rested entirely on materials not of record in the trial court").

8. See Martin Arbagi, Roe and the Hippocratic Oath, in ABORTION AND THE CONSTITUTION: REVERSING ROE V. WADE THROUGH THE COURTS 159, 163 (1987) (discussing how Justice Blackmun did not "cite any primary sources" in the section of Roe "dealing specifically with the Hippocratic oath").

9. See Gregory J. Roden, Prenatal Tort Law and the Personhood of the Unborn Child: A Separate Legal Existence, 16 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 207, 208 (2003) (examining "the state of prenatal tort and wrongful death law at the time the Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade"); David Kader, The Law of Tortious Prenatal Death Since Roe v. Wade, 45 Mo. L. REV. 639, 640 (1980) ("The ideological history of prenatal injury law, and the more recent development of prenatal death law has consistently moved toward the affirmation of the unborn as a 'person' in the law, with a parallel history evidenced in criminal abortion legislation."); William J. Maledon, Note, The Law and the Unborn Child: The Legal and Logical Inconsistencies, 46 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 349, 358 (1971) ("Where the child is born alive and then subsequently dies as a result of injuries received prior to birth, the courts which have considered the question are almost unanimous in allowing the child's estate to bring an action for wrongful death.").

"Although the cause of action for wrongful death is purely statutory, the child born alive has always been considered a 'person' regardless of how short a time he actually survives." Id. For the state of legal protection before Roe see Case Comment, The Role of the Law of Homicide in Fetal Destruction, 56 IOWA L. REV. 658, 659 n.8 (1971) (citing ten states with statutes "defining feticide as a homicide").

10. See Richard Gregory Morgan, Roe v. Wade and the Lesson of Pre-Roe Case Law, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1727 (1979) (discussing various state and federal court decisions on a right to abortion).
precedent,\textsuperscript{11} and the unborn child’s status as a human being or person in the law.\textsuperscript{12} Others have criticized the workability of the Court’s doctrine\textsuperscript{13} and its impact on women.\textsuperscript{14} Recently, Professor

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{11} See Edward Lazarus, \textit{Closed Chambers: The First Eyewitness Account of the Epic Struggles Inside the Supreme Court} 367 (1998) (discussing how the Court “failed in its responsibility to justify its ruling or even clarify the source of its authority”).
  \item \textsuperscript{12} See Michael Stokes Paulsen, \textit{The Plausibility of Personhood}, 74 Ohio St. L.J. 13, 14 (2013) (considering “the constitutional question of the legal personhood status of living human fetuses \textit{in utero}”).
  \item \textsuperscript{13} See, e.g., Clarke D. Forsythe, \textit{Abuse of Discretion: The Inside Story of Roe v. Wade} 150–52 (2013) [hereinafter \textit{Abuse of Discretion}] (discussing the various problems with the Doe “health” definition, which expanded the abortion “right” beyond viability); Mary Ann Glendon, \textit{From Culture Wars to Building a Culture of Life, in The Cost of “Choice”: Women Evaluate the Impact of Abortion} 3, 5 (Erika Bachiochi ed., 2004) (“Doe’s broad definition of ‘health’ spelled the doom of statutes designed to prevent the abortion late in pregnancy of children capable of surviving outside the mother’s body unless the mother’s health was in danger.”); Clarke D. Forsythe & Bradley N. Kehr, \textit{A Road Map Through the Supreme Court’s Back Alley}, 57 Vill. L. Rev. 45, 46 (2012) (“The main obstacle to effective health and safety regulations is not a lack of majority support, but rather the Supreme Court’s abortion doctrine, which was misguided in its inception and has been contradictory in its application.”); James Bopp, Jr., & Richard E. Coleson, \textit{The Right to Abortion: Anomalous, Absolute, and Ripe for Reversal}, 3 BYU J. Pub. L. 181, 183 (1989) (“The special treatment for the abortion right violates the principles underlying the rule of law, the foundation stone of our constitutional system.”). See generally John T. Noonan, Jr., \textit{A Private Choice: Abortion in America in the Seventies} (1979) (discussing twenty inquiries that explore the history and nature of the abortion right).
  \item \textsuperscript{14} See Clarke D. Forsythe & Stephen B. Presser, \textit{The Tragic Failure of Roe v. Wade: Why Abortion Should Be Returned to the States}, 10 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 85, 109 (2005) (“The medical and sociological data now make plain that induced abortion has undermined the health of women in myriad ways: physically, psychologically, medically, and relationally.”); Glendon, \textit{supra} note 13, at 10 (“Where abortion is concerned, medical and psychological consequences
Randy Beck has published several articles that focus on the arbitrary nature of the viability rule that the Court has never adequately justified, a focus shared by others before him. Professor Stephen Gilles has analyzed how the Court has never justified or explained its life-or-health exception after viability. Others have criticized the search for a new rationale for the Court's abortion doctrine, whether it is found in the Equal Protection Clause or the Nineteenth Amendment.

abound.

15. See Randy Beck, The Essential Holding of Casey: Rethinking Viability, 75 UMKC L. Rev. 713, 725 (2007) (considering and rejecting “three possible explanations for the viability standard”). Beck argues that “[t]he inadequacy of these three rationales shows that the Court has failed to present a principled defense of viability as the controlling line.” Id.; see also Randy Beck, Gonzales, Casey, and the Viability Rule, 103 NW. U. L. Rev. 249, 252 (2009) (“Under the reasoning of Casey, if the Court cannot offer a principled constitutional rationale for requiring the ability to survive ex utero as a condition for state protection, then the Court should abandon the viability rule as an illegitimate and arbitrary line, inappropriate for judicial imposition.”); Randy Beck, Self-Conscious Dicta: The Origins of Roe v. Wade’s Trimester Framework, 51 Am. J. Legal Hist. 505, 520 (2011) (providing a discussion of the issue of the duration of abortion rights from a cover memorandum that accompanied Justice Blackmun’s second draft of Roe); Memorandum from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to the Conference, Re: No. 70-18—Roe v. Wade (Nov. 21, 1972) (quoting Justice Blackmun as saying “[y]ou will observe that I have concluded that the end of the first trimester is critical. This is arbitrary, but perhaps any other selected point, such as quickening or viability, is equally arbitrary”) (on file at the Library of Congress, in the Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Manuscript Division, Box 151, Folder 6); Randy Beck, State Interests and the Duration of Abortion Rights, 44 McGeorGe L. Rev. 31, 38 (2013) (“While the Court alluded to ‘logical and biological justifications’ for ‘State regulation protective of fetal life after viability,’ it nowhere explained those justifications or why they took on added weight at the point when the fetus crossed the viability threshold.”).

16. See Mark Tushnet, Two Notes on the Jurisprudence of Privacy, 8 Const. Comment. 75, 80 (1991) (stating that the coherence of the distinction between viability and non-viability is rarely examined and that the concept of viability is problematic); John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale L.J. 920, 924–25 (1973) (discussing the inadequacy of the viability rule).

17. See Stephen G. Gilles, Roe’s Life-or-Health Exception: Self-Defense or Relative-Safety?, 85 Notre Dame L. Rev. 525, 527 (2010) (“As formulated in Roe, the exception turns out to be deeply ambiguous in rationale and scope.”).

18. See Erika Bachiochi, Embodied Equality: Debunking Equal Protection...
II. The Medical Premise of Roe v. Wade

Too little attention, however, has been paid over the past forty years to the complete lack of a factual record in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton, and to the Court's fundamental medical assumption that drove the outcome. The decision and opinions were driven by the medical claim that "abortion was safer than childbirth," which was raised for the first time in the briefs in the Supreme Court and without any lower court record. That assumption was at the very heart of the deliberations and decisions in the abortions cases. The Court in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health specifically referred to it...
as “Roe’s factual assumption” and said that “the State retains an interest in ensuring the validity” of the assumption.

The medical premise directly and profoundly shaped virtually every major aspect of Roe and Doe, including the creation of the trimester system and the prohibition of health and safety regulations in the first trimester. Because of this medical assumption, the Justices extended the right to abortion throughout pregnancy. It was key to the Court’s historical rationale for a “right” to abortion. Because of this notion, the Justices gave abortion providers complete discretion to manage any issues of health and safety, and they prohibited public-

23. Id. at 430 n.12.
24. Id.
25. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163 (providing that the state’s interest in regulating abortion becomes “compelling” “at approximately the end of the first trimester”).
26. Id.
27. With respect to the State’s important and legitimate interest in the health of the mother, the ‘compelling’ point, in light of present medical knowledge, is at approximately the end of the first trimester. This is so because of the now-established medical fact, referred to above at 149, that until the end of the first trimester mortality in abortion may be less than mortality in normal childbirth.
28. See id. at 163–64 (“If the State is interested in protecting fetal life after viability, it may go so far as to proscribe abortion during that period [after viability], except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.”).
29. See id. at 148–49 & n.44 (“Mortality rates for women undergoing early [legal] abortions... appear to be as low as... rates for normal childbirth. Consequently, any interest of the State in protecting the woman from an inherently hazardous procedure, except when it would be equally dangerous for her to forgo it, has largely disappeared.”); Id. at 151 (“Because medical advances have lessened this concern, at least with respect to abortion in early pregnancy, they argue that with respect to such abortions the laws can no longer be justified by any state interest. There is some scholarly support for this view of original purpose.”).
health officials from regulating abortion in the first trimester.\(^{30}\) This medical assumption was the most consequential factual assumption of the abortion decisions of 1973, and it has been assumed to be true in subsequent abortion decisions by the Court.\(^{31}\)

**A. The Impact of Roe and Doe**

Of course, what the public knows as “Roe v. Wade” is really two cases, *Roe v. Wade* and *Doe v. Bolton*. The companion case of *Doe v. Bolton* has been regularly ignored over the past forty years, despite its significant impact on abortion policy in the United States. The Court held that *Roe* and *Doe* “are to be read together.”\(^{32}\) In *Roe*, the Court held that the states could prohibit abortion after fetal viability, “except where it is necessary . . . for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.”\(^{33}\) Then, in *Doe*, the Justices defined “health” as “all factors—physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman’s age—relevant to the well-being of the patient.”\(^{34}\) The “health exception” after viability swallowed the supposed prohibition after viability. For forty years, the “health exception” after viability has meant emotional well-being without limits.\(^{35}\) Though some dispute that

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30. See id. at 164 (“For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending physician.”).


