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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA

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Record No. 850604

ROBERT P. HUDOCK,

Appellant,

V.

VIRGINIA STATE BAR, EX REL. TENTH DISTRICT COMMITTEE,

Appellee

APPENDIX

Robert P. Hudock, pro se Robert P. Hudock & Associates 8150 Leesburg Pike, Suite 1200 Vienna, Virginia 22180 (703) 893-0760



CHARLES G. JAMES, CHARMAN ROBERT P. JOYNER, COMMISSIONEP WILLIAM E. O'NEILL, COMMISSIONER

COMMONWEALTH of VIRGINIA

L W HINER CHIEF
DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
LOU-ANN D. JOYNER, CLERK

DEPARTMENT OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF VIRGINIA

P. O. BOX 1794 RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23214

April 13, 1984

DEPUTY COMMISSIONED KENNETH S. WILHO'T WILLIAM R YATES JERRY O TALTON

REGIONAL OFFICERS

ALEXANDRIA
CAROLYN J. COLVILLE
LAWRENCE D. TARR

LEBANON JOHN COSTA

NORFOLK ROBERT J. MACBETH. JR

Mr. Michael Rigsby Bar Counsel Virginia State Bar 700 Building Suite 1622 Richmond, Virginia 23219

Dear Mr. Rigsby:

Please find enclosed materials relative to a complaint the Industrial Commission of Virginia wishes to file against Robert P. Hudock, Esquire. The Commission entered an Order of compromise settlement on May 26, 1981, wherein, Robert P. Hudock, Esquire, was awarded the amount of \$2,500, as counsel fees to be deducted from the gross settlement in the amount of \$15,000.00.

Section 65.1-102 provides that fees of attorneys shall be subject to the approval and award of the Commission.

It came to our attention in February that Mr. Hudock had collected a total fee in the amount of \$5,000.00 for services rendered. Our numerous attemps to solve this matter have been ineffectual to date.

We are requesting that the appropriate committee investigate this matter. I am available at your convenience to discuss same and thank you in advance for your cooperation.

Very truly yours,

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF VIRGINIA

Andrew Edelstein Claims Manager

AE:meb enclosure

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CHARLES G. JAMES, CHARMAN ROBERT P. JOYNER, COMMISSIONER WILLIAM E. O'NEILL, COMMISSIONER

L. W. HINER, CHIEF DEPUTY COMMISSIONER LOU-ANN D. JOYNER, CLERK

COMMONWEALTH of VIRGINIA

DEPARTMENT OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF VIRGINIA

P. O. BOX 1794 RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23214

June 20, 1984

DEPUTY COMMISSIONERS
KENNETH S WILHOIT
WILLIAM R YATES
JERRY O, TALTON

REGIONAL OFFICERS

ALEXANDRIA

CAROLYN J. COLVILLE
LAWRENCE D. TARR

LEBANON JOHN COSTA

NORFOLK ROBERT J. MACBETH, JR.

Commonwealth of Virginia Virginia State Bar Tenth District Committee Suite 420 6400 Arlington Boulevard Falls Church, Virginia 22046

Attention: Kathe Anderson, Esquire

Re: VSB Docket No. 84-474

Robert Hudock - BC-DC-10

Complainant: Industrial Commission

Dear Ms. Anderson:

This is in response to your letter of June 13, 1984.

Please be advised that the Commission has referred this case to the Hearing Docket for an evidentiary hearing. You may want to hold the investigation in abeyance, pending the disposition of this matter before the Industrial Commission of Virginia.

We appreciate your time and efforts. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you would like to discuss this matter further.

Very truly yours,

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF VIRGINIA

L. W. Hiner

Chief Deputy Commissioner

LWH:meb

cc: Robert P. Hudock & Associates 8150 Leesburg Pike, Suite 1200

Tysons Corner

Vienna, Virginia 22180

VIRGINIA STATE BAR



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TENTH DISTRICT COMMITTEE

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IN THE MATTER OF:

VSB NO. 84-474

The above-entitled matter came on for hearing at

11:45 a.m. in the offices of Boothe, Prichard and Dudley, 4103 Chain Bridge Road, Fairfax, Virginia, on Tuesday,

September 18, 1984.

