Previability Abortion and the Pain of the Unborn

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Teresa S. Collett*

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I. Introduction

One of the most basic and widely accepted principles of political governance is that the state is justified in promulgating laws to protect individuals from harm by others. 1 The state’s power to legislate and protect against a variety of

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1 See, e.g., The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“[A]ll men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.—That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed . . . .”).
harm, including the harm of being made to suffer physical pain, has been recognized in both domestic\(^2\) and international law.\(^3\) “The Government of course has an obligation to protect its citizens from harm.”\(^4\) The exercise of this power is up to the prudential judgment of our state and national legislatures, however, and is not a constant constitutional imperative.\(^5\)

This power of protection encompasses all living creatures,\(^6\) as well as developing fetal human life.\(^7\) Thirteen states and the House of Representatives have passed legislation that strictly limits abortions during the second half of the pregnancy, generally after nineteen weeks gestation,\(^8\) to protect the developing human person from pain.\(^9\) These laws, known as Pain-

\(^2\) See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2012) (criminalizing and defining torture as “an act committed by a person acting under the color of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody or physical control”).

\(^3\) See, e.g., Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 2, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3a94.html (“Each State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction.”).


\(^5\) See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989) (rejecting a claim against local child-protection officials who, after notice of possible abuse, failed to protect a child from beatings by his father that left the child severely brain damaged).


\(^9\) See Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 735–36 (8th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (upholding a South Dakota law requiring that women be informed that abortion ends the “life of a whole, separate, unique, living human being,” and finding that opponents of the definition provided “no
Capable Child Protection Acts, strictly limit abortion after the point of gestation when the unborn child has developed the capacity to feel pain during the process of an abortion.10

Proponents argue that protecting an unborn child from such pain is a natural extension of the long tradition in American law prohibiting acts that inflict unwarranted suffering on human beings and other sentient creatures.11 Opponents argue that such laws are based on scientific speculation and inflammatory rhetoric.12 Given the large number of states adopting Pain-Capable Child Protection Acts, it is no surprise that these arguments are now before federal courts. This Article explores the arguments supporting the existence of fetal pain and the constitutionality of abortion limits at twenty weeks gestation.

II. Fetal Pain and the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban

The question of whether and when the unborn child feels pain is not new. Since the early 1980s, there has been extensive evidence to the opposite conclusion.

10. See David F. Forte, Life, Heartbeat, Birth: A Medical Basis for Reform, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 121, 134 (2013) ("[S]tates have passed a version of the Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act. The Act prohibits abortion after twenty weeks of pregnancy based on the State's assessment of medical evidence that the unborn child could experience pain as early as twenty weeks." (footnotes omitted)).


12. See, e.g., Harper Jean Tobin, Confronting Misinformation on Abortion: Informed Consent, Deference, and Fetal Pain Laws, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 111, 152 (2008) ("Statements about fetal pain currently in place in several states are questionably accurate and clearly misleading."); Lindsay J. Calhoun, Comment, The Painless Truth: Challenging Fetal Pain-Based Abortion Bans, 87 TUL. L. REV. 141, 151 (2012) ("As detractors have noted, the language of the legislative findings is extremely misleading with regard to medical support and certainty." (footnote omitted)).
debate about whether the unborn experience pain during abortion. President Reagan brought this issue squarely into public view in 1984 when he said, “when the lives of the unborn are snuffed out [by abortion], they often feel pain, pain that is long and agonizing.” This debate reemerged and intensified when the world caught a glimpse of life within the womb through the picture of Samuel Armas’s tiny hand apparently grasping the finger of his perinatal surgeon who was repairing Samuel’s spine when he was only twenty-one weeks in gestation.

