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Tax, Corporate Governance, and Norms

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This Article examines the use of federal tax provisions to effect changes in state law corporate governance. There is a growing academic controversy over these provisions, fueled in part by their popularity among legislators as a method of addressing the recent spate of corporate scandals. As a case study on the use of tax to regulate corporate governance, this paper compares and contrasts two measures enacted during the New Deal—the enactment of the undistributed profits tax in 1936 and the overhaul of the tax-free reorganization provisions in 1934—and considers why the former was so much more controversial and less sustainable than the latter. While some of the difference can be explained by the different political and economic circumstances surrounding each proposal, this Article argues that the divergence in the degree of opposition can be explained in part by an examination of the extent to which each provision threatened an underlying norm, or longstanding standard, of corporate behavior. The Article goes on to test this norms-based explanation against several recent attempts to enact corporate governance-oriented tax provisions and concludes that it has modern relevance. The implication is that while Congress may use the Tax Code to reinforce existing norms of corporate behavior, it is likely to be less successful when it tries to use the Code to change existing norms or introduce new ones.

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I. Introduction

President Bush's proposal to end double taxation, which was justified in part because it would increase dividends and thereby improve corporate "accountability,"1 was only the latest example of the federal government's

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effort to use the Internal Revenue Code as a tool to modify corporate behavior. In recent years, Congress has enacted or introduced a number of corporate governance-motivated tax provisions—from limiting deductions for allegedly excessive executive compensation and imposing excise taxes on the receipt of so-called "greenmail" payments during takeovers to denying deductions both for stock options that have been expensed for accounting purposes and for punitive damage payments. In fact, almost since the inception of the corporate income tax, Congress has recognized its potential to serve as a de facto system of federal corporate law. Proponents of the earliest corporate income tax in 1894 predicted that one of its benefits would be the "salutary" influence it would have on corporations by establishing a means of federal oversight. When President Taft later proposed an excise tax on corporations in 1909, he

corporation's underlying financial health and enable investors to evaluate more readily a corporation's financial condition. This, in turn, increases the accountability of corporate management to its investors.).


The United States is not alone in its effort to use the tax system as a tool of corporate governance. During the post-World War II era, the United Kingdom has instituted no fewer than five major reforms of the corporate tax system that can be traced back to the desire to influence corporate behavior. See MERVYN KING, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE CORPORATION 5 (1977) (describing four of the five major reforms of the corporate tax system since the war); SVEN STEINMO, TAXATION AND DEMOCRACY: SWEDISH, BRITISH, AND AMERICAN APPROACHES TO FINANCING THE MODERN STATE 47–48 (1993) (concerning the United Kingdom's use of taxation to influence corporate behavior). The fifth major change occurred in 1997 when the United Kingdom ended its Advance Corporation Tax System. Steven A. Bank, The Dividend Divide in Anglo-American Corporate Taxation, 30 J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2004).

3. William L. Wilson, The Income Tax on Corporations, 158 N. AM. REV. 1, 7 (1894) ("The very limited public supervision incident to the assessment and collection of such a tax would not work any wrong or any interference with their lawful operations, while as a necessary part of a tax law, and used only for that bona-fide purpose, it might be salutary in its influence."). Wilson was the Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee. Id. at 1.
noted that one of the merits of the tax was "the federal supervision which must be exercised in order to make the law effective over the annual accounts and business transactions of all corporations." Federal taxation was a means to preempt the traditional state role in the regulation of corporations without actually establishing a system of federal incorporation.

Despite its long history, the attempt to regulate corporations through the tax system has had only mixed results. In many cases, Congress's corporate governance-motivated tax reform efforts have failed miserably. This is not to say that tax reform has failed to actually modify corporate behavior for at least a brief time, although this may be the case in some instances. Rather, many of the tax provisions introduced or enacted as part of a corporate governance reform effort have simply failed, in the words of Mark Roe, to "survive" in the face of fierce corporate resistance. If they survived enactment and were not technically repealed within a few years, they have been effectively rendered useless or counterproductive, and their continued existence has been the subject of much criticism.


5. This is not to suggest that federal incorporation itself has never been considered. Progressive-era reformers called for an explicit federal incorporation requirement in the face of a perceived decline in state corporation laws, but such proposals were defeated. See Martin J. Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890-1916, at 203-85 (1988) (concerning proposals for Sherman Act revision and the Hepburn bill); Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Comment, Corporate Privileges for the Public Benefit: The Progressive Federal Incorporation Movement and the Modern Regulatory State, 77 Va. L. Rev. 603, 622-23 (1991) (stating that reformers increasingly became advocates of a federal incorporation law). In large part, the securities laws enacted in 1933 and 1934 served as a de facto federal corporations law. See Robert B. Thompson & Hilary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56 Vand. L. Rev. 859, 869 (2003) ("The government response to the excesses of the 1920s and to the pain of the Great Depression again led to calls for federal corporations law, but the New Deal Congress that passed securities litigation in 1933 and 1934 chose less intrusive means.").

6. See Mark J. Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance 118 (1994) ("But to survive, a proposal must not gore the ox of a powerful interest group. The tax on undistributed profits threatened managers; within a few years the tax was dead.").