ROBERT P. HUDOCK, ESQUIRE

APPEARANCES

Committee:

Vincent W. McAlevy, Esquire, Chairman Ann W. Mische, Esquire John A. C. Keith, Esquire Thomas J. Cawley, Esquire Arthur B. Vieregg, Jr., Esquire Terrence R. Ney, Esquire Mr. G. William Graves

Harry M. Hirsch, Esquire Assistant Bar Counsel

Mr. William J. Madigan, Jr.

Kathryn M. Anderson, Esquire Counsel for the Committee

Andrew Edelstein, Complainant

Robert P. Hudock, Esquire Respondent

Reporter: Gaye C. Johnson, RPR

Maureen McMahon Court Reporting. 12974 Ridgemist Lane Faitfax, Va. 22033

12974 Ridgemist Lane Faitfax, Va. 22033

(703) 631.1052

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But isn't it true that in that file, there is nothing in there that indicates there was any inquiry as to what was in the Dest interest of Bernice Smith?

The decision is based on looking -- by the Chief Deputy, based on looking at the medical reports, looking at the circumstances surrounding it and making a judgment call whether they feel that the compromise would be in her best interest.

Do you know if Mrs. Smith is competent to manage \$12,500 placed in her hands?

MS. ANDERSON: I think that this is irrelevant.

THE CHAIRMAN: I sustain the objection.

BY MR. HUDOCK:

Does the Industrial Commission have any control over a what Mrs. Smith does with the money when she receives it?

MS. ANDERSON: I think that's irrelevant, too.

THE CHAIRMAN: No. Answer the question.

THE WITNESS: All right. There are situations where they will put controls. But in this instance, no, there was no limitation placed on her.

BY MR. HUDOCK:

So it would be no violation of the order of the commission or rules if Mrs. Smith took that money and gambled it away; isn't that true?

> Maureen McMahon Court Reporting 12974 Ridgemist Lane Faitfax, Va. 22033

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| - 1 | Andrew EdelsteinCross Examination |
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| | |
| 1 | A None whatsoever. |
| 2 | MS. ANDERSON: He is asking him to rule what the |
| 3 | committee is supposed to be doing. |
| 4 | THE CHAIRMAN: Well, he can't answer that question. |
| 5 | I sustain the objection. |
| 6 | BY MR. HUDOCK: |
| 7 | Q Well, isn't it true that you don't really inquire |
| 8 | as to what Mrs. Smith or any other lump sum settlement claim- |
| 9 | ant is going to do with the money once they get it? |
| 10 | A. You are asking in all settlements? |
| 11 | Q. Well, I am asking you in this settlement, did you |
| 12 | inquire of Mrs. Smith what she was going to do with her |
| 13 | \$12,500? |
| 14 | A. Again, I personally didn't approve this settlement. |
| 15 | But there was no evidence in the file that there was or that |
| 16 | those questions were asked, no. |
| 17 | Q Well, then isn't it true that Mrs. Smith can do |
| 18 | anything she wants with that \$12,500? |
| 19 | A. It's also true that we have |
| 20 | Q Just answer the question. |
| 21 | A. Yes. |
| 22 | Q And she could drink it away if she wants to? |
| 23 | A. She could. |
| 24 | Q She could gamble it away if she wants to? |
| 25 | THE CHAIRMAN: That's already been answered, |
| | 14 14 1 0 0 |

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12974 Ridgemist Lane Fairfax, Va. 22033

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or so if you want.

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concluded.)

Maureen McMahon Court Reporting
12974 Ridgemist Lane
Fairles Vo. 22033

(Whereupon, the hearing in the above-entitled matter was

Fairfax, Va. 22033

MR. EDELSTEIN: It should be out in the next week

THE CHAIRMAN: Well, we will deliberate with what we have right now.

(Whereupon, a recess was taken for the Committee to deliberate.)

