
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IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA



Record No. 800817

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, ex rel., ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA.

Appellant

V.

STATE CORPORATION COMMISSION and BALTIMORE TANK LINES INC.

Appellees

ADDENDUM TO JOINT APPENDIX

Marshall Coleman Attorney General

John G. MacConnell Kenneth W. Thorson Assistant Attorneys General P. O. Box 6-L Richmond, Virginia 23282

Counsel for Appellant

Edward C. Tosh Counsel to the Commission P. O. Box 1197 Richmond, Virginia 23209

Alexander Wellford Counsel to Baltimore Tank Lines, Inc. Christian, Barton, Epps, Brent & Chappell 1200 Mutual Building Richmond, Virginia 23219

Counsel for Appellees

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A I would say so. Our auditors, in my view, have identified, and I think the attorney for the Applicant is in accord with it, we have identified the amount of fuel purchased in excess in Virginia and we have stipulated that that fuel was used in the other State.

Q Going back just a moment to the question Commissioner Shannon asked you a moment ago, I am not sure I understood the answer correctly. Perhaps I didn't understand the question. I thought he asked you if you had a carrier operating fifty percent of his time in Virginia, fifty percent in North Carolina, all fuel purchased in North Carolina —

COMMISSIONER SHANNON: I changed that.

I changed it. I said all fuel purchased in

Virginia, he would get half back.

WITNESS STUART: I answered half back.

But under the present law, we would not give half back, because out of the fuel purchased in Virginia, he would have to absorb the tax differential.

COMMISSIONER SHANNON: There is a two cent differential.

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copied Virginia's statute word for word.

Some of the states still have the same wording. In my inquiries to other tax administrators, I hate to say this, but their administrative procedure varies with the demands of the taxpayers.

In the case of North Carolina -- I have enquired and they tell me that, yes, our statute is still like yours, but we just have to wink at it and we do not administer it that way.

COMMISSIONER HARWOOD: Let me ask a question: Aren't the laws of Maryland,

Pennsylvania, North Carolina, similar in effect but the enforcement or interpretation of the law are different?

WITNESS STUART: I would say so, but
I would also say similar in effect has never
been defined. It is anybody's thought as to
what the effect is. Does it merely mean that
it is taxing for the use of highway? Does it
mean that the same components have to go into
the tax as to types of vehicles? Does it mean
that some states can include water vessels in
it? Yachts or motorcycles? And still be similar

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in effect. We have approached the idea that it has to tax the same type of vehicle and operation, or person and entity, that is done in Virginia.

COMMISSIONER HARWOOD: But the law itself is similar in effect. In fact, it is identical.

WITNESS STUART: It was at one time.

I am not familiar -- I think Maryland law has been amended now to make compliance elective to the taxpayer.

COMMISSIONER HARWOOD: It is a fungible.

It is a fungible good. It is impossible to identify five gallons of diesel fuel bought at South Hill, Virginia from five gallons bought at Jessup, Maryland, for instance.

WITNESS STUART: We have attempted to apply an inventory approach, which the Commission directed be done in 1961 as a first in, first out.

COMMISSIONER HARWOOD: The FIFO approach to the tank is used.

WITNESS STUART: It is true it is not a color scheme proposition, where you have one color in one state, and one in another.

Stuart - Direct

be, and I take it Mr. Wellford was standing to make the same objection, because you have just translated it --

MR. MINTER: I thought his objection was on the basis of an opinion or speculation. This obviously has no opinion or speculation if it is based absolutely on the records of this Commission.

COMMISSIONER BRADSHAW: I thought his objection went to the effect.

MR. MINTER: I have not asked him about the effect. I asked him of the two million dollars at the end of this particular period in tax credits, how many can be -- lets ask him this: How many were refunded?

COMMISSIONER BRADSHAW: That is all right.

WITNESS STUART: Seven hundred and fifty thousand dollars was refunded through June 30, 1978, applicable to this period. I have no current figures on it since I left that division.

BY MR. MINTER (Continuing)

Q In the same period, then, why were not the remaining dollars refunded. If you had two million dollars in credits, and you refunded only seven hundred

and fifty thousand.

A I would say the majority of it was not applied for. There was no application made for the excess credits.

Q Do you have any explanation for that?

A Well ---

MR. WELLFORD: I object to that, Your Honor. That is total speculation. Why a user doesn't --

COMMISSIONER SHANNON: I think he is getting into the area of speculation.

COMMISSIONER BRADSHAW: Let me ask a question. Does that mean that the state is overcollecting what is actually due?

WITNESS STUART: It is, sir, and they have always done that.

COMMISSIONER BRADSHAW: Okay.

BY MR. MINTER (Continuing)

Q Let me ask you about one or two final questions. Am I correct in my understanding, that in this particulæ application, we are concerned really with the operation of only two trucks operating in Virginia?

A I don't recall the exact number that the auditor referred to in his memorandum.

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by Maryland, and we are talking about a road tax imposed by Virginia. The stipulation takes care of the Maryland side.

Then we go to the questions of credits, and the credit section we are discussing here talks about fuel purchases, and the tax paid on fuel as a credit against the road tax. It says that excess credits can be used against the Virginia liability in the succeeding four quarters, and then it talks about a refund. And it says that if it shall appear that the Applicant has paid to another State under a lawful requirement of such State a tax similiar in effect.