The debate over fetal pain made its way into the courts after the passage of state and federal bans of a procedure commonly known as “partial-birth abortion.” In ruling on the constitutionality of the federal ban, Judge Richard C. Casey, sitting in the Southern District of New York, called the procedure “gruesome, brutal, barbaric, and uncivilized.” He found that

13. See Engelman, supra note 11, at 281 (discussing the debate about fetal pain).


16. The federal partial-birth abortion ban prohibits a physician from deliberately and intentionally vaginally deliver[ing] a living fetus until, in the case of a head-first presentation, the entire fetal head is outside the body of the mother, or, in the case of breech presentation, any part of the fetal trunk past the navel is outside the body of the mother, for the purpose of performing an overt act that the person knows will kill the partially delivered living fetus.


abortion procedures “subject fetuses to severe pain.”\textsuperscript{18} In contrast, Judge Phyllis J. Hamilton of the Northern District of California arrived at a different conclusion. She wrote that “much of the debate on this issue is based on speculation and inference”\textsuperscript{19} and that “the issue of whether fetuses feel pain is unsetttled in the scientific community.”\textsuperscript{20} These divergent conclusions illustrate the key factual battle involved in challenges to Pain-Capable Child Protection Acts—when does the unborn child develop the capacity to feel pain?

\textbf{III. Defining Our Terms}

Before attempting to answer the questions of “whether” and “when” an unborn child or human fetus “feels pain,” it is necessary to establish what the words “feels” and “pain” mean in this context.\textsuperscript{21} Much of the disagreement on the existence and extent of the unborn child’s pain can be explained by the absence of a common definition of these key terms. There are three competing definitions of “fetal pain” arising from whether “feels” means to have a “conscious appreciation of” or merely “experience,” and from the question of how such appreciation or experience can be ascertained.

\textbf{A. Conscious Appreciation}

Some physicians and scientists restrictively define “feels” to mean only those responses that reflect some self-awareness or “conscious appreciation of pain.”\textsuperscript{22} “Pain is a subjective sensory

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{18} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{19} Planned Parenthood Fed’n v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957, 997 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
\item \textsuperscript{20} Id. at 1002.
\item \textsuperscript{22} See Stuart W.G. Derbyshire, \textit{Can Fetuses Feel Pain?}, 332 Brit. Med. J. 909, 911 (2006), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1440624/ (“Without consciousness there can be nociception but there cannot be pain.”); David James Mellor et al., \textit{Fetal “Awareness” and “Pain”: What Precautions Should Be Taken to Safeguard Fetal Welfare During Experiments?},
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
and emotional experience that requires the presence of consciousness to permit recognition of a stimulus as unpleasant.” In the absence of consciousness, they argue that the most researchers can conclude from the medical and scientific evidence is that the human fetus “reacts to physical stimulation.”

Whether the fetus feels pain, however, hinges not on its biological development but on its conscious development. Unless it can be shown that the fetus has a conscious appreciation of pain after 26 weeks, then the responses to noxious stimulation must still essentially be reflex, exactly as before 26 weeks.


Groups such as the Birth Control Trust, whose director Ann Furedi co-wrote one of the papers, admit that the foetus reacts to physical stimulation, such as procedures involving needles, from around 12 to 14 weeks. They agree that stress levels can rise in these circumstances. But they argue that the mere reaction to physical stimuli does not automatically indicate the feeling of pain.

See also Lee et al., supra note 23, at 947 (“[P]ain perception probably does not function before the third trimester.”).

25. Stuart Derbyshire & Ann Furedi, “Fetal Pain” Is a Misnomer, 313 BRIT.
This reasoning was embraced by the federal district court in *Women’s Medical Professional Corp. v. Voinovich*. The court concluded that the state could not justify a ban on partial-birth abortion, as preventing unnecessary cruelty to the fetus, due to the absence of medical testimony that the fetus “experiences a conscious awareness of pain.” In essence, the court reasoned that absent evidence that the fetus had “mindful awareness” of noxious stimuli, there can be no pain, and in the absence of pain, there can be no cruelty.