THE CHAIRMAN: The Committee has considered the testimony as brought forth during the hearing in the case of Robert Hudock, 84-474 and with regard to the allegation of DR 1-102(A)(1), the Committee finds that there is no violation. With regard to DR 1-102(A)(4), the Committee finds that there is no violation. With regard to DR 2-105(A), the Committee finds that there has been a violation of that DR in that it is in the opinion of the Committee that the fee in excess of the \$2,500.00 from the Industrial Commission was illegal and in violation of the Code of Virginia, Section 65.1-102 and that it was excessive as defined in DR 2-105, Subsection B, Subsection 3, which states that a fee is excessive when it is in excess of the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services. In violation of DR 2-105, the Committee has further decided to certify the matter for further consideration to the Grievance Committee in Richmond. My Hudock will receive a letter to that effect very shortly.



VIRGINIA STATE BAR

TENTH DISTRICT COMMITTEE PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL


October 5, 1984

E. Samuel Clifton
Executive Director
Virginia State Bar
Suite 1622, 700 Building
700 East Main Street
Richmond, Virginia 23219

Vincent W. McAlevy, Esq.

2201 Wilson Boulevard

Arlington, VA 22201



CERTIFICATION

Re: BC-DC-10-Hudock, Robert P.

Complaint by: Industrial Commission of Virginia

VSB Docket No.: 84-474

Dear Mr. Clifton:

Following is the Certification by the 10th District Committee of the above-referenced matter.

I. STATEMENT OF MISCONDUCT

- 1. The Committee found that Mr. Hudock accepted a fee in excess of that awarded by the Industrial Commission of Virginia.
- 2. The Committee found that this acceptance constituted a violation of Disciplinary Rule 2-105(A) in that it was a clearly excessive fee as that term is defined in Disciplinary Rule 2-105(b)(3) and that such fee violates Virginia Code §65.1-102.

II. TRANSCRIPT AND EVIDENCE

The transcript and exhibits received or refused at the hearing pertaining to, or considered by, the Committee in certifying the foregoing misconduct will be sent to you under separate cover by Maureen McMahon, the court reporter at the hearing. Enclosed please find all other documents relating to the misconduct.

Respectfully submitted,

Vincent W. McAlevy

Chairman

Date Executed: 10/9/84

AFFIDAVIT

COUNTY OF ARLINGTON

STATE OF VIRGINIA, to-wit:

This day Vincent W. McAlevy appeared before me and made oath that the foregoing statements are true to the best of his knowledge and belief.

Warlene S. Z. Notary 6/19/88.

My Commission expires

cc: Michael Rigsby

Kathryn M. Anderson

Maureen McMahon

m D. Dolan, III, President Suite Three Forth Henderson Road Iton, Virginia 22203 none: 703-243-5000

t H. Patterson, Jr., President-Elect loss Building nond, Virginia 23219 hone: 804-644-4131

T. Mayo, Jr., Immediate Past President Box 3037 olk, Virginia 23514 hone: 804-622-3000



Virginia State Bar

Suite 1022, not Building, not East Main Street Richmond, Virginia 23210 • 504 n80-2001

October 31, 1984

N. Samuel Clifton. Executive Director Telephone: 804-786-5970

Michael L. Rigsby, Bar Counsel Telephone: 804-786-5956

Juanita T. Stevenson Director of Administration Telephone. 804-786-5971

Elizabeth L. Keller Director of Bar Services Telephone: 804-786-5961

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL CERTIFIED MAIL RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED

Re: Virginia State Bar Ex Rel Tenth District Committee v. Robert P. Hudock, Respondent Disciplinary Board Docket No. 84-38

STATEMENT OF CHARGES OF MISCONDUCT

- 1. Robert P. Hudock represented a client in a matter before the Industrial Commission of Virginia in which an order was entered May 25, 1981, indicating a total compromise settlement award of \$15,000 out of which a \$2,500 attorneys fee was to be paid to Mr. Hudock, leaving the claimant with the sum of \$12,500.
- 2. Mr. Hudock had a contingency agreement with the client calling for a one—third contingency fee in the matter.
- 3. Mr. Hudock accepted \$2,500 from his client in addition to the \$2,500 fee awarded by the Commission, for a total of \$5,000 attorneys fee.