33. *Id.* at 164–65.


35. See id. (“[T]he medical judgment may be exercised in the light of all factors . . . relevant to the well-being of the patient.”).
the “health” exception is a constitutional requirement, federal courts have imposed it as a constitutional requirement to invalidate abortion laws, including post-viability regulations. As Laurence Tribe wrote shortly after the decisions, “in [Roe and Doe] . . . [the Court] carried that doctrine [of substantive due process] to lengths few observers had expected, imposing limits on permissible abortion legislation so severe that no abortion law in the United States remained valid.”

B. The Mistake that Left the Justices with No Record

Roe and Doe actually began as a procedural mistake that left the Justices with no evidentiary record. The Court took the two cases in April 1971, when Justices Black and Harlan were still on the Court, not to decide the abortion issue but to decide the application of Younger v. Harris and, to a lesser extent,

36. See Women’s Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1036, 1037 (1998) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Our conclusion that the statutory phrase at issue in Doe was not vague because it included emotional and psychological considerations in no way supports the proposition that, after viability, a mental health exception is required as a matter of federal constitutional law.”).

37. See Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d 283, 299 (3d Cir. 1984) (“It is clear from the Supreme Court cases that ‘health’ is to be broadly defined. As the Court stated in Doe v. Bolton, the factors relating to health include those that are ‘physical, emotional, psychological, familial, [as well as] the woman’s age.’”), aff’d, Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986); see also Michael J. Tierney, Post-Viability Abortion Bans and the Limits of the Health Exception, 80 Notre Dame L. Rev. 465, 470 (2004) (“While there are many places to look for guidance, the Sixth Circuit was wrong to look to Vuitch and Doe to establish that a mental health exception was constitutionally mandated. Both of these decisions were statutory interpretations and not constitutional mandates.”); Brian D. Wassom, Comment, The Exception that Swallowed the Rule? Women’s Medical Professional Corporation v. Voinovich and the Mental Health Exception to Post-Viability Abortion Bans, 49 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 799, 800 (1999) (“Federal courts, however, have been wary to uphold such laws unless they contain an unambiguous health exception—one that, in the view of many courts, must allow doctors almost limitless discretion to determine what ‘health’ means in any given context.”).

38. Abuse of Discretion, supra note 13, at 1.
Dombrowski v. Pfister to the procedural aspects of Roe and Doe. Then, in September 1971, Justices Black and Harlan abruptly retired due to ill health. That flipped the balance of the Court, and a temporary majority of four Justices—Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall—resolved or disregarded the Younger issue and decided to use the two cases to declare a right to abortion before the Black and Harlan vacancies could be filled. That is how the Justices ended up with two cases that had no trial or any evidentiary record on abortion or its implications, disregarding a long line of cases holding that the Court will not decide constitutional questions without an adequate record.

40. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).

41. See Abuse of Discretion, supra note 13, at 19 (“Younger intersected with the abortion cases filed in federal court against state laws from 1969 to 1972 because a doctor who was prosecuted for abortion in state court might file a case in federal court to block the state prosecution—the kind of scenario with which Younger was concerned.”).

42. See id. at 37 (“One of the decisive moments came in September 1971, about three months before the first oral arguments, when Justices Black and Harlan abruptly retired, within a week of each other, due to poor health.”).

43. See id. at 43. (“The Black and Harlan vacancies gave the four Justices who favored striking down the abortion laws—Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, and Stewart—a great incentive to decide Roe and Doe without the votes of Powell and Rehnquist.”).

44. See, e.g., Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 321–22 (1991) (“We possess no factual record of an actual or imminent application of [the statute] sufficient to present the constitutional issues in ‘clean-cut and concrete form.’” (citations omitted)); Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 546 (1976) (“We have often declined to decide important questions regarding ‘the scope and constitutionality of legislation’ in the absence of ‘an adequate and full-bodied record.’” (citations omitted)); Pub. Affairs Assocs. v. Rickover, 369 U.S. 111, 113 (1962) (per curiam) (“Adjudication of such problems, certainly by way of resort to a discretionary declaratory judgment, should rest on an adequate and full-bodied record. The record before us is woefully lacking in these requirements.”); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132 (1937) (“Courts deal with cases upon the basis of the facts disclosed, never with nonexistent and assumed circumstances.”); City of Hammond v. Schappi Bus Line, 275 U.S. 164, 171–72 (1927) (“Before any of the questions suggested, which are both novel and of far reaching importance, are passed upon by this Court, the facts essential to their decision should be definitely found by the lower courts upon adequate evidence.”).
Justice Blackmun told this story to at least two people, and it is confirmed by the briefs, the Justices’ papers, and the oral arguments. Justice Blackmun wrote to Chief Justice Rehnquist in 1987:

I remember that the old Chief [Warren Burger] appointed a screening committee, chaired by Potter [Stewart], to select those cases that could (it was assumed) be adequately heard by a Court of seven. I was on that little committee. We did not do a good job. Potter pressed for Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton to be heard and did so in the misapprehension that they involved nothing more than an application of Younger v. Harris. How wrong we were.45

With no evidentiary record in either Roe or Doe, the Justices were left with a large vacuum and the temptation to rely upon their personal experiences, prejudices, and hunches in deciding the abortion cases. And, in that evidentiary vacuum, the Justices were susceptible to untested theories of law, history, and medicine.46

C. The Source of the Medical Mantra

One of those untested theories was the medical notion that “abortion was safer than childbirth.” Up through the 1950s, neither leading abortion advocates nor Planned Parenthood claimed that “abortion was safer than childbirth.”47

45. Letter from Justice Blackmun, U.S. Supreme Court, to Chief Justice Rehnquist (July 16, 1987) (on file at the Library of Congress, Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 151, Folder 3, and Box 1407, Folder 13); see also ABUSE OF DISCRETION, supra note 13, at 18 (quoting Justice Blackmun’s July 20 letter to Justice Rehnquist).

46. Federal Judge Richard Posner recently suggested that he erred in Crawford v. Marion County when he upheld a state voter identification law despite the insufficiency of the record. Judge Posner said: “I think we did not have enough information. And of course it illustrates the basic problem that I emphasize in [my new] book. We judges and lawyers, we don’t know enough about the subject matters that we regulate, right?” Josh Gerstein, Judge: My Voter ID Ruling Was Wrong, JOSH GERSTEIN BLOG (Oct. 11, 2013, 6:04 PM), http://politi.co/165Y0qQ (last visited Jan. 22, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).

47. See ABUSE OF DISCRETION, supra note 13, at 159 (discussing where “the mantra” came from).
The source of the claim is apparently an April 1961 report by Christopher Tietze in the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA). Thereafter, attorneys for abortion advocates made the claim in numerous cases in the 1960s in an attempt to influence the courts to legalize abortion. Eventually, Tietze's paper made its way into court decisions. The California Supreme Court's 1969 decision in People v. Belous, the first state court decision to invalidate a state abortion law, was the first court to make the claim. That decision actually cited three of the medical sources that the Supreme Court later cited in Roe and Doe. By the time the Court considered Roe and Doe, the claim that "abortion is safer than childbirth" was so frequently repeated that it had become a mantra.

48. See Christopher Tietze, Legal Abortion in Eastern Europe, 175 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1149, 1149 (1961) ("These low [abortion] death rates compare favorably with mortality from all complications of pregnancy, childbirth, and the puerperium . . . .").

49. See, e.g., Poe v. Menghini, 339 F. Supp. 986, 994 n.24 (D. Kan. 1972) (stating that "Plaintiffs' evidence indicates that the abortion procedure is among the safest of surgical procedures," citing, without reference, "a survey" that revealed that abortion "is 2.7 times safer than childbirth"); Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293, 301 (E.D. Wis. 1970) (citing the Belous decision, not any medical study); People v. Belous, 458 P.2d 194, 200–01 n.7 (Cal. 1969) (stating "[i]t is now safer for a woman to have a hospital therapeutic abortion during the first trimester than to bear a child" (citing Tietze, supra note 48, at 1152)); Vera Kolblova, Legal Abortion in Czechoslovakia, 196 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 371 (1966); K. Mehland, Combating Illegal Abortion in the Socialist Countries of Europe, 13 WORLD MED. J. 84 (1966).


51. See id. at 206 (invalidating section 274 of the California Penal Code, which made it a crime to perform an abortion unless it was necessary to preserve the woman's life); Abortion, 64 NW. J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 393, 394 (1973) (providing that People v. Belous "was the first decision to declare a criminal abortion statute unconstitutional").

52. Compare Belous, 458 P.2d at 201 n.7 (citing Tietze, supra note 48, at 1152; Kolblova, supra note 49; Mehland, supra note 49), with Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 149 n.44 (1973) (citing Tietze, supra note 48, at 1152), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 216 n.5 (1973) (citing Tietze, supra note 48, at 1152; Kolblova, supra note 49; Mehland, supra note 49).
D. No Factual Record in the Abortion Cases

Both Roe and Doe were decided without trials or evidentiary records. The factual records consisted merely of a complaint, an affidavit, and motions to dismiss that addressed legal, not factual, issues. In two hour-long hearings, the judges addressed procedural and jurisdictional issues more than they addressed substantive questions. And then a direct appeal to the Supreme Court was made without any intermediate appellate review.