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26. See *Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Voinovich*, 911 F. Supp. 1051, 1074 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (“Until medical science advances to a point at which the determination of when a fetus becomes ‘conscious’ can be made within a reasonable degree of certainty, neither doctors nor judges nor legislators can definitively state . . . when the fetus becomes aware of pain.”).

27. *Id.* In *Stenberg v. Carhart*, 530 U.S. 914 (2000), Justice Kennedy provided a layperson’s description of partial-birth abortion or the D & X procedure:

In the D & X, the abortionist initiates the woman’s natural delivery process by causing the cervix of the woman to be dilated, sometimes over a sequence of days. The fetus’ arms and legs are delivered outside the uterus while the fetus is alive; witnesses to the procedure report seeing the body of the fetus moving outside the woman’s body. At this point, the abortion procedure has the appearance of a live birth . . . . With only the head of the fetus remaining in utero, the abortionist tears open the skull. According to Dr. Martin Haskell, a leading proponent of the procedure, the appropriate instrument to be used at this stage of the abortion is a pair of scissors. Witnesses report observing the portion of the fetus outside the woman react to the skull penetration. The abortionist then inserts a suction tube and vacuums out the developing brain and other matter found within the skull. The process of making the size of the fetus’ head smaller is given the clinically neutral term “reduction procedure.” Brain death does not occur until after the skull invasion, and, according to Dr. Carhart, the heart of the fetus may continue to beat for minutes after the contents of the skull are vacuumed out. The abortionist next completes the delivery of a dead fetus, intact except for the damage to the head and the missing contents of the skull.

*Id.* at 959–60 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).


29. *Id.* at 1074; see also Interview by Bob Abernethy with Peter Singer, Professor, Princeton Univ., in *Religion & Ethics Newsweekly* (PBS television
B. Behavioral and Physiological Responses

Other physicians and scientists have rejected the requirement of consciousness as a predicate to the experience of pain. These doctors argue that observed physiological and behavioral responses to noxious stimuli are reliable indicators of pain, particularly for those individuals who are not capable of the self-reporting. Even those who deny the existence of fetal pain prior to self-consciousness concede unborn children respond to painful stimuli at or before eighteen weeks of gestation:

It is known that the fetus withdraws from a needle from about 18 weeks and also launches a stress response following needle puncture. The stress response includes the release of hormones and neurotransmitters dependent on activity in areas of the midbrain. These findings confirm that signals about tissue damage are transmitted from the spinal cord and brainstem to the midbrain from at least 18 weeks.

Physicians and scientists recognizing the existence of fetal pain prior to viability argue that absent the ability to self-report, physical evidence of pain-like responses should be viewed as “infantile forms of self-report and should not be discounted as ‘surrogate measures’ of pain.” While conceding the lack of

31. Behavioral changes include withdrawal of affected body parts, crying, and facial expressions. Id.
33. FETAL AWARENESS, supra note 23, at 5.
34. Anand & Craig, supra note 32, at 5; see also Vivette Glover & Nicholas Fisk, We Don’t Know Better; Better to Err on the Safe Side from Mid-gestation, 313 BRIT. MED. J. 796, 796 (1996) (arguing that fetal stress responses may be
perfect correspondence between behavioral and physiological indicia and the actual experience of pain, these physicians and scientists note that self-reports of pain and the actual experience of pain also lack a perfect correspondence. They argue that the burden of proof is on those who deny the existence of fetal pain in the face of the physical evidence, rather than upon those who seek to respond to the evidence by attempting to alleviate pain.

C. Neurological Development

Those subscribing to the view that fetal pain should be presumed in cases involving physiological and behavioral responses regularly refer to the development of the fetal nervous system to reinforce their argument. The spinal cord and brain develop within the human embryo’s neural tube, which forms within the first two or three weeks of gestation. Within the first

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35. See Anand & Craig, supra note 32, at 3 (describing self-reports as a “faulty source of inference”).