Such conduct by Robert P. Hudock constitutes Misconduct in violation of Disciplinary Rules 2-105(A), 2-105(B)(3) of the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility.

Harry M. Hirsch

HMH:mib

ROBERT P. HUDOCK DOCKET NO. 84-38

DR 2-105 Fees for Legal Services.

- (A) A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect an illegal or clearly excessive fee.
- (B) A fee is clearly excessive when, after a review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be left with a definite and firm conviction that the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee. Factors to be considered as guides in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:
 - (3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.

1 DISCIPLINARY 2 BOARD of the 3 VIRGINIA 5 STATE BAR 7 8 9 Robert P. Hudock Respondent 10 11 12 13 Docket No. 84-38 14 15 16 17 May 16, 1985 Richmond, Virginia 18 19 20 21 22 HALASZ & HALASZ 23 Court Reporters P. O. Box 223 Richmond, Virginia 23203 24 (804) 741-5200 25 Reported by: Victoria V. Halasz

Appellant's Argument on Motion 1 disbarment. 2 Any questions, sir, as to the procedure? 3 MR. HUDOCK: I have some preliminary motions I would like to raise before the proceeding goes forward. 4 have filed some of these motions in written form and I ask 5 6 they be ruled on prior to proceeding with the hearing. THE CHAIRMAN: Do you have any questions as to 7 procedure before we get to the motion? 8 9 MR. HUDOCK: No no questions as to procedure except the question of what is the standard of finding of 10 11 misconduct, is it under the standard of clear and convincing evidence? 12 THE CHAIRMAN: Clear and convincing evidentiary 13 14 standard. Do you want to make your motions, Mr. Hudock? 15 16 MR. HUDOCK: Yes. 17 First --18 THE CHAIRMAN: Would you come up here, please? 19 MR. HUDOCK: I am sorry. 20 This matter was reviewed by a district 21 committee and the district committee certified so-called charges to this board. I would first move to dismiss the 22 23 proceeding because the district committee's certification is

not in line with the disciplinary rules. The review of the

transcript and the finding of that committee's review used

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the standard of finding that I may have charged an excessive legal fee.

However, the statement rendered by the chairman of that committee used the term excessive legal fee. But the rule and the standard is a clearly excessive fee. And further the standard for whether or not it is clearly excessive is the fee customarily charged for similar services. And there was not one scintilla of evidence at that committee hearing as to what anyone else charged but me in terms of legal services for legally charging for similar services.

Therefore, the district committee has certified a charge which does not meet the disciplinary rules and, therefore, I ask that these charges be dismissed.

I will go through them all or one at a time.

THE CHAIRMAN: Go through them all.

MR. HUDOCK: The complainant here is the

Industrial Commission of Virginia. Not any private person.

It's my understanding that there will be no representative of

the Industrial Commission here. I have no opportunity

therefore to cross-examine a complainant, there is no

complainant to testify at this hearing.

THE CHAIRMAN: Without interrupting you, isn't

the issue really very simple, what the award was of the

Industrial Commission and what your fee arrangements were

THE WITNESS: The manner in which my firm does it is the way I do it, of course, and that we prepare the petition and order because the understanding is that it must be approved by the Industrial Commission, the entire settlement. We leave a blank space when the lump sum is agreed upon, that figure is placed on the papers.

Then for the attorney's fee a blank space is left for the Industrial Commission to determine and write in the attorney's fee. Then obviously they will also write in the balance that the complainant is to receive, which will be the total sum minus the attorney fee.

BY MR. RIGSBY:

- Q What law firm do you work with?
 - Name of the law firm is Ashcraft & Gerel.
- Q Are you a partner or an associate?
- A I am an associate.
 - Q As an associate, you follow the instructions the firm gives you?
 - A That is right, that is correct.
 - Q What is the area of practice Ashcraft & Gerel engages in?
 - A Well, now with reference to our Virginia practice, it is primarily workmen's comp. If I were to give a percentage break down, which would not be exact, but approximately 75 percent of the practice in Virginia is

BY MR. HUDOCK:

Q Mr. Swiger, you said there is an opportunity for reconsideration of a legal fee; would you point out any section in the Code of Virginia which allows you to appeal the attorney's fee granted in a compromised settlement case?