This is identical in effect. Then you may award the refund. The problem, as I understand it, generally revolves around the identity question that Judge Catterall's memorandum addresses. And he says that after proving that he, the Applicant, bought in Virginia so much fuel, that his tax credits exceeded his tax debits, he has to prove how much of his Virginia purchased fuel was taxed in some other State.

I think we have done that. Now, as I understood Mr. Stuart, and I will stand

corrected, on questioning by Mr. Minter, as I understood it, he said that there has never been a case like this before the Commission. I think it is a very difficult burden of proof, and I think this is a rather unique case in that it has been proven.

Insofar as the statutory amendment proposed in the middle sixties to the Legislature, it didn't address this kind of problem.

As I understood Mr. Stuart, the gasoline dealer says if you have excess credits you get them back. You don't have to go through this exercise and prove the user of this fuel in another state that taxes that are imposed is the tax similar in effect. That is all.

Now, that is my argument today, and that is what it was back in June.

COMMISSIONER SHANNON: You look upon this as being a unique situation. You don't see that this is just a carte blanche application to refund excess credits, per se?

MR. WELLFORD: Not based on my review of Judge Catterall's memorandum. And that is the question of where was that fuel used. Now,

Pennsylvania. Now, what happened was that Maryland's application of its law allowed Baltimore Tank Lines, as I understand Mr. Stuart, to take credit for fuel put in leased vehicles, which he doesn't do, and these vehicles moved into Pennsylvania which I understand also has a law that imposes a tax. But it was purchasing fuel in Maryland for these vehicles, and the result was there was an overpurchase in Maryland and he got a credit in Maryland.

But that has nothing to do with this particular case except to the question of payment. Does the statute require out-of-pocket payment or can a debit against your account stand as a payment?

I submit that under any sort of present day logic it is payment.

COMMISSIONER SHANNON: You are saying it doesn't have to be a cash payment. A bookkeeping payment will comply with the requirements of the statute.

MR. WELLFORD: Yes, sir. And we get back down to the basic, that as to this particular fuel this company has been paying twenty cents

COMMISSIONER BRADSHAW: You don't consider a credit as payment?

MR. MINTER: Your Honor, there can't be a credit in a situation of this kind on any two trucks, and that is what you are talking about. In the State of Maryland, the Applicant here paid no gross receipts. They were credited with all of the gallonage purchased in the State of Maryland.

This statute, in order to be administered, requires that you pay, be assessed, on an identifiable gallonage outside the State.

If you don't you can't identify it.

COMMISSIONER BRADSHAW: I thought, as I understood the facts, that Maryland did assess a liability for all the tax, for gallons used in Maryland, and they had excess, and therefore credit.

MR. MINTER: Your Honor, I really don't know how to respond to you. I feel like I am going around and meeting myself coming back again.

COMMISSIONER BRADSHAW: Is that a fact?

MR. MINTER: It is a fact that in Maryland enough fuel tax was paid, purchased at the

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pump in Maryland, to offset any liability for road tax in Maryland.

COMMISSIONER BRADSHAW: And therefore set up a credit. I mean you would have to --

MR. MINTER: That is immaterial.

That is all beside the point. The point is that no road tax was paid in Maryland. Now, if no road tax was paid in Maryland, obviously the so-called 'credit,' if you want to call it that, was applicable to every bit of the gallonage bought up there. It could have been millions of gallons. Enough for the entire fleet. There would be no way in Heaven's name of determining any application to two trucks operating in Virginia and Maryland.

And it is obvious from this Code

Section -- it is just clear, simple, every day
english, that to measure on the terms of what
you have paid in the foreign state, but not to
exceed nine cents per gallon.

Now, this isn't a debate over paid or credits or what have you, but it is a question of identifying fuel, and if you don't identify the fuel, there is no way in this world to make any sort of a refund.

Maryland has such a tax. They have a road tax measured by fuel purchased, the same as in Virginia.

COMMISSIONER HARWOOD: The problem is the two cent distinction.

MR. MINTER: Again, that is immaterial, Your Honor.

COMMISSIONER HARWOOD: It is not immeterial either to the Commonwealth who is the teceiver of the tax, or the payer, who has to pay it.

MR. MINTER: It is immeterial as far as the legal issue in this case is concerned.

It is quite obvious that the Staff is of the opinion that you cannot validly or legally refund this tax. And if the Commission would want any sort of a legal memo, or any of this reduced to writing, we would be more than pleased.

COMMISSIONER SHANNON: I think it would be helpful. Since this is a very vital issue, and I am sure it is going — the Attorney General is in here, and it could be appealed, I think it would be helpful if each counsel would write a little memorandum. Mr. Wellford, Mr. Marshall,

CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I have complied with Rule 5:49 of the Rules of the Supreme Court by filing twenty copies of this Addendum to Joint Appendix in the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court and by mailing three copies to Edward C. Tosh, Esquire, Counsel to the State Corporation Commission, P. O. Box 1197, Richmond, Virginia 23209, and three copies to Alexander Wellford, Esquire, Christian, Barton, Epps, Brent & Chappell, 1200 Mutual Building, Richmond, Virginia 23219, this 23rd day of July 1980.

Kenneth W. Thorson

Assistant Attorney General