If the assumption that infants experience pain is correct, then the benefits are measured by a decrease in needless human suffering. The cost of a mistaken assumption of infant pain would be to waste the effort. Costs and benefits come down squarely on the side of assuming that infants do experience pain. The burden of proof should be shifted to those who maintain that infants do not feel pain.

See also Sampsa Vanhatalo & Onno van Nieuwenhuizen, Fetal Pain?, 22 BRAIN & DEV. 145, 149 (2000) (stating that the proper response to evidence of fetal response to noxious stimuli is to avoid or treat any possibly noxious stimuli rather than speculate on the possible emotional experiences of pain by the fetus or neonate); John Wyatt, When Do We Begin to Feel the Pain?, GUARDIAN, Oct. 24, 1996, at 2

While responsible scientists have a duty to emphasise what they don’t know, doctors have a duty of care that should lead them to err on the side of caution. If there is a possibility of lasting harm, we must act in the best interests of our patients even when the evidence is ambiguous. We should, in the words of Glover [a clinical scientist in the psychobiology group at Queen Charlotte’s and Chelsea Hospital in London], ‘give the foetus the benefit of the doubt,’ and extend the use of effective pain relief to surgical procedures before birth.

37. The language and content of Part III.C draw substantially from Collett, Fetal Pain Legislation, supra note 11, at 165–68.

38. PARLIAMENTARY OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH., supra note 30, at 2.
four weeks following conception, the primitive structures of the brain are recognizable.39 The internal structure of the brain continues to develop throughout the pregnancy and during the first year of infancy into a complex structure that regulates many distinct physical processes.40

In addition to the brain and spinal cord, the human nervous system consists of an intricate network of peripheral receptors and transmitters.41 The receptors specifically involved in discerning pain are called nociceptors.42 Nociceptors are naked nerve endings that lie free in the skin, with their cell bodies in the dorsal root ganglia.43 They respond to pressure stimuli, thermal stimuli, and chemical stimuli, and transmit their sensory signals through the spinal cord to the brain via cutaneous nerve fibers.44 The network of nociceptors and fibers develops in the period from seven to twenty weeks’ gestation, beginning in the skin of the face, then to the palms of the hands and soles of the feet, until it covers the entire body.45 The fibers link to the central nervous system through a network of synapse-like connections to the cells of the fetal dorsal horn in the spinal cord.46 Neural and chemical connections transmit the impulses received by the dorsal horn to the brain.47

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39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See Fetal Awareness, supra note 23, at 3–4 (“Nociceptors are sensory nerve terminals found in the skin and internal organs that convert tissue damage into electrical signals. The pattern and strength of these nociceptor signals is the first determining step in generating pain.”).
44. See id. (“Two types of dermal nociceptor exist: high threshold mechanoreceptors (HTMs), which respond to pressure and transmit impulses . . . and polymodal receptors (PMNs), which respond to pressure, thermal and chemical stimuli.”).
As the brain receives the impulses, they enter the thalamus. The thalamus registers the impulse and, if it identifies the impulse as one of organic pain, this portion of the brain sends physiological signals to the motor nerves to initiate the body's complex reflexive response to pain. After interconnection, the thalamus can also transmit the initial impulse to the cortex of the brain, where complex processing, including psychological reaction and directed physical responses, takes place. Although both the thalamus and cortex are recognizable in the basic brain structure from about six weeks' gestation, they continue to grow in size and internal structure throughout the pregnancy. The thalamus, however, develops and interconnects with the nervous system much earlier than the cortex. By twelve weeks of gestation, the thalamus is mature enough to receive impulses from the sensory network. Only at or beyond twenty weeks is the interconnection between the thalamus and the cortex sufficiently developed for the cortex to receive the impulses transmitted from the network via the thalamus.

From a neurological development perspective, the key to answering the question of whether fetuses experience pain
depends primarily upon the development and function of the various regions of the brain. Although simple reflex responses are observable even after only seven weeks of gestation, the brain is not yet involved in the process. Without any brain activity, there can be no perception of pain, according to the current consensus of the medical community. But medical opinion divides over whether the cortex exclusively controls the human fetus’s perception of pain, or whether the thalamus and lower brain stem can generate these perceptions.