Realizing that Doe’s lack of any evidentiary record was a problem, Sarah Weddington’s co-counsel in the Supreme Court, Roy Lucas, stressed the need to fill that vacuum at a strategy meeting of attorneys in Manhattan in July 1971, as historian David Garrow recounts. Lucas sought to rectify the lack of a factual medical record by filing “a supplementary appendix of more than four dozen prior court rulings and medical journal papers that all-told came to an imposing 477 pages, far larger than the brief itself,” as Garrow has described it. He filled the “supplemental appendix” with sixty articles, fifteen of which dealt


54. See Abuse of Discretion, supra note 13, at 160 (discussing the lack of a factual record in Roe and Doe).

55. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 113 (1973) (“Appellants directly appealed to this Court on the injunctive rulings, and appellee cross-appealed from the District Court’s grant of declaratory relief to Roe and Hallford.”); see also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 179 (1973) (“The appellants, claiming entitlement to broader relief, directly appealed to this Court.”).

56. See David J. Garrow, Liberty and Sexuality: The Right to Privacy and the Making of Roe v. Wade 493 (1994) (providing that Lucas “emphasized how regrettable it was that Doe’s crucial but as yet unsuccessful challenge to the Georgia statute’s hospitalization requirement was going forward without any extensive trial court evidentiary record having been developed”).

57. See id. (“Data on New York’s now almost one-year-old experience with nonhospital procedures might be a potentially persuasive substitute if it was featured prominently enough in the Doe briefs, Lucas advised.”).

58. Id. at 500.
with “medical” and “sociological” issues.\textsuperscript{59} Nine articles addressed medicine. But none of these nine articles claimed that abortion was safer than childbirth.\textsuperscript{60} And none of these was among those that the Court eventually cited.\textsuperscript{61} Many of the articles were not peer-reviewed,\textsuperscript{62} some were not even published,\textsuperscript{63} and none was part of the record.\textsuperscript{64} So, the mantra was first presented in the briefs filed in the Supreme Court in the summer of 1971 before the first oral arguments on December 13, 1971. The truth of the claim that “abortion was safer than childbirth” was directly

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{59} See \textit{id.} at 500–01 (“Lucas included former Justice Tom Clark’s law review essay as well as medical studies by supportive doctors such as Bob Hall and Christopher Tietze . . . .”).
  \item \textsuperscript{60} See \textit{ABUSE OF DISCRETION, supra note 13, at 160} (discussing medical articles and essays that Roy Lucas included in the supplemental appendix in \textit{Doe}).
  \item \textsuperscript{62} Tietze, \textit{supra} note 48; See Forsythe & Kehr, \textit{supra} note 13, at 52 (“It is not an analysis of data, must less a peer-reviewed study, but a report on conference papers addressing statistics from the 1940s and 1950s from Eastern European countries.”).
  \item \textsuperscript{63} Harvey & Pyle, \textit{supra} note 61.
  \item \textsuperscript{64} See \textit{ABUSE OF DISCRETION, supra note 13, at 160} (discussing the lack of record).
\end{itemize}
disputed at oral argument, and it was repeatedly pointed out that neither Roe nor Doe had any record.65

The mantra was based on abortion mortality numbers from Soviet Bloc countries.66 But there were no reliable data from these countries, and no reliable data that these rates were comparable or that they showed that “abortion was safer than childbirth.” No existing text book on obstetrics and gynecology claimed that “abortion was safer than childbirth.”67 Nevertheless, Justices Blackmun and Douglas ended up citing seven medical references between them to support the mantra in Roe and Doe.68 All except one of the seven sources relied on 1950s statistics from Soviet Bloc countries; but even those were not peer-reviewed studies, just raw numbers.69 They cited, for example, Tietze’s 1961 JAMA article, but this was merely a report of an international conference on abortion from May 1960 and conversations by the author, Christopher Tietze, with a “Dr. Herschler” about Hungarian data.70 Another is merely a letter to the editor.71 Several of the articles do not even claim to compare

65. Id.; see also id. at 161 (“The Justices never questioned the truthfulness of the mantra or of the proffered medical data, though it was disputed by the attorneys for Texas and Georgia.”).

66. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 149 n.44 (1973) (citing Tietze, supra note 61 (Japan, Czechoslovakia, Hungary) and Tietze, supra note 48, at 1152 (Eastern Europe); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 216 n.5 (1973) (citing Kolblova, supra note 49; Mehland, supra note 49). See ABUSE OF DISCRETION, supra note 13, at 163–70, for a critical analysis of these articles.

67. See ABUSE OF DISCRETION, supra note 13, at 170 n.60. (“But no textbooks are cited in Roe to support the mantra because the existing obstetrical textbooks published before 1972 never made the claim . . . .”)

68. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 149 n.44 (citing medical articles in majority opinion of Justice Blackmun); Doe, 410 U.S. at 216 n.5 (citing medical articles in concurring opinion of Justice Douglas).

69. That article was Malcom Potts, Postconceptive Control of Fertility, 8 INTL. J. OF GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 957 (1970). This article “contains no data and no supporting studies,” and “[v]irtually all assertions on data are undocumented and have no citations whatsoever.” Forsythe & Kehr, supra note 13, at 53.

70. Tietze, supra note 48.

71. Kolblova, supra note 49. Vera Kolblova’s “article’ is really a six-paragraph letter to the editor” in which she “comments on Czech abortion law since 1957.” Forsythe & Kehr, supra note 13, at 53.
childbirth mortality and abortion mortality. Finally, there were
data from New York City, derived from ten months of New York
State’s legalization of abortion after July 1970. But this was
hotly disputed for one key reason: 55.5% of the abortions in those
months were performed on out-of-state residents who were lost to
follow-up, making it impossible to monitor their condition. A
one-page clerk’s memo in Justice Blackmun’s papers
acknowledged this criticism, concluding that it was
“devastating.” But Justice Blackmun merely corrected the
clerk’s grammar, as he was known to do, and proceeded to cite
the New York numbers in his final Roe opinion. The mantra—and the data from the Soviet Bloc countries—were challenged as
unreliable by the attorneys for Texas and Georgia in their briefs
and at the oral arguments in December 1971, and the
rearguments in October 1972.

72. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 149 n.44 (1973) (citing Potts, supra note 69, at 967; Christopher Tietze, United States: Therapeutic Abortions, 1963 to
(1973) (citing Kloblova, supra note 66; Mehland, supra note 66).
73. Abortion Mortality, 20 M ORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 208, 208
(1971).
74. See Forsythe & Kehr, supra note 13, at 53 (discussing the arguments
that critics made regarding “a June 1971 report on data from New York City
supposedly documenting the city’s experience since New York legalized abortion
on July 1, 1970”).
75. Memorandum from Law Clerk to Justice Blackmun (on file with the
76. See LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY
BLACKMUN’S SUPREME COURT JOURNEY 107 (2005) (“And he himself reviewed his
clerks’ work, not only correcting their spelling and punctuation but also
checking the accuracy of the citations in the opinions they drafted for him. No
other justice engaged in this level of detailed review.”).
78. See ABUSE OF DISCRETION, supra note 13, at 170–71 (discussing how the
contrary data was ignored by the Court).
E. Impact of the Medical Mantra

Unfortunately, the adoption of the medical mantra by the Court in Roe that “abortion was safer than childbirth” has had at least four negative results.

1. The Public Health Vacuum

From the 1960s to the 1980s, Henry J. Friendly was considered one of the greatest federal judges never to sit on the U.S. Supreme Court. From 1959 until his death in March 1986, Judge Richard Posner has written that “Friendly’s opinions and academic writings, in field after field, proposed revisions and clarifications of doctrines that time after time the Supreme Court gratefully adopted.” Both Justices William Brennan and John Paul Stevens considered Friendly one of the greatest federal judges. So, it was significant that Friendly was assigned in 1969 to hear a federal court challenge to the New York State abortion law, one of twenty plus cases filed in the federal courts between 1969 and 1972 to challenge state abortion laws. Friendly, who favored the legalization of abortion by the state legislature,

79. See DAVID M. DORSEN, HENRY FRIENDLY: GREATEST JUDGE OF HIS ERA 356 (2012) (“Many, including Justices John Paul Stevens and Antonin Scalia, have coupled Friendly with Hand as the two greatest lower-court federal judges who never sat on the Supreme Court.”).
82. See DORSEN, supra note 79, at 356 (discussing “the many extravagant, but warranted, compliments paid to Friendly”).
84. See A. Raymond Randolph, Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Address at the Barbara K. Olson Memorial Lecture: Before Roe v. Wade: Judge Friendly’s Draft Abortion Opinion (Nov. 11, 2005), in 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1035, 1036 (2006) (discussing how Judge Friendly was one of the judges assigned to a three-judge district court to hear the case brought by Roy Lucas in Hall v. Lefkowitz).
drafted an opinion in April and May 1970, which rejected the extension of *Griswold v. Connecticut* to abortion. He would have upheld the constitutionality of the New York State abortion law.

But Friendly's draft opinion never saw the light of day. When New York State legalized abortion in May 1970, the case was dismissed as moot, and Friendly's opinion was left in his personal papers for thirty-six years, apparently open to the public but little noticed until 2006. Friendly's draft opinion stated:

> [T]he decision what to do about abortion is for the elected representatives of the people, not for three, or even nine, appointed judges . . . . The legislature can make choices among [various abortion policies], observe the results, and act again as observation may dictate. Experience in one state may benefit others . . . . In contrast a court can only strike down a law, leaving a vacuum in its place.

That's exactly what *Roe v. Wade* did.