A Without having the book before me, I would assume -- now I have never specifically had to do it procedurally, because my practice has been if I were to receive a fee and I thought it was inappropriate would be to draft a letter to the particular commissioner or deputy commissioner that determined the fee, copy to my client, seeking an adjustment of the fee. I would assume that, just as any other award --

Q I am not asking you to assume, Mr. Swiger. I am asking you to tell us if you know.

A Yes, sir. I have had opportunity to appeal settlement orders, not on attorney's fees but on other circumstances, which led me to believe it was in my client's best interest to have the settlement set aside after it had been approved. And I appeal that in the same manner in which—the same manner as any other award can be appealed, filing the appeal within 20 days of the entry of the settlement order.

Q Have you ever done this to appeal your attorney's fee?

A I have not.

Q And isn't it true there is no such procedure to do that within the Virginia Code and there is the Industrial Commission book if you care to look at it?

MR. MIDDLEDITCH: I think, based on your prior objection, Mr. Hudock, of rendering a legal conclusion, the same question applies to this witness bearing the same problem. That's for us to determine. And you can in your argument, of course, make whatever point you would like on those lines.

THE CHAIRMAN: And I will tell you what bothers me about it, because the words he used was that he would ask them to reconsider. You use the word appeal. He is trying — and he told you the mechanism by which he got them to reconsider which was by writing a letter, which is far different from an appeal. But I want you to understand that we catch these distinctions.

BY MR. HUDOCK:

Q I am glad you brought that out, because I want to pursue that distinction.

The fact is there is no mechanism set out in the statute to even write a letter to request a reconsideration, isn't that true?

THE WITNESS: May I answer that question?

25 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

| 3 | |
|----|---|
| 1 | THE WITNESS: As far as the specific |
| 2 | reconsideration, I don't believe there is a specific |
| 3 | mechanism. |
| 4 | BY MR. HUDOCK: |
| 5 | Q All right. So what you are doing is you are |
| 6 | relying on the cooperation, if you will, of the Industrial |
| 7 | Commission by writing to them informally? |
| 8 | A Well, as I indicated to you, I have had the |
| 9 | opportunity to appeal settlement orders and I have appealed |
| 10 | that in the same manner any other award can be appealed, and |
| 11 | in answer to your previous case that under 60.1-89, which is |
| 12 | the process of appealing the order by the Industrial |
| 13 | Commission. |
| 14 | Q But the appeal was based in behalf of your |
| 15 | client, who was the complainant? |
| 16 | A That is correct. |
| 17 | Q And the complainant is a party before the |
| 18 | Commission, isn't that true? |
| 19 | A That is correct. |
| 20 | Q And you are not a party before the Commission, |
| 21 | are you? |
| 22 | A That is also correct. |
| 23 | Q Now, you said that the procedure at least |
| 24 | during your practice since 1981 was to leave the order blank |
| 25 | and let the Industrial Commission fill in the amount of legal |

fees, is that true?

A If I may correct one apparent mistake that was made with regard to when I started, I was admitted to the Bar in '81 and had a judicial clerkship for one year, I have been practicing for Ashcraft & Gerel and doing workmen's compensation litigation since August 16th of 1982, just so you are clear on that.

Q Limiting it to the period of time you were practicing with Ashcraft & Gerel, that's the procedure you have used?

- A Yes, sir.
- Q And you learned that procedure from the Industrial Commission, didn't you?
 - A No, sir, I learned that from Ashcraft & Gerel.
 - Q Do you know where they learned that procedure?
 - A Really couldn't tell you that.
- Q If a complainant comes into your office to ask you what his rights are regarding workmen's compensation, do you have a right to charge him a fee for that consultation?
 - A You are asking my opinion?
 - Q Yes.
- A In my opinion, on a workmen's compensation case, you may only receive a fee that has been specifically approved by the Industrial Commission. I think if you were to advise the Commission that someone had sought your advice

| A No, sir, in the majority of cases that I have |
|---|
| settled that I have had approved by Mr. Hiner, like I said, |
| at that time most of them would be taken down and be done |
| face-to-face during the time when I had other reviews before |
| the full commission, and he would specifically ask if you had |
| come to any specific agreement with your client, and I would |
| say only the agreement with whatever the Commission |
| determined to be an acceptable fee. |

Q Do you have any idea what the Commission would do with a fee if you said you had a one-third contingency fee?