According to some physicians, the earlier development of the thalamus and lower brain stem is sufficient for pain perception. Based on evidence obtained by observing anencephalic and hydranencephalic infants who have no or minimal cortex development, these experts assert that pain perception does not depend upon established connections from the thalamus to the cortex and can exist after the thalamus establishes its connection with the sensory network:

57. See Comm’n on Inquiry into Fetal Sentience, Human Sentience Before Birth § 5.2 (1996), available at http://www.prolifeinfo.ie/am_cms_media/uploaded/d/0e1625729_docacvpainhumansentience-before-birth.doc ("It is commonly believed that without the cortex, the large mass of brain involved in intricate decision-making, thought and controlled behaviour, there can be no experience of pain.").
58. See id. § 5.3.

Professor Fitzgerald claimed that to challenge the idea that the cortex was the only region of awareness would challenge “the very basis of our understanding of the brain . . . .[,] It is a basic acceptance of the scientific and medical community that the cortex is the site of experience, of understanding, of emotion, of interaction with the outside world . . . The cortex is what makes us into living, reacting, individuals.” However, some scientists do challenge this thinking. (omissions in original).
59. Id. § 5.3.2.
60. See id. § 5.3.1 ("[T]he evidence from such children challenges the doctrine that the cortex is required for all conscious awareness. The possibility is therefore increasing that the fetus could be aware and have consciousness once lower structures in the brain are formed."). “The thalamus (rather than the sensory cortex) is thought to be the crucial structure for the perception of some types of sensation, especially pain, and the sensory cortex may function to give finer detail to the sensation.” Stephen G. Waxman, Correlative Neuroanatomy 125 (24th ed. 2000). This conclusion, although distinguishable, is consistent with the statement of the American Academy of Pediatrics that “[t]he decision [to administer anesthesia to neonates undergoing surgical
Despite total or near-total absence of the cortex, these children [with hydrocephaly] clearly possess discriminative awareness. They distinguish familiar from unfamiliar people and environments and are capable of social interaction, visual orienting, musical preferences, appropriate affective responses, and associative learning. . . .

Multiple lines of evidence thus corroborate that the key mechanism of consciousness or conscious sensory perception are not dependent on cortical activity. Consistent with this evidence, the responses to noxious stimulation of children with hydranencephaly are purposeful, coordinated, and similar to those of intact children.61

Because the thalamus connection to the sensory network can be established as early as twelve weeks of gestation, some experts would date possible pain perception at twelve to thirteen weeks.62 Other physicians argue that the cortex–thalamus connection is necessary to experience pain.63 Since this connection is established at the earliest between twenty and twenty-four weeks of gestation, these experts assert that only those fetuses of twenty or more weeks of gestation can experience pain.64

63. See Lee et al., supra note 23, at 952 (“While the presence of thalamocortical fibers is necessary for pain perception, their mere presence is insufficient—this pathway must also be functional.”).
64. Id.; see also Derbyshire & Furedi, supra note 25, at 912 (stating that the “neuroanatomical system for pain can be considered complete by 26 weeks gestation”); David J. Meller et al., *The Importance of “Awareness” for Understanding Fetal Pain*, 49 BRAIN RES. REV. 455, 456 (2005) (“[T]he final critical cortico-thalamic connections appear to be present by 24–28 weeks of gestation. This suggests that the fetus could potentially be able to feel pain by the third trimester, at least in a rudimentary fashion.” (footnotes omitted)); Richard P. Smith et al., *Pain and Stress in the Human Fetus*, 92 EURO. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY & REPROD. BIOLOGY 161, 161–62 (2001) (noting the neuroanatomical pathways necessary to feel pain begin to develop at 22 weeks,
State legislatures throughout the country have waded into the debate between physicians and scientists over these questions, with thirteen states concluding that there is substantial medical evidence that the unborn can feel pain and that abortion should be strictly limited at and after twenty weeks’ gestation.65 Courts are now considering whether such legislative conclusions provide an adequate basis for statutory bans on abortions at twenty weeks’ gestation and later.66 In Gonzales v. Carhart,67 the majority noted “[m]edical uncertainty does not foreclose the exercise of legislative power in the abortion context any more than it does in other contexts.”68 In light of the Supreme Court’s treatment of congressional findings regarding the partial-birth abortion procedure in Gonzales, it seems likely the laws will be upheld.69