The Justices' medical assumption was directly responsible for the Justices' prohibition of health and safety regulations in the first trimester, when ninety percent of abortions are done. After *Roe* and *Doe*, the Justices proceeded between 1974 and 1980 to affirm invalidation or deny certiorari in three cases with clinic regulations. The implications have been serious, as recent incidents demonstrate:

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85. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

86. See Randolph, supra note 84, at 1038 ("Judge Friendly viewed abortion as another matter entirely, having nothing to do with privacy of the *Griswold* variety.").

87. See id. at 1040 ("For we cannot say the New York legislature lacked a rational basis for considering that abortion causes such harm.").

88. See id. at 1035 (noting that no one knows "Judge Friendly wrote an opinion in the first abortion-rights case ever filed in federal court" because that opinion was never published).

89. See id. at 1037 (stating that the *Hall v. Lefkowitz* case was dismissed and no opinion was issued, after the New York legislature amended the statute to allow abortion on demand during the first twenty-four weeks of pregnancy).

90. Id. at 1040–41.

91. Forsythe & Kehr, supra note 13, at 51.

92. See Friendship Med. Ctr., Ltd. v. Chi. Bd. of Health, 505 F.2d 1141, 1143 (7th Cir. 1974) (invalidating "regulations which describe in substantial detail conditions, equipment, and procedures that medical facilities offering
Investigative officials in February 2010 found “deplorable and unsanitary” conditions and numerous health and safety violations in the Philadelphia abortion clinic of Dr. Kermit Gosnell. The Philadelphia District Attorney charged Gosnell with murder in the death of an abortion patient. He was tried in March 2013, and convicted on May 13, 2013.  

After Alexandra Nunez died in January 2010 from a botched abortion by Dr. Robert Hosty at his A-1 Women’s Center in Queens, New York, the State of New York finally revoked his license two years later. 

In July 2011, a jury in Orlando, Florida awarded $36.7 million in damages against abortion provider Dr. James Pendergraft for profound injuries to a child who survived a late-term abortion.

Abortions must comply with, without regard to the trimester of pregnancy involved), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1975); Sendak v. Arnold, 429 U.S. 968 (1976), aff’d 416 F. Supp. 22, 22–23 (S.D. Ind.) (declaring unconstitutional the part of the Indiana abortion statute that requires all abortions, including those in the first trimester of pregnancy, to be performed “in a hospital or a licensed health facility”); Coe v. Gerstein, 376 F. Supp. 695, 696 (S.D. Fla. 1973) (holding that Florida’s “approved facility” requirements “are constitutionally invalid because they make no distinction between the first trimester of pregnancy... and the latter trimesters where the State may impose regulations reasonably related to the preservation and protection of maternal health”), appeal dismissed, 417 U.S. 279 (1974), and affirming denial of injunction sub nom. Poe v. Gerstein, 417 U.S. 281 (1974). 


• In the summer of 2011, the Chicago Tribune found six deaths and 4,000 injuries in Illinois abortion clinics that were never reported to the Illinois Department of Health.\(^{96}\)

• Healthy twenty-four-year-old Tonya Reaves died in July 2012, at Northwestern Memorial Hospital after an elective abortion at a clinic on South Michigan Avenue in Chicago. A wrongful death suit was filed and settled by Planned Parenthood.\(^{97}\)

• A healthy twenty-nine-year-old woman, Jennifer Morbelli, died in January 2013, after an abortion at thirty-three weeks of pregnancy at an abortion clinic in Germantown, Maryland.\(^{98}\)

• Twenty-two-year-old Lakisha Wilson died on March 28, 2014, after complications from an abortion on March 21, 2014, at the Preterm Clinic on Shaker Boulevard in Cleveland, Ohio.\(^{99}\)


Though the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and the Fifth Circuit have allowed health and safety regulations to go into effect in forty years, the Supreme Court has yet to approve health and safety regulations in the first trimester.

2. The Expansion to Viability (and Beyond) and the Risks of Late-Term Abortions

After Roe and Doe were reargued on October 11, 1972, Justice Blackmun distributed his second draft opinion on November 21, 1972, which emphasized the end of the first trimester (twelve weeks) as the “decisive” limit to the right to abortion. The Justices then began to negotiate over the scope of the abortion right they were creating. By early December, Justices Powell and Marshall had persuaded Justice Blackmun to expand the right by sixteen weeks—four whole months—from twelve weeks to twenty-eight weeks of pregnancy. There was never any briefing, or argument, on viability or its medical implications. The word viability was not mentioned even once.

100. See Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Bryant, 222 F.3d 157, 159 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding that South Carolina’s regulation establishing standards for licensing abortion clinics “serves a valid state interest”), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1191 (2001); Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Comm’r, S.C. Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Control, 317 F.3d 357, 371 (4th Cir. 2002) (finding constitutional South Carolina’s reporting and licensing requirements for abortion clinics); Women’s Med. Ctr. of Nw. Hous. v. Bell, 248 F.3d 411, 423 (5th Cir. 2001) (concluding that the annual 300 abortion threshold set by Texas “for subjecting abortion facilities to licensing bears some rational relationship to the state interest in protecting the health and welfare of Texas abortion patients”).

101. ABUSE OF DISCRETION, supra note 13, at 134; see also id. at 133–34 (“You will observe that I have concluded that the end of the first trimester is critical. This is arbitrary, but perhaps any other selected point, such as quickening or viability, is equally arbitrary.” (quoting Justice Blackmun’s second draft opinion distributed on November 21, 1972)).

102. Id. at 140–42; see also id. at 138–39 (discussing Justices Marshall and Powell’s lobbying, which led to Blackmun’s memo in which he proposed viability and asked for reactions to his suggestion). After Justice Blackmun had received the responses, he “finally responded with another Memo to the Conference dated December 15, 1972, which indicated that he would change the draft to adopt viability.” Id. at 139.
during the four hours of argument in December 1971 and October 1972.\(^\text{103}\)

Blackmun’s third draft of December 21, 1972, only four weeks before the decisions were publicly released, expanded the right to viability.\(^\text{104}\) The scope of the abortion right that the Justices created in *Roe* and *Doe* isolates the United States as one of only four nations out of 195 in the world that allows abortion for any reason after fetal viability. Those four are China, North Korea, Canada, and the United States.\(^\text{105}\) Although Justice Powell played a pivotal role in influencing Justice Blackmun to expand the abortion right to viability, Justice Powell later told his biographer that *Roe* and *Doe* were “the worst opinions I ever joined.”\(^\text{106}\)

It is important to recognize that the viability rule is directly connected to the state’s interest in fetal life.\(^\text{107}\) The viability rule is about the size and significance of the fetus. But the viability rule was not formulated with any serious consideration of maternal health or the implications for maternal health.\(^\text{108}\) There is almost no discussion in *Roe* or *Doe* of the implications of expanding the right to viability for maternal health, and there was no evidentiary record to assess the maternal health implications, though the attorney for the Georgia plaintiffs told

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104. See Garrow, *supra* note 56, at 585–86 (“Here I have tried to recognize the dual state interests of protecting the mother’s health and of protecting potential life.” (quoting Justice Blackmun’s December 21, 1972 cover memo) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

105. *Abuse of Discretion, supra* note 13, at 126 nn.4–5.


107. See *Roe v. Wade*, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (“With respect to the State’s important and legitimate interest in potential life, the ‘compelling’ point is at viability.”).

108. See *Abuse of Discretion, supra* note 13, at 145 (“The shift to viability ignored the medical statistics that the Justices had, indicating that the immediate medical risks to women grew considerably after the first trimester.”).
the Justices that “mortality and complications for late abortions are three times greater, after twelve weeks.”109 And, in the twenty-nine or so abortion cases considered by the Supreme Court on the merits since Roe, there has been little consideration of the maternal health implications of the viability rule or of late-term abortions.110

3. “Health” Considerations in Supreme Court Abortion Cases Have Been a “One-Way Ratchet”

After adopting the mantra that “abortion is safer than childbirth,” the Justices have operated since Roe with the assumption that “health” concerns are a “one-way ratchet” in favor of access to abortion, based on the assumption that there are only risks from delaying an abortion, and none from abortion itself. Only in 2007 in Gonzales v. Carhart111 was this “one-way ratchet” finally questioned and largely shelved in favor of a more even-handed examination of health considerations and health data.112


112. See id. at 163 (providing that states have “wide discretion to pass
4. Shielding the Justices from New Medical Data and Developments

Justice O'Connor wrote in her Akron dissent in 1983: “[a]s today’s decision indicates, medical technology is changing, and this change will necessitate our continued functioning as the Nation’s 'ex officio' medical board with powers to approve or disapprove medical and operative practices and standards throughout the United States.” With Roe and Doe, the Justices assumed the role of the national abortion control board, but they have no means to monitor the public health impact, as public health officials normally do. The Justices cannot regulate or intervene in public health crises. They cannot monitor new technological developments or review the FDA’s approval of RU-486. The Justices are completely passive and dependent on litigation—cases that are selectively appealed to them. And since Gonzales, there has been a concerted effort by abortion advocates to keep abortion cases away from the Supreme Court.

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114. See Forsyte & Kehr, supra note 13, at 64 (“With disincentives on state officials to create new clinic regulations, the Court is unable to do anything to fill the vacuum it created. As a passive institution, it must wait for a case to reach it . . . .”).

115. See Benten v. Kessler, 505 U.S. 1084 (1992) (denying application to vacate injunction against importation of RU 486 without full record of the medical implications of RU 486, where two justices would have vacated the injunction).