A I have never asked him to approve a one-third, so I don't have knowledge. I could only speculate.

Q All right. Do you know that there are no published guidelines by the Industrial Commission as to how they set fees?

A That is my understanding, there is no published quideline, yes, sir.

Q And there are no published rules about setting fees?

A That is also my understanding, yes, sir.

Q And in fact they have -- or let's say Mr. Hiner has a standard which he imposes of 15 percent on a typical fee, isn't that true?

A Yes, sir.

percent attorney's fees at the time you submit the order for approval by a commission; is there a -- do you understand what I am saying?

A No, ma'am.

Q I understood you to say that you have on some rare occasions submitted a case of fee on a settlement agreement for approval for the Commission, and that on those some rare occasions you have after that submission gone back to talk more about the attorney's fees, after the initial order.

A No, ma'am, I never had an occasion to go back and ask for attorney's fees. I have had occasion after a case has been approved and settled to have that settlement set aside for various reasons, not involving the attorney's fees.

Q All right. When submitting a settlement agreement that involves what you feel would be attorney's fees in excess of the standard 15 percent, are you aware of some procedure whereby you can bring that to the attention of the Commission prior to their sanctions of your agreement?

A Yes, ma'am, and that would be to very simply to explain to them why you feel a typical fee would be appropriate in the case to show the -- for lack of a better word -- the aggrevating circumstances which would indicate to the Commission why a higher fee would be appropriate in this

case.

Q Would that explanation be in writing, or verbal, or just how would it be made?

A My practice is to put it in writing and copy the client.

Q And what is the practice of your firm, if one exists, if you know?

A That would be the practice. That's what I have been advised to do in situations where I feel the typical 15 percent fee would not accurately reflect the amount of work put into the case.

Q And so I understand you to say there is, other than your firm's practice on that matter, you don't know of any other authority for engaging in that process?

A With regard to the asking for the higher of a typical fee, no, I have not had an opportunity to discuss that with any of my competition who practice from a complainant's point of view.

EXAMINATION BY MR. HASKINS:

O Mr. Swiger, I am interested in specifically the customary fees for workmen's compensation matters and the manner in which they are charged in your locality, which I believe it is Northern Virginia where Mr. Hudock practices. Would it be customary based on your personal knowledge and somewhat of an expert in workmen's compensation law to have

Hudock has talked about typical cases; in a typical case where there are no hearings and simply a proposed or compromised settlement the Commission enters an order, \$15,000 case, would you consider a 33 percent fee to be excessive? Your personal knowledge observation of the practice.

A Yes, I would.

MR. HASKINS: All right, sir. Thank you.

THE CHAIRMAN: Any other panel members have any

questions?

FURTHER EXAMINATION BY MR. MARKOW:

and customs and customary charges and practices where you practice, that is the northern part of Virginia, do you have any knowledge as to whether there has been any change in those practices and those customs prior, well let's say in the two years prior to the time you came to the Bar? You came to the Bar in 1982, right?

- A No, sir, I was admitted in 1981.
- Q But I mean to the -- as a practicioner.
- A Yes, sir.
- 0 '82?
- A August 16th of '82.
 - Q In 1981, do you have any knowledge either way as to whether the customary fee charges and practices you

have talked about were in effect in '80 and '81?

A My understanding was that they were. And the reason, the basis for that understanding is that when I joined the firm of Ashcraft & Gerel and going through my training process, I was advised that was the practice in our firm for attorney's fees. So it was that as of that day and apparently had been for at least some period of time prior to that time.

Q You don't know how long prior to that time?

A No, I wouldn't be able to give you a precise time, no, sir.

Q Have you ever heard anybody indicate to you that the practice has changed?

No, sir.

MR. MIDDLEDITCH: I have got one question.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, sir.