IV. Federal Constitutional Analysis of Abortion Regulation

In Roe v. Wade,70 the Supreme Court declared that the Constitution contained an implicit right to obtain an abortion.71 The Court characterized the right as the logical extension of another implied right—the right to use contraception—which was grounded in the implied right to privacy.72 In so holding, however, the Court recognized that the abortion decision was unique:

As we have intimated above, it is reasonable and appropriate for a State to decide that at some point in time another interest, that of health of the mother or that of potential human life, becomes significantly involved. The woman’s

and are complete at 26 weeks).

65. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (listing the thirteen state statutes).

66. See, e.g., supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing a federal court decision that addressed a state’s fetal pain statute).


68. Id. at 129.


70. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

71. Id. at 153.

72. Id. at 152.
privacy is no longer sole and any right of privacy she possesses must be measured accordingly.73

Unlike contraception, abortion involves both the mother and “a whole, separate, unique, living human being” that she carries.74

Roe established what was to become a “rigid trimester analysis,” permitting virtually no regulation of abortion during the first trimester, and regulations directed only at preserving maternal health in the second trimester.75 The state could protect unborn human life by prohibiting abortions only in the third trimester after the child was “viable” or capable of living outside the womb,76 and then only if the abortion was not necessary to preserve the life or the health of the mother.77

This trimester approach to abortion legislation was criticized by four members of the Court in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services78:

We think that the doubt cast upon the Missouri statute by these cases is not so much a flaw in the statute as it is a reflection of the fact that the rigid trimester analysis of the course of a pregnancy enunciated in Roe has resulted in subsequent cases like Colautti and Akron making constitutional law in this area a virtual Procrustean bed.79

73. Id. at 159.
74. See Planned Parenthood v. Rounds Minn., N.D., S.D., 530 F.3d 724, 735 (8th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (upholding a South Dakota law requiring that women be informed that abortion ends the “life of a whole, separate, unique, living human being,” and finding that opponents of the definition provided “no evidence to the contrary”).
76. A viable fetus is “potentially able to live outside the mother’s womb, albeit with artificial aid,” and presumably capable of “meaningful life outside the mother’s womb.” Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160–63 (1973); see also Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 388 (1979) (“Viability is reached when, in the judgment of the attending physician on the particular facts of the case before him, there is a reasonable likelihood of the fetus’ sustained survival outside the womb, with or without artificial support.”). Medical authorities most commonly place viability between twenty-two and twenty-six weeks gestation. MS Pignotti, The Definition of Human Viability: A Historical Perspective, 99 ACTA PAEDIATRICA 33, 35 (2010).
77. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163–64.
79. Id. at 517.
The plurality opinion recognized that the State’s interest in protecting fetal life existed throughout the pregnancy: “[W]e do not see why the State’s interest in protecting potential human life should come into existence only at the point of viability, and that there should therefore be a rigid line allowing state regulation after viability but prohibiting it before viability.”

Ultimately the trimester approach was rejected by the Court in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, because the trimester framework “misconceives the nature of the pregnant woman’s interest; and in practice it undervalues the State’s interest in potential life, as recognized in Roe.” The Justices, however, retained fetal viability as a measure of constitutional significance.