117. See, e.g., Emily Bazelon, The Reincarnation of Pro-Life, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 29, 2011, at MM13 (“[L]itigators trying to uphold a woman’s right to an abortion are not running scared. In fact, they are being remarkably shrewd in their case selection.”); Irin Carmon, Planned Parenthood Takes Texas Abortion Laws to Court, MSNBC (Sept. 27, 2013), http://tv.msnbc.com/2013/09/27/planned-parenthood-aclu-take-texas-abortion-laws-to-court/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2014) (“Notably, the groups are not challenging the provision of the law that bans abortion after 20 weeks.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The strategic reason to avoid challenging that ban is that “a
III. Maternal Mortality Data

The notion that “abortion is safer than childbirth” has become even less tenable since 1973 for at least five reasons: (1) the dysfunctional abortion data reporting system in the United States that relies completely on voluntary reporting;\(^\text{118}\) (2) the incomparability of the published abortion mortality rate and the published maternal (childbirth) mortality rate;\(^\text{119}\) (3) medical data on the increasing rate of maternal mortality in the second trimester;\(^\text{120}\) (4) the growing body of international medical studies finding long-term risks to women from abortion;\(^\text{121}\) and (5) maternal mortality data from countries with superior abortion recordkeeping collection and reporting systems,

Texas challenge would go to the conservative Fifth Circuit,” which would potentially uphold the law. Id. However, “[s]imilar laws in Arizona and Idaho were twice found unconstitutional in the Ninth Circuit of Appeals, which is considered more liberal.” Id. Therefore, the combination of the Ninth Circuit decisions with the Fifth Circuit’s potential decision to uphold the law “would create a split in the circuits that would make the Supreme Court likelier to hear it.” Id.


\(^{119}\) See Byron C. Calhoun, John M. Thorp & Patrick S. Carroll, Maternal and Neonatal Health and Abortion: 40-Year Trends in Great Britain and Ireland, 18 J. AM. PHYSICIANS & SURGEONS 42, 42 (2013) (“Abortion statistics, when published officially by governments, often tend to be inaccurate due to underreporting or unsubstantiated estimates due to incomplete data collection.”); Forsythe & Kehr, supra note 13, at 60–62 (explaining the noncomparability of the published abortion mortality rate and the published childbirth mortality rate).

\(^{120}\) See Linda A. Bartlett et al., Risk Factors for Legal Induced Abortion-Related Mortality in the United States, 103 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 729, 729 (2004) (“The relative risk (unadjusted) of abortion-related mortality was 14.7 at 13–15 weeks of gestation (95% confidence interval [CI] 6.2, 34.7), 29.5 at 16–20 weeks (95% CI 12.9, 67.4), and 76.6 at or after 21 weeks (95% CI 32.5, 180.8).”)

THE MEDICAL ASSUMPTION which find a higher rate of abortion mortality than childbirth mortality.\textsuperscript{122}

The medical mantra in 1972 was based on the supposed comparison of maternal (childbirth) mortality rates and abortion mortality rates from Soviet Bloc counties.\textsuperscript{123} Today, the claim that “abortion is safer than childbirth” is based on the mechanical comparison of the official published abortion mortality rate and the official published childbirth (maternal) mortality rate. There are several reasons why these rates are non-comparable.

There are only two national organizations that collect abortion data: the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), a federal governmental agency, and the private Alan Guttmacher Institute (AGI).\textsuperscript{124} Reporting of abortion data to both is voluntary.\textsuperscript{125} There is no federal law requiring the reporting of

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\textsuperscript{123} Supra note 66 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{124} Rebekah Saul, Abortion Reporting in the United States: An Examination of the Federal-State Partnership, GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/3024498.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2014) (discussing national reporting and noting only two sources, the “CDC’s abortion surveillance system . . . [which is] the sole governmental source of abortion data” and “[t]he Alan Guttmacher Institute (AGI), which collects abortion data by surveying providers directly”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).

\textsuperscript{125} See Calhoun, supra note 118, at 265 (explaining that the CDC data “base their estimates on voluntary submissions” and the “abortion reporting by [A]GI is based on voluntary submissions”).
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abortion data, or complications, or deaths. Because abortion reporting in the United States is completely voluntary, there are only estimates of the number of abortions annually and of the number of abortion deaths. As one researcher noted in 2008, “[m]any state health departments are able to obtain only incomplete data from abortion providers, and in some states, only forty to fifty percent of abortions are reported.” Death certificates have been found to be unreliable. The bottom line is that they are non-comparable because what goes into the numerators and the denominators of each is radically different. This is explained at length in a medical review article published in the January 2013 issue of the online journal Scientifica and in a 2013 article in The Linacre Quarterly.

A 2012 article by Raymond and Grimes—perhaps the latest to make the claim that abortion is safer than childbirth—simply repeats the defective and misleading methodology of the past forty years and fails to demonstrate that abortion is safer for

126. See id. ("Abortion data are simply not complete and those provided are merely estimates with huge variance, and are subject to considerable error.").

127. Rachel K. Jones et al., Abortion in the United States: Incidence and Access to Services, 2005, 40 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 6, 7 (2008); see also Rachel K. Jones et al., Underreporting of Induced and Spontaneous Abortion in the United States: An Analysis of the 2002 National Survey of Family Growth, 38 STUD. IN FAM. PLAN. 187, 189 (2007) (“Although the Guttmacher Institute estimates of numbers of abortions are regarded as the most comprehensive source of abortion statistics in the United States, the estimates may be inaccurate.” (citation omitted)).


129. See Clarke D. Forsythe & Bradley N. Kehr, A Road Map Through the Supreme Court's Back Alley, 57 VILL. L. REV. 45, 60 (2012) (explaining the incomparability of the abortion mortality rates and childbirth mortality rates due to differences in calculation of each ratio).

130. See Thorp, supra note 121, at 2 ("Moreover, [terminations of pregnancy] cannot be linked to other sources of health data such as birth or death certificates, thereby making precise calculation of mortality rates or subsequent birth outcomes impossible."); see also Calhoun, supra note 118, at 266–72 (explaining the reasons why abortion mortality and maternal mortality measurements are unreliable).
several reasons. It is based on U.S. data, which is unreliable because of the dysfunctional data collection and reporting system in the United States that depends completely on voluntary reporting. It is based on mere estimates of the number of abortions, as reported by the CDC, and estimates of rates; yet the CDC admits that it undercounts abortions by fifteen percent, because abortion reporting to the CDC is voluntary. Consider the fact that several states, like California with one-third of all abortions annually, do not report to the CDC. Raymond and Grimes claim that “[t]he risk of death associated with childbirth is approximately fourteen times higher than with abortion.” But as one careful medical researcher pointed out, “[t]his statement is unsupported by the literature and there is no credible scientific basis to support it.”

In contrast to the unreliable U.S. data, two international studies in the past two years look at maternal mortality data from Chile and Ireland, which both limit abortion. A 2012 study of maternal mortality in Chile relied on fifty years (1957–2007) of official data from Chile’s National Institute of Statistics.


132. Id.; see also Karen Pazol, et al., Abortion Surveillance—United States, 2010, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WkLY. REP., Nov. 29, 2013, at 11 (noting CDC reporting and counting practice “inflates abortion statistics for reporting areas” with high percentages of out-of-state abortion recipients and “undercounts abortions for states with limited abortion services,” high legal restrictions, or “geographic proximity to services in another state”).

133. Raymond & Grimes, supra note 131, at 216.

134. Id.; see Calhoun, supra note 118, at 265 (“Current incidence estimates exclude abortion in California . . . .”).

135. Id.

136. Calhoun, supra note 118, at 264.

authors looked at factors likely to affect maternal mortality, such as years of education, per capita income, total fertility rate, birth order, clean water supply, sanitary sewer, and childbirth delivery by skilled attendants. They also looked at pertinent educational and maternal health policies, including legislation that has prohibited abortion in Chile since 1989, to assess the effects of these policies on maternal mortality. One of the most striking findings is that, contrary to widely held assumptions, prohibiting abortion in Chile did not result in an increase in maternal mortality. In fact, maternal mortality declined after Chile’s 1989 abortion prohibition was enacted. From 1957 to 2007, the overall Maternal Mortality Ratio or MMR (the number of maternal deaths related to childbirth divided by the number of live births) declined by 93.8%, from 270.7 deaths per 100,000 live births in 1957 to 18.2 deaths per 100,000 live births in 2007. After abortion was made illegal in 1989, the MMR continued to decline—from 41.3 to 12.7 per 100,000 live births (-69.2%). Chile has the lowest maternal mortality ratio in Latin America.

A 2012 study of Irish data compared maternal mortality and maternal health trends in Ireland with those in England, Scotland, and Wales. The study compared the populations

138. See id. at 2, 7 (explaining the factors considered including graphs of maternal mortality ratios based on these factors).

139. See id. at 9 (discussing abortion legislation and its effects on maternal mortality).

140. See id. at 3 (charting the decline in maternal mortality rate in Chile).

141. See id. at 9 (“After abortion became illegal in 1989, a decreasing trend in [Maternal Mortality Rate] was observed, from 41.3 to 12.7 in 2003 (69.2% reduction).”).

142. Id. at 3.

143. Id. at 5, 9; see also Elard Koch et al., Fundamental Discrepancies in Abortion Estimates and Abortion-Related Mortality: A Re-Evaluation of Recent Studies in Mexico with Special Reference to the International Classification of Diseases, 4 INT’L J. WOMEN’S HEALTH 613, 618 (2012) (showing declining graphed maternal mortality ratios in Chile).

144. See Koch, supra note 143, at 618 (“The findings of this study confirm that [Maternal Mortality Rate] in Chile has steadily and consistently decreased, reaching the lowest rate in Latin America . . . .”).