EXAMINATION BY MR. MIDBLEDITCH:

Q I believe you indicated that you had knowledge about contingent fee arrangements and in nonworkmen's compensation cases, did you not?

A Yes, sir.

Q And I think you indicated that at least on one occasion you were familiar with a 40 percent contingency in a medical malpractice case, is that correct?

A That is correct, sir.

determines to be appropriate in a given case.

Q All right, sir, to its customs and traditions and usage as far as is the workmen's camp cases are concerned?

A Well, no, sir. My firm has advised me that 65.1-102 gives the authority to the Industrial Commission to determine the fee. Now, I also have an understanding there are attorneys who sign clients up to a specific agreement and then submit that agreement to the Industrial Commission for approval. And I have been advised that we would be at liberty, we could do that if we like. But our firm does not because of the administrative problems posed by that of keeping track of every minute of every day you put in on a given case, keeping a record of it and submitting it to the Industrial Commission for approval.

So I think the Commission does on cases, because I have personal knowledge from cases where an attorney last involved in a comp case and then brought me in as co-counsel where they have come to an hourly agreement with a client and then submitted that agreement with an outline of the hours expended to the Commission for approval, rather than just leaving it entirely up to the Commission to determine the fee.

THE CHAIRMAN: Any other members of the panel?

MR. HASKINS: One question.

FURTHER EXAMINATION BY MR. HASKINS:

locality of Northern Virginia, do you have any personal knowledge of anyone in your firm who last ever handled a case that you know of, your cases or other attorneys, where the attorney for the claimant has collected privately from the complainant an additional fee or fee in addition to that which has been awarded by the Industrial Commission?

A I have no knowledge of that. To the best of my knowledge, no one in my firm has ever done that and the other claimant's attorneys with whom I am familiar with have never done that.

Q Simply put, you have never heard of such a thing?

A No, sir.

MR. HASKINS: All right, sir.

THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. Rigsby, any other

questioned?

MR. RIGSBY: No, sir.

THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. Hudock.

FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. HUDOCK:

Q You are really testifing based on the deliberate decision of Ashcraft & Gerel as to how they charge their clients for the convenience of the firm, that is to leave the fee totally to the Industrial Commission?

| 1 | A With regard to the manner in which we do, I |
|----|---|
| 2 | think convenience is one of the factors that they consider, |
| 3 | because as I have indicated it does save the administrative |
| 4 | expense and time and effort of keeping track of every minute |
| 5 | of every day. |
| 6 | Q You don't really know for sure outside Ashcraft |
| 7 | & Gerel what attorneys in fact collect for fees in Industrial |
| 8 | Commission cases? |
| 9 | A Well, being a complainant's attorney, I have an |
| LO | opportunity to socialize and be involved professionally with |
| 11 | other complainant's attorneys, and the ones I am familiar |
| L2 | with handle it much in the same manner our firm does. |
| L3 | Q But you don't really know what they collect and |
| 14 | put in their blanks? |
| 15 | A You mean amounts? |
| 16 | Q Yes. |
| 17 | A No, sir. |
| 18 | MR. HUDOCK: I have no further questions. |
| 19 | THE CHAIRMAN: Any other questions? |
| 20 | Thank you very much, we appreciate it. You are |
| 21 | excused and free to go. |
| 22 | Call your next witness, Mr. Rigsby. |
| 23 | MR. RICSBY: That's the Bar's case. |
| 24 | THE CHAIRMAN: The Board will take a |
| 25 | five-minute recess. |

VIRGINIA:

BEFORE THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR DISCIPLINARY BOARD

VIRGINIA STATE BAR EX REL TENTH DISTRICT COMMITTEE,

Complainant

٧.

DOCKET NO. 84-38

ROBERT P. HUDOCK.

Respondent

ORDER

On Thursday, May 16, 1985, came on for hearing the Charges of Misconduct certified against Robert P. Hudock by the Tenth District Committee of the Virginia State Bar. The hearing was held before a duly convened panel of the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board consisting of Sharon A. Coles, James W. Haskins, Theodore J. Markow, Leigh B. Middleditch, Jr. and Samuel N. Klewans, presiding. Notice of the Charges of Misconduct and of the hearing before the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board were served upon Robert P. Hudock in the manner provided by the Rules applicable to this proceeding.