To date, most cases regarding the ability of states to prohibit abortions after viability have focused on the method of determining viability. The existence of this rule, and the Court’s acceptance of the state’s compelling interest in protecting viable unborn children, however, does not foreclose the establishment of a separate and independent state interest in preserving the lives of unborn children at the point when they are capable of feeling pain.

V. Fetal Pain as an Independent State Interest

The Supreme Court has never been asked whether the state’s interest in protecting unborn children who have the capacity to feel pain is sufficiently compelling to support a limited prohibition on abortion. Challenges to Pain-Capable Child Protection Acts require courts to determine whether the capacity

80. Id. at 519.
82. Id. at 873.
83. See id. at 879 (“[A] State may not prohibit any woman from making the ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy before viability.”).
84. See, e.g., Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051, 1077 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (“[I]t appears that the physician cannot rely solely on his or her own best clinical judgment in determining whether a fetus is viable; instead, that determination must be objectively reasonable as well, that is, reasonable to other physicians, as well as to the physician making the determination.” (footnote omitted)).
to feel pain, independent of fetal viability, is sufficient to sustain a limited prohibition on abortion. While opponents argue vigorously that the pain capacity of the previable unborn should be legally irrelevant,\textsuperscript{85} there are several indications by various members of the Supreme Court that suggest the limited protection afforded to pain-capable unborn children may be constitutional.\textsuperscript{86}

Just as the issue of abortion deeply divides the American people, abortion cases divide the Supreme Court, with many of the most significant rulings being plurality opinions. Among the most prominent examples are the plurality opinions in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services\textsuperscript{87} and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.\textsuperscript{88} Recent abortion cases such as Casey and Gonzales v. Carhart suggest a growing willingness of the Court to recognize and weigh multiple state interests in assessing the constitutionality of an abortion regulation.

In Stenberg v. Carhart,\textsuperscript{89} Justice Kennedy emphasized that Casey held it was “inappropriate for the Judicial Branch to provide an exhaustive list of state interests implicated by abortion” and that “Casey is premised on the states having an important constitutional role in defining their interests in the abortion debate.”\textsuperscript{90} In Gonzales, Justice Kennedy described the state’s interest in the protection of fetal life as substantial at all points: “Casey struck a balance that was central to its holding, and the Court applies Casey’s standard here. A central premise of Casey’s joint opinion . . . [is] that the government has a


\textsuperscript{86} See, e.g., Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 778 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[T]he State’s interest in the protection of an embryo . . . increases progressively and dramatically as the organism’s capacity to feel pains, to experience pleasure, to survive, and to react to its surroundings increases day by day.”).

\textsuperscript{87} 492 U.S. 490 (1989).

\textsuperscript{88} 505 U.S. 833 (1992).

\textsuperscript{89} 530 U.S. 914 (2000).

\textsuperscript{90} Id. at 961 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
legitimate, substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal life . . . ” 91

In Gonzales, the Court upheld the federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act, which made no distinction based on viability: “The Act does apply both previability and postviability because, by common understanding and scientific terminology, a fetus is a living organism while within the womb, whether or not it is viable outside the womb.” 92 Justice Kennedy, author of the majority opinion, emphasized the State’s interest in protecting the fetus: “Casey struck a balance that was central to its holding, and the Court applies Casey’s standard here. A central premise of Casey’s joint opinion . . . [is] that the government has a legitimate, substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal life . . . ” 93

Recognition of a compelling state interest in the protection of pain-capable unborn children does not require the Court to reject a woman’s liberty interest in obtaining an abortion or the balancing framework of Casey—it only asks the Court to recognize the legislature’s ability to weigh and rely upon new scientific evidence supporting a strong state interest in regulating abortions at twenty weeks’ gestation. Even former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stevens, who during his tenure on the Court repeatedly voted to strike down abortion regulations, listed the “organism’s capacity to feel pain” as a ground on the basis of which “the State’s interest in the protection of an embryo . . . increases progressively and dramatically.” 94 He noted that “[t]he development of a fetus—and pregnancy itself—are not static conditions, and the assertion that the government’s interest is static simply ignores this reality.” 95