145. See Byron C. Calhoun, John M. Thorp & Patrick S. Carroll, Maternal and Neonatal Health and Abortion: The 40-Year Experience in Great Britain and
living in the Republic of Ireland and in Northern Ireland with those in Scotland and England, and examined women’s health trends between 1969 and 2009. The report examined numerous women’s health factors, including fertility, premature birth rates, stillbirth rates, mental health resource usage, medication usage for mental health, breast cancer rates, and immunological disorders. Among the most significant findings are that the rates of stillbirths in the Republic and Northern Ireland are significantly less than similar rates in England and Scotland. Rates of stillbirth per 1,000 live births were 3.8/1,000 in the Irish Republic and 4.1/1,000 in Northern Ireland, compared to 4.9 in England, and 5.1 in Scotland.

The study found similar contrasts in the rates of low-birth weight infants. Low birth weight infants (<2,500 grams) were increased in England and Scotland compared to the Irish Republic (39.7/1,000 live births in the Irish Republic, 56.3/1,000 in England, and 52.3/1,000 in Scotland). These findings are consistent with previous studies that have found higher rates of stillbirths, premature births, and low-birth-weight infants in women with a history of induced abortion.

The Irish study also looked at maternal mortality in Ireland compared to England, Scotland and Wales. Maternal death rates per 100,000 live births were significantly higher in the English/Welsh populations and Scottish populations (10/100,000

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146. See id. at 46 (“Over the 40 years of legalized abortion in the UK there has been a consistent pattern in which higher abortion rates have run parallel to higher incidence of stillbirths, premature births, low birth-weight neonates, cerebral palsy, and maternal deaths as sequela of abortion.”).

147. Id. at 44.

148. Id.

149. Id.

150. See 135 Statistically Significant Studies: Abortion—Preterm Birth and/or Low Birth Weight Links 60s-12, PHYSICIANSFORLIFE.ORG (Dec. 1, 2012), http://www.physiciansforlife.org/content/view/2305/26/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2014) (listing studies that show an increased risk of pre-term birth among women with prior induced abortion) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
in England/Wales, and 10–12/100,000 in Scotland), compared to the Irish population (1–2/100,000 live births in the Irish Republic).\textsuperscript{151}

The study also looked at demographic trends in Ireland. While the fall in fertility throughout Europe since 1968 has impacted Ireland, the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland continue to show higher fertility rates.\textsuperscript{152} The Total Fertility Rate (TFR) is near to 2.0 in both Irish jurisdictions. (This corresponds to a family of two children.) That rate is much higher than the average European TFR (around 1.4) and close to the replacement level of 2.07 TFR.\textsuperscript{153} As a result, Ireland has a substantially younger population.

The Irish study suggests, at the very least, that the claim that legal abortion is necessary for improved maternal health is dubious.\textsuperscript{154}

\textsuperscript{151} See Calhoun et al., supra note 145, at 43 (“These rates are instructive since they demonstrate a relatively low [Total Abortion Rate] in both Irish jurisdictions compared with England, Wales, and Scotland (Great Britain).”).

\textsuperscript{152} See id. at 76 (noting that for Northern Ireland “the latest [Total Fertility Rate] is 1.87” and for the Republic of Ireland “Forecasting used the . . . [Total Fertility Rate] of 1.86”).

\textsuperscript{153} See id. at 75 (charting the eight European countries against the “Replacement Level 2.07”).


They show that the death of Savita Halappanavar was due to “inevitable miscarriage” at seventeen weeks and the failure to properly diagnose and treat sepsis (infection), and had nothing to do with the legal status of abortion in Ireland. HEALTH INFO. AND QUALITY AUTH., INVESTIGATION INTO THE SAFETY,
Another maternal mortality study published in 2013 looked at all Danish women born between 1962 and 1993.\textsuperscript{155} The study found a protective effect from childbirth and found that the higher the number of abortions, the higher the mortality risk for women.\textsuperscript{156}

Another study published in 2013 looked at maternal mortality data in Mexico.\textsuperscript{157} The authors sought to clarify the data that goes into the numerators and denominators of mortality rates over the past twenty years (1990–2008) in Mexico.\textsuperscript{158} They found a substantial drop in maternal deaths and a substantial reduction in abortion-related mortality in Mexico between 1990 and 2010 and that “approximately ninety-eight percent of maternal deaths are related to causes other than illegal induced abortion in Mexico.”\textsuperscript{159}

Thus, these three recent medical studies, of abortion prohibitions in Ireland, Chile, and Mexico, suggest that countries with abortion prohibitions have lower maternal mortality rates, better women’s health trends, and better demographic trends than countries with widely-accessible abortion.

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\textsuperscript{155}See Coleman, Reardon & Calhoun, supra note 122, at 569 (“In this Danish population-based study, records of women born between 1962 and 1993 . . . were examined to identify associations between patterns of pregnancy resolution and mortality rates across 25 years.”).

\textsuperscript{156}See id. at 4 (“[T]hose who had experienced induced abortion(s) and natural loss(es) had more than three times the risk of death compared with women who had only experienced birth(s).”).

\textsuperscript{157}Koch et al., supra note 143, at 613.

\textsuperscript{158}See id. at 615–16 (noting discrepancy in “calculating the numerator of [the Abortion Mortality Ratio]” and “discrepancy [relating] to the calculation of the denominator”).

\textsuperscript{159}Id. at 622.
IV. International Medical Data on the Risks of Induced Abortion

In the twenty years since the Supreme Court’s decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the number of international, peer-reviewed medical studies on the risks from abortion has grown significantly. Medical studies over the last two decades have created substantial data finding significant increased risks after abortion, as a January 2013, medical review article in Scientifica describes in detail.

It is important to handle these data carefully. First, the studies focus on “increased risk” after abortion, which is not the same thing as causation, though increased risk and other indicators may eventually prove causation. Second, some medical studies have found no increased risk after abortion. They need to be taken into consideration.

A. Increased Risk of Pre-Term Birth (PTB) After Induced Abortion

Nevertheless, there are now more than 140 peer-reviewed studies that have found a statistically significant increased risk in pre-term birth (PTB) after abortion. This has particular

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161. See Thorp, supra note 121, at 4–5 (explaining the short and long-term harms of termination of pregnancy); see also 135 Statistically Significant Studies: Abortion—Preterm Birth and/or Low Birth Weight Links 60s-12, supra note 150 (listing studies finding an increased risk of preterm birth and low birth weight following abortion).

162. Id. at 5.


164. 135 Statistically Significant Studies: Abortion—Preterm Birth and/or Low Birth Weight Links 60s-12, supra note 150.
relevance for African-American women, who have an “almost two-fold higher rate of preterm births.” These studies found an increased risk of PTB after induced abortion among women from more than thirty-five countries, including: Wales, Egypt, the United States, China, Japan, Hungary, Poland, Greece, Britain, Thailand, Australia, Norway, Germany, Finland, France, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, Scotland, the Czech Republic, Spain, Slovenia, Romania, Russia, Denmark, Brazil, Botswana, Togo, Taiwan, Nigeria, Iraq, India, Pakistan, Kuwait, Korea, Canada, and Turkey.

A PLOS Medicine study published in July 2013 by Oliver-Williams et al. has been reported as claiming that the increased risk of pre-term birth after induced abortion has been eliminated by modern methods of abortion. But the actual study falls short of making that claim and seems to suffer from a number of methodological flaws. (The authors start by admitting what has been denied by so many for so long: “Numerous studies have demonstrated that therapeutic termination of pregnancy (abortion) is associated with an increased risk of subsequent preterm birth”.) The abortions were self-reported from personal interviews (not drawn from medical record data or linked to the specific patient). That seems unusual for data from Scotland, where the government pays for abortions and keeps individual records. The abortion methods (chemical v. surgical) were not

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165. Thomas F. McElrath, *Unappreciated But Not Unimportant: Health Disparities in the Risk of Cervical Insufficiency*, 25 HUM. REPROD. 2891, 2891 (2010); see also Emmanuel A. Anum et al., *Health Disparities in Risk for Cervical Insufficiency*, 25 HUM. REPRO. 2894, 2899 (2010) (discussing the increased risk of African-American women for “cervical insufficiency” which is a cause of pre-term birth). This is magnified by a “dose effect” if a woman has had two, three, or four prior terminations of pregnancy (TOPs). McElrath, supra note 165, at 2892.

166. See 135 Statistically Significant Studies: Abortion—Preterm Birth and/or Low Birth Weight Links 60s-12, supra note 150.

167. See Oliver-Williams et al., supra note 163, at 10 (suggesting that “[modernizing] methods of abortion . . . may significantly reduce the subsequent burden of morbidity and mortality related to preterm births”).

168. Id. at 1.

169. See id. at 2 (explaining the methodology of the study, which relied on self-reported data).

actually connected with the individual women, preventing the researchers from knowing which type of abortion the women had or even whether they experienced PTB.\textsuperscript{171} So, the authors’ conclusion that shifting from surgical to chemical abortions eliminated the risk of PTB is no more than a guess and not a finding drawn from scientifically observed evidence. The authors emphasize the technique of pre-treating of the cervix prior to abortion as supposedly reducing the risk of PTB, but there was no data to connect this.\textsuperscript{172} It was merely the authors’ hunch. Consequently, the Oliver-Williams study hardly dispels the findings of more than 140 international studies from more than thirty countries finding an increased risk of PTB after abortion.

\textbf{B. Increased Risk of Mental Trauma After Induced Abortion}

Whether negative mental health outcome is associated with induced abortion is one of the most hotly debated questions in medicine today. There are studies on both sides of the question.\textsuperscript{173} The studies and the data have to be handled carefully. No one study settles a medical question. And association does not mean causation.

Nevertheless, many would be surprised to learn that there at least ninety-nine international, peer-reviewed, statistically pages/Introduction.aspx (last updated Dec. 6, 2012) (last visited Jan. 25, 2014) (noting that the National Health Service is funded by taxes in Europe and “[i]n some areas, the [National Health Service] will pay for abortions at private clinics”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).