Robert P. Hudock appeared in person. Michael L. Rigsby appeared as counsel for the Virginia State Bar.

Upon consideration of the testimony and documentary exhibits presented, the board finds by clear and convincing evidence that:

1. Robert P. Hudock represented a client in a matter before the Industrial Commission of Virginia. Mr. Hudock prepared, or caused to be prepared, a petition to the Commission leaving a blank space therein for his fee. The petition stated " The petitioner requests the commission to approve payment of the said settlement in one lump sum, and the employee further asks the commission to award a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid directly from the settlement award . . ."

- 2. An order was entered by the Commission May 25, 1981, indicating a total compromise settlement award of \$15,000 out of which a \$2,500 attorneys fee was to be paid to Mr. Hudock, leaving the claimant with the sum of \$12,500.
- Mr. Hudock had a contingency agreement with the client calling for a one-third contingency fee in the matter.
- 4. Mr. Hudock asked for and received \$2,500 from his client in addition to the \$2,500 fee awarded by the commission, for a total of \$5,000 attorneys fees.
- 5. Mr. Hudock knew, or should have known, the requirements of Section 65.1-102 of the Code of Virginia, 1950, as amended.

It is the opinion of the board that such conduct by Robert P. Hudock constitutes misconduct in violation of Disciplinary Rule 2-105(A) and (B).

WHEREFORE, it is the judgment of the board, that such conduct by

Robert P. Hudock warrants the imposition of a Public Reprimand. Accordingly,

It is ORDERED that Robert P. Hudock be, and he is hereby, reprimanded for such misconduct, which reprimand is a PUBLIC REPRIMAND.

It is further ORDERED that a copy of this Order shall be mailed to Robert P. Hudock at his last address on file with the Virginia State Bar, 8150 Leesburg Pike, Suite 1200, Vienna, Virginia 22180.

DAY OF _______, 1921.

VIRGINIA STATE BAR DISCIPLINARY BOARD

VIRGINIA:

BEFORE THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR DISCIPLINARY BOARD

VIRGINIA STATE BAR EX REL TENTH DISTRICT COMMITTEE,

Complainant

٧.

DOCKET NO. 84-38

ROBERT P. HUDOCK,

Respondent

NOTICE OF APPEAL AND ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

The respondent, Robert P. Hudock, hereby gives notice of appeal from the Order of the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board entered on June 10, 1985, and mailed on June 24, 1985, and further gives notice that the hearing transcript or an agreed statement of facts and other incidents of hearing will be filed, all in compliance with the Rules of the Virginia State Bar and The Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia.

The respondent states as the assignments of error the following:

- I. The Board erred in failing to terminate the proceedings when the findings of the 10th District Committee did not substaniate any violation of the Disciplinary Rules;
- (a) There was no evidence of "the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services."
- (b) The Committee did not make any finding of the charging of a "clearly excessive fee."
- (c) The Committee is imposing a punishment where none was authorized by the legislature for the enforcement of Section 65.1-102 of the Code of Virginia.
- 2. The Board erred in imposing a punishment for what is in effect a claimed violation of Section 65.1-102 of the Virginia Code where the legislature did not authorize any such punishment or penalty.

- 3. The Board erred in abusing its discretion by proceeding to hear the matter while the underlying legal issues in a case of first impression are pending before the Virginia Court of Appeals.
- 4. The charges of misconduct are insufficient at law to constitute a violation of the Disciplinary Rules.
- 5. The statutory Section 65.1-102 violates the Due Process and Equal Protection provisions of the U.S. Constitution.
- 6. The Board erred in making a finding of misconduct where there was insufficient evidence to support the finding.
- 7. The Board erred in allowing the testimony of the Ashcraft and Gerell attorney's testimony where the evidence showed that the witness was not in practice at the time of the alledged violations, was not familiar with the charges of other attorneys at the time of the alledged violations, and his own firm's fee policy was based on the firm's convenience and desire to minimize time and record keeping.

Respectfully submitted,

Robert P. Hudock, pro se