These statements all suggest possible movement away from viability as the sole constitutional marker of legislative power to limit abortions, and toward a more nuanced and balanced

92. Id. at 147.
93. Id. at 126.
95. Id. at 778.
approach that would include consideration of the unborn child’s pain.

VI. Responding to the Claim that Late Abortions Are Too Few to Be of Concern

Some opponents of Pain-Capable Child Protection Acts argue that the legislation is unnecessary given the small percentage of abortions occurring after the first trimester of pregnancy.96 While it is true that the percentage of abortions occurring at or after twenty weeks in the pregnancy is relatively small,97 the issue is not insignificant. Twenty-three percent of all abortion providers in the United States offer abortions at twenty weeks.98 In 2009, of the 1.21 million abortions performed in the United States, more than 18,000 were performed after twenty-one weeks’ gestation.99

In any context other than abortion, 18,000 lost lives would generate massive federal and state efforts to prevent these deaths. Two examples illustrate this point. An estimated 15,529 people with an AIDS diagnosis died in 2010.100 In that same year the federal government spent $19.6 billion for HIV/AIDS care, housing, prevention, and research.101 For 2014 the President proposed to increase domestic HIV/AIDS funding to $23.2 billion.102

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96. Engelman, supra note 11, at 311.
97. See Guttmacher Inst., Facts on Induced Abortion in the United States 2 (2013), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb_induced_abortion.pdf (reporting that 1.2% of all abortions in 2010 were performed at or after twenty-one weeks gestation).
98. Id.
99. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (describing the low percentage of abortions performed after twenty-one weeks gestation).
102. Id.
Drunk driving laws and government prevention programs provide another example of substantial government efforts to save a small number of lives. According to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 10,322 people were killed in alcohol-impaired-driving crashes in 2012.\textsuperscript{103} Federal and state laws criminalize alcohol-impaired driving and state participation in federal transportation funding is conditioned upon various educational and enforcement efforts to prevent these deaths.\textsuperscript{104}

Many Americans believe that saving 18,000 unborn children from pain is as important as saving the 15,000 AIDS patients or the 10,000 victims of drunk driving, and well worth the effort to pass, enforce, and defend Pain-Capable Child Protection Acts.\textsuperscript{105}

\textbf{VII. Conclusion}

If there is a single issue in the abortion debate where common ground could be found, one would hope it might be on the issue of protecting the unborn from the pain of abortion by limiting abortions at twenty weeks or later to cases in which the mother’s life or physical health is at stake. Legislatures in thirteen states have enacted laws that say that babies cannot be

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In a nationwide poll of 1,003 registered voters in March, The Polling Company found that 64% would support a law such as the Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act prohibiting abortion after 20 weeks—when an unborn baby can feel pain—unless the life of the mother is in danger. Only 30% opposed such legislation. (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
aborted from the point that substantial medical evidence demonstrates the child can feel pain—twenty weeks.106 Pain-Capable Child Protection Acts are innovative only insofar as the legislation relies upon scientific evidence establishing the unborn child’s capacity to feel pain at twenty weeks’ gestation and concludes that the acquisition of this capacity makes that child sufficiently like the rest of us to mark a tipping point—a tipping point at which it becomes constitutional for states to restrict abortion to cases involving pregnancies that pose a threat to the mother’s life or substantial impairment of a major bodily function. The evidence of the unborn child’s pain was not available to the U.S. Supreme Court when it created the constitutional right to abortion in 1973. Both pro-life and pro-choice justices have acknowledged the relevance of pain in adjudicating abortion cases.107 It is time for the Court to review the evidence and adjust its constitutional jurisprudence to reflect the medical reality of fetal pain and respect the state’s right to intervene and protect the child.

106. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (listing the thirteen state statutes).

107. See supra notes 90–95 and accompanying text (discussing opinions of Justice Kennedy and Justice Stevens).