\textsuperscript{171} Oliver-Williams et al., \textit{supra} note 163, at 2.

\textsuperscript{172} See id. at 1 (noting that the association between previous abortion and pre-term birth disappeared by 2000 in Scotland, “paralleled by increasing use of medical abortion and cervical pre-treatment . . .”). Although these trends were possibly related, “we could not test this directly as the data on the method of prior abortions were not linked to individuals in the cohort.” \textit{Id}.

\textsuperscript{173} Compare Francesco Bianchi-Demicheli et al., \textit{Termination of Pregnancy and Women’s Sexuality}, 53 \textit{Gynecologic \\& Obstetric Investigation} 48, 50 (2002) (explaining the increased psychological impact, and sexual dysfunction of termination of pregnancy), with Anne Nordal Broen et al., \textit{The Course of Mental Health After Miscarriage and Induced Abortion: A Longitudinal, Five-Year Follow-Up Study}, 3 \textit{BMC Med.} 17, 17 (2005) (“Women who had experienced a miscarriage had more mental distress at ten days and six months after the pregnancy termination than women who had undergone an abortion.”).
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significant studies that have found an increased risk of mental trauma after induced abortion. A 2013 forty-year review essay published in *Scientifica* reviewed the existing data on three reputed long-term risks of induced abortion: pre-term birth, breast cancer, and mental trauma. The author cited the numerous studies that have found an increased risk of mental trauma after induced abortion.

A study published in September 2011 in the British Journal of Psychiatry (BJP) critically reviewed the results of twenty-two previous studies on abortion and mental health published between 1995 and 2009. The results revealed a moderate to high increased risk of mental health problems after abortion. This study has sparked a contentious debate in the literature.


175. See Thorp, supra note 121, at 5 (noting pre-term birth, breast cancer, and mental health problems as three conditions "in which the literature is more comprehensive in reporting links between [termination of pregnancy] and the health outcome in question").

176. See id. at 13–16 (listing several studies reviewing mental trauma and its connection to abortion).


178. See ACAD. OF MED. ROYAL COLLS., supra note 177, at 180 (noting that "the results revealed a moderate to highly increased risk of mental health problems after abortion").

179. See Responses to This Article, BRITISH J. OF PSYCHIATRY, http://bjp.rcpsych.org/content/199/3/180.abstract#responses (last visited Jan. 2, 2014) (providing access to responses to Priscilla Coleman’s article titled *Abortion and Mental Health*) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also David M. Fergusson et al., *Does Abortion Reduce the Mental Health Risks of Unwanted or Unintended Pregnancy? A Re-Appraisal of the Evidence*, 47 AUSTL. N.Z. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 819, 819–27 (2013) (considering whether abortion has therapeutic benefits to mitigate the mental health risks of abortion). This study
Two possible objections to studies finding an increased risk are that they fail to include appropriate comparison group(s) and that they fail to control for pre-existing conditions, and much of the debate centers on these factors.\textsuperscript{180} Four subsequent studies and reviews, by Charles,\textsuperscript{181} Robinson,\textsuperscript{182} one written for the Royal College of Psychiatrists (RCP),\textsuperscript{183} and by Steinberg\textsuperscript{184} have challenged the 2011 BJP study. But each has weaknesses of its own.

A 2013 study by researcher David Fergusson reviewed the 2011 BJP study and other studies published since 2011 criticizing the BJP study.\textsuperscript{185} Fergusson concluded that “there is no available evidence to suggest that abortion has therapeutic effects in reducing the mental health risks of unwanted unintended pregnancy. There is suggestive evidence that abortion may be associated with small to moderate increases in risks of some mental health problems.”\textsuperscript{186} Despite the ongoing debate, there remain a number of well-done studies that have found an increased risk of mental trauma after abortion.

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\textsuperscript{180}. See Steinberg et al., supra note 163, at 431–32 (noting the “seven significant errors in the methods, analyses and reasoning of Coleman's meta-analysis”).

\textsuperscript{181}. See Vignetta E. Charles et al., Abortion and Long-Term Mental Health Outcomes: A Systematic Review of the Evidence, 78 CONTRACEPTION 436, 436 (2009) (identifying methodological issues in studies that found an “abortion trauma syndrome”).

\textsuperscript{182}. See Gail E. Robinson et al., Is There An ‘Abortion Trauma Syndrome’? Critiquing the Evidence, 17 HARV. R. PSYCHIATRY 268, 268 (2009) (suggesting that the most accurate studies found no, or few risks of mental health caused by abortion).

\textsuperscript{183}. See ACAD. OF MED. ROYAL COLLS., supra note 177, at 17 (“No details of any quality assessment process were included in the Coleman review.”).

\textsuperscript{184}. Steinberg et al., supra note 163, at 430 (presenting a “summary of the most serious and significant errors of [the Coleman] meta-analysis because policy, practice and the public have been misinformed”).

\textsuperscript{185}. Fergusson et al., supra note 179, at 821 (noting that the Coleman study “fail[ed] to provide a formal review of the therapeutic benefits of abortion”).

\textsuperscript{186}. Id. at 819.
C. Increased Risk of Breast Cancer from the Loss of the Protective Effect of a First Full-Term Pregnancy

The claim that abortion increases the risk of breast cancer is also vigorously debated. It has long been acknowledged that a first full-term pregnancy provides a measure of protection against breast cancer.187

Yet, there have been seventy international, peer-reviewed studies that have addressed the association since at least 1957.188 At least thirty-three have found an increased risk of breast cancer after induced abortion.189

All of these preceded the Huang study. A November 2013 study by Huang et al. of Chinese women published in Cancer Causes & Controls looked at the association between abortion and breast cancer.190 The meta-analysis by Huang et al. examined the findings and quality of thirty-six studies (consisting of two cohort studies and thirty-four case control studies) from fourteen provinces in China that had been previously published.191 The authors acknowledged that “Chinese females historically had a lower risk of breast cancer compared to their counterparts in the USA and other Western countries.”192 Citing a 2012 Chinese study by Li, the authors noted that “the incidence


189. See infra Appendix C.

190. See Yubei Huang et al., A Meta-Analysis of the Association Between Induced Abortion and Breast Cancer Risk Among Chinese Females, CANCER CAUSES & CONTROL (Nov. 2013), http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10552-013-0325-7#page-1 (last visited Mar. 17, 2014) (“Compared to people without any history of [induced abortion], an increased risk of breast cancer was observed among females who had at least one [induced abortion].”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).

191. Id.

192. Id. at 2.
of breast cancer in China had increased at an alarming rate over the past two decades"193 and that this “marked change in breast cancer incidence was paralleled [sic] to the one-child-per-family policy,” citing a 2002 Chinese study by Qiao.194 This new study was undertaken, at least in part, due to conflicting results in prior studies by Brind (1996) and Beral (2004) and due to conflicting results in prior Chinese studies.195

Citing three studies by Russo & Russo (1987), Kelsey (1979), and Kelsey (1981), the authors noted that prior “experimental data” provided a plausible biological reason for an association between induced abortion and an increased risk of breast cancer:

During the first trimester of pregnancy, hormonal changes propel newly produced breast cells through a state of differentiation, a natural maturing process which greatly reduces the risk of breast cancer in the future. An interruption of this process by abortion will arrest this process before differentiation occurs, greatly raising the future risk of breast cancer in the future.196

The authors were also careful to distinguish induced abortion from spontaneous abortion.197

The authors concluded that “overall, this systematic review of thirty-six studies with different designs and conducted across a


194. Id. (citing Qiao, Analysis of Induced Abortion of Chinese Women, 26 POPULATION RES. 16 (2002))

195. Compare Joel Brind et al., Induced Abortion as an Independent Risk Factor for Breast Cancer: A Comprehensive Review and Meta-Analysis, 50 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMMUNITY HEALTH 481, 494 (1996) (noting a “significant positive association between induced abortion and breast cancer incidence”), with Valerie Beral et al., Breast Cancer and Abortion: Collaborative Reanalysis of Data from 53 Epidemiological Studies, Including 83,000 Women with Breast Cancer from 16 Countries, 363 THE LANCET 1007, 1014 (2004) (noting “the aggregate relative risk of breast cancer associated with having a record of one or more pregnancies that ended as an induced abortion compared with having no such record . . . [suggests] no significant adverse effects . . . ”).

196. Huang et al., supra note 190, at 2.

197. See id. ("[S]tudies focused on spontaneous abortion, and studies with incomplete data of interest were excluded.").
wide range of regions in China revealed that induced abortion (IA) was significantly associated with an increased risk of breast cancer among Chinese females. The risk increased as the number of IA increased. This is referred to by statisticians as a “dose-response” or “dose-effect”; the stronger the exposure (dose) to the agent, the greater the increased risk. And the authors noted that previous studies supported this dose-effect, finding that the risk increased as the number of abortions increased.

The Huang study found a “dose-response.” Thus, one prior induced abortion increased the breast cancer risk by forty-four percent. With two prior induced abortions, they found a seventy-six percent increased risk. And with three prior induced abortions, they found an eighty-nine percent increased risk. (Each finding was statistically significant, meaning that it was not due to chance alone.)

The authors noted an important difference between induced abortion in the United States and in China, which may help explain the biological association. Since abortion in the United States is often to prevent a first birth, whereas abortion is used in China to prevent a second birth under the one-child policy, “the protective effects of early childbirth will probably dilute the harmful effect of more IAs [induced abortions].”

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198. Id. at 7.
200. Huang et al., supra note 190, at 8.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 4.
203. Id. at 6.
204. Id.
205. See Glossary of Statistical Terms, OECD.ORG (May 26, 2002), http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=3904 (last updated Aug. 11, 2005) (last visited Jan. 25, 2014) (“An effect is said to be significant if the value of the statistic used to test it lies outside acceptable limits, that is to say, if the hypothesis that the effect is not present is rejected.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
206. Huang et al., supra note 190, at 8.
noted that further research was needed because of certain limitations in their study.207

**D. Placenta Previa**

Placenta previa is the condition when the placenta settles low in the mother's uterus, covering the cervical canal.208 If it remains in this position in late pregnancy, it can have serious risks for mother, including hemorrhaging, and for the child, including increased risk of sudden infant death syndrome and risks from prematurity if a premature delivery is required.209 A 2003 review of the literature located three studies that found an increased risk of placenta previa after abortion.210 A fourth study was published in 2003, which found an increased risk of placenta previa after abortion.211

These studies do not settle these medical and scientific questions, though they provide evidence of increased risks of various kinds. At the same time, no studies have yet refuted the findings of increased risk of pre-term birth, or mental trauma, or

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207. See id. (noting that “future prospective cohort studies with more adequate reference group were needed to investigate the association further” because of possible overstated positive associations between induced abortions and breast cancer in the studies reviewed).


209. See id. (“One of the biggest concerns with placenta previa is the risk of severe vaginal bleeding (hemorrhage),” which can be “heavy enough to be life-threatening” and “may prompt an emergency C-section before [the] baby is full term.”).

210. See John M. Thorp, Jr., Katherine E. Hartmann & Elizabeth Shadigian, Long-Term Physical and Psychological Health Consequences of Induced Abortion: A Review of the Evidence, 58 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOL. SURVEY 67, 74 (2003), http://content.silaspartners.com/156/41045/156_41045_shadigian.1.pdf (“Three studies were found exploring induced abortion and placenta previa,” all of which found a “positive association”).

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breast cancer after an abortion. More studies are clearly needed, and more can be expected from various countries with better abortion data recordkeeping and collection than exists in the United States.

V. Isaacson v. Horne, the Medical Assumption, and the Viability Rule

The mistakes made by the Justices during the deliberations in Roe and Doe, including the notion that “abortion is safer than childbirth,” are directly relevant to the Court’s consideration of state abortion regulations in future abortion cases. The Court in Gonzales v. Carhart in 2007 upheld the constitutionality of the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act (PBABA). But, as a number of scholars have pointed out, the Court expressed concern with late-term abortions and, in dictum, suggested that the states should have greater deference to limit late-term abortions. The Court’s dicta gave greater deference to the states and concluded that the states have “wide discretion to pass legislation in areas where there is medical and scientific uncertainty.”

The twenty-week limit in Isaacson v. Horne might have given the Court the opportunity to apply Gonzales and review the factual assumption that “abortion is safer than childbirth,” because medical data show that the maternal mortality rate from abortion increases significantly in the second trimester. Horne could have given the Court the opportunity to reassess its factual

214. See Gonzales, 550 U.S at 128 (noting that “[t]he Act’s stated purposes are protecting innocent human life from [partial-birth abortion] and protecting the medical community’s ethics and reputation” and that “Casey reaffirmed that the government may use its . . . regulatory authority to show its profound respect for the life within the women (citation omitted)”).
215. Id. at 163.
217. See Bartlett, supra note 120.
assumption that drove the superstructure of Roe in light of contemporary medical data in the context of late-term abortions.

In the approximately thirty abortion cases that the Court has decided on the merits since 1973, the Court has rarely addressed the risks to women from abortion based on medical evidence in a trial record.218 Instead, the Court has stated that the public has an interest in protecting maternal health, but only in the abstract, as in the Casey decision in 1992, where the Court said that “[r]egulations designed to foster the health of a woman seeking an abortion are valid if they do not constitute an undue burden.”219 Future cases may create an opportunity for the Supreme Court to review a real record on the risks of abortion to women, and the unregulated public health vacuum that the Court has allowed for forty years.220

Reexamination of the medical mantra in Roe also raises some larger questions about the future of the Supreme Court and abortion. There are now four challenges to the mantra that “abortion is safer than childbirth”: (1) fundamental challenges to the dysfunctional abortion reporting system here in the United States where all data reporting is voluntary,221 (2) maternal mortality data showing an increasing rate of maternal mortality from abortion after the first trimester,222 (3) the growing body of international data on the long-term risks to women from abortion,223 and (4) maternal mortality data from other countries with better data collection and recordkeeping that show a higher rate of abortion mortality than maternal mortality.224

Those challenges set up some possible paradigm shifts. How will the maternal mortality data and long-term risks data affect the consideration of maternal “health”? Will some sort of analysis

218. See Forsythe & Presser, supra note 14, at 90 (describing the original Jane Roe’s Rule 60(b) motion in McCorvey v. Hill where Circuit Judge Edith Jones reviewed the Court’s abortion jurisprudence and its lack of consideration of medical developments).


220. See Forsythe & Kehr, supra note 13.

221. Supra note 118 and accompanying text.

222. Supra notes 119–19 and accompanying text.

223. Supra note 121 and accompanying text.

224. Supra note 122 and accompanying text.
balancing the risks of “delay” with the risk to women from the abortion be required? Will providers be required to demonstrate that the risks of not having the abortion outweigh the risks of having the abortion? If advocates contend that the principle underlying Roe is autonomy, not the relative safety of abortion, will the Supreme Court dismiss the data on the relative risks from abortion? Or will the Court allow the states to regulate or prohibit abortion at some gestational stage if providers cannot demonstrate that the risks of not having the abortion outweigh the risks of having the abortion? Unfortunately, the new paradigm will not be addressed in Horne, which was denied certiorari by the Supreme Court in January of 2014.225

VI. Conclusion

Federal Judge Henry Friendly put his finger on the Supreme Court’s errors in 1978 when he criticized the Court for the use of medical data in Roe and Doe that were not part of any record. He wrote:

[T]he main lesson I wish to draw from the abortion cases relates to procedure—the use of social data offered . . . for the first time in the Supreme Court itself . . . . The Court’s conclusion in Roe that ‘mortality rates for women undergoing early abortions, where the procedure is legal, appear to be as low as or lower than the rates for normal childbirth’ rested entirely on materials not of record in the trial court, and that conclusion constituted the underpinning for the holding that the asserted interest of the state ‘in protecting the woman from an inherently hazardous procedure’ during the first trimester did not exist.226

Friendly continued,

If an administrative agency, even in a rulemaking proceeding, had used similar materials without having given the parties a fair opportunity to criticize or controvert them at the hearing stage, reversal would have come swiftly and inexorably . . . .

The Court should set an example of proper procedure and not follow a course which it would condemn if pursued by any other tribunal.\textsuperscript{227}

These concerns, and the growth in international medical data over the past two decades since \textit{Casey}, should counsel the Supreme Court to give greater deference to the states in their attempt to protect maternal health.

\textsuperscript{227} \textit{Id.} at 37–38.
Appendix A: List of 140+ Medical Studies Finding an Increased Risk of Pre-Term Birth After Abortion


31. E. Obel et al., *Pregnancy Complications Following Legally Induced Abortion with Special Reference to Abortion Technique*, 58 ACTA OBSTET. GYNECOL. SCAND. 147 (1979).


35. H. Kreibich & A. Ludwig, Early and Late Complications in Induced Abortions of Primigravidae (Including Suggested Measures), 74 Z AETNTL FORTBILD (Jena) 311 (1980).


37. A. Levin, Association of Induced Abortion with Subsequent Pregnancy Loss, 243 J. AM. MED. ASSN 2495 (1980).

38. E.B. Obel, Long-Term Sequelae Following Legally Induced Abortion, 27 DANISH MED. BULL. 61 (1980).


43. C. Madore et al., A Study on the Effects of Induced Abortion on Subsequent Pregnancy Outcome, 139 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 516 (1981).

44. P.E. Slater et al., The Effect of Abortion Method on the Outcome of Subsequent Pregnancy, 26 J. REPROD. MED. 123 (1981).


55. G. Krasomski et al., *Fate of Subsequent Pregnancies After Induced Abortion in Primiparae*, 40 *Wiad Lek* 1593 (1987).


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98. B. Balaka et al., *Risk Factors Associated with Prematurity at the University of Lome, Togo*, 95 BULL. SOC. PATHOL. EXOT. 280 (2002).


108. P. Stang et al., *Induced Abortion Increases the Risk of Very Preterm Delivery; Results from a Large Perinatal Database*, in FERTILITY STERILITY S159 (2005).


134. Siladitya Bhattacharya et al., Reproductive Outcomes Following Induced Abortion: A National Register-based Cohort Study in Scotland. 2 BMJ OPEN e000911 (2012), http://bmjopen.bmj.com/content/2/4/e000911.full.pdf.


Appendix B: List of 99 Medical Studies Finding an Increased Risk of Mental Trauma After Abortion


30. Richard Henshaw et al., *Psychological Responses Following Medical Abortion (Using Mifepristone and Gemeprost) and Surgical Vacuum Aspiration: A Patient-Centered, Partially Randomized Prospective Study*, 73 ACTA OBSTETRICA ET GYNECOLOGICA SCANDINAVICA 812 (1994).


40. Lise Schleiss et al., *Psychological Consequences of Induced Abortion*, 159 UGESKRIFT LAÆGER 3603 (1997).


60. F. Bianchi-Demicheli et al., Termination of Pregnancy and Women’s Sexuality, 53 GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS INVEST. 48 (2002).

61. Priscilla K. Coleman et al., A History of Induced Abortion in Relation to Substance Use During Subsequent Pregnancies Carried to Term, 187 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1673 (2002).


Appendix C: List of 33 Medical Studies Finding an Increased Risk of Breast Cancer After Abortion