7. See, e.g., Eric A. Lustig, The Emerging Role of the Federal Tax Law in Regulating Hostile Corporate Takeover Defenses: The New Section 5881 Excise Tax on Greenmail, 40 U. Fla. L. Rev. 789, 792 (1988) (arguing that "the use of federal tax law to discourage greenmail transactions violates tax policy goals, and such violations are not justified by this overly broad, punitive statute"); James R. Repetti, Corporate Governance and Stockholder Abdication: Missing Factors in Tax Policy Analysis, 67 Notre Dame L. Rev. 971, 974 (1992) (suggesting that tax policy may be a significant contributor to stockholder abdication); Susan J. Stabile, Is
Notwithstanding such criticism, recent observers suggest that in some cases tax can be an effective ally in the fight to reform corporate governance. David Schizer, for example, argues that a variety of tax rules have served as an effective hindrance to executive hedging transactions. Reuven Avi-Yonah goes further, arguing that the corporate tax and, by implication, corporate rates, can be used "to control the excessive accumulation of power in the hands of corporate management." This normative conclusion draws support from recent studies in the economics literature that demonstrate the corporate governance benefits of strong tax enforcement by reducing the level of "managerial diversion" of corporate assets. Given the existing political support and academic controversy surrounding the use of tax as a tool of corporate governance, the challenge is to more fully investigate whether some corporate governance-motivated tax reforms may be better positioned to succeed than others.

Perhaps the best prism through which to understand the use of taxation to modify corporate behavior is the experience of the New Deal. Not only does it have the advantage of historical distance, but the New Deal is also replete with examples of corporate governance-oriented tax provisions. During a relatively brief period of time, Congress embarked on an ambitious, but ultimately unsuccessful, campaign to change corporate behavior through tax reform.

There a Role for Tax Law in Policing Executive Compensation?, 72 St. John's L. Rev. 81, 90-92 (1998) (stating that section 280G, aiming to make excessive parachute payments financially prohibitive to a corporation, has limited effectiveness); David I. Walker, Tax Incentives Will Not Close Stock Option Accounting Gap, 96 Tax Notes 851 (2002) (arguing that tax incentives are unlikely to result in full accounting for stock option expenses); Kurt Hartmann, Comment, The Market for Corporate Confusion: Federal Attempts to Regulate the Market for Corporate Control Through the Federal Tax Code, 6 DePaul Bus. L.J. 159, 199 (1993) ("The strict confines of the tax code do not lend themselves well to the implementation of social policy.").


10. See Mihir Desai et al., The Protecting Hand: Taxation and Corporate Governance 2 (Mar. 2003), available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/cbg/Events/Papers/RPP_4-17-03_Dyck.pdf (last visited June 27, 2004) (arguing that a higher tax rate increases the level of diversion, while stronger tax enforcement reduces it).

Thus, between 1932 and 1936, legislators enacted or attempted to enact tax provisions designed to restrict the growth of large corporations;\(^2\) to eliminate the holding company structure;\(^3\) to lower the amount of executive compensation;\(^4\) to force the distribution of dividends;\(^5\) and to minimize mergers, acquisitions, and other business combinations.\(^6\) While some of these corporate governance-motivated proposals were enacted amid only mild opposition and remain a part of the Code to this day,\(^7\) most were either rejected immediately or were repealed within a few years.\(^8\)

As a case study on the use of tax provisions to regulate corporate governance, this Article compares and contrasts two New Deal-era corporate tax provisions—the proposed abolition and eventual overhaul of the tax-free reorganization provisions in the Revenue Act of 1934 and the enactment of an undistributed profits tax in the Revenue Act of 1936—where managerial resistance spelled the difference between success and failure. The proposal to abolish or radically alter the reorganization provisions, which governed the tax treatment of stock and property received in mergers, consolidations, and other business combinations, aroused only limited managerial opposition and the resulting provisions have survived virtually intact to this day. The undistributed profits tax, on the other hand, was the target of a vigorous


13. See id. §102(h), 49 Stat. at 1016 (reducing the dividends received deduction from one hundred to ninety percent); Revenue Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-154, § 141(c), 47 Stat. 169, 213 (1932) (providing for an additional tax of three-quarters of one percent for filing a consolidated return); National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-67, § 217(e), 48 Stat. 195, 209 (1934) (raising the additional tax on consolidated returns to one percent); Revenue Act of 1934, § 141, 48 Stat. 680, 720-21 (1934) (raising the additional tax on consolidated returns to two percent for railroad corporations and abolishing the right to file consolidated returns for all other corporations); Revenue Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-740, § 26(b), 49 Stat. 1648, 1664 (1936) (reducing the dividends received deduction to eighty-five percent).

14. See LEFF, supra note 11, at 87–89 (describing serious proposals in 1932 and 1934 to erect tax limits on executive salaries).


16. See infra notes 83–143 and accompanying text (discussing the tax-free reorganization provision).


18. Examples of such rejection include the abolition of the consolidated return and the imposition of an undistributed profits tax.
lobbying campaign and was repealed after only a few years. Although both provisions were at least partially justified on tax policy grounds, they had significant and publicly acknowledged implications for corporate governance and for the independence of managers vis-à-vis their shareholders. In the former case, eliminating or tightening the tax-free reorganization provisions as part of an effort to restrict excessive business combinations potentially limited a manager’s ability to expand his business through acquisitions. In the latter case, an undistributed profits tax designed to prevent corporate "hoarding" of earnings and profits restricted the free cash flow managers counted on for capital projects and cash acquisitions. Managerial opposition to both proposals may reflect the problems associated with the shareholders’ delegation of authority to an agent—the manager—who is imbued with self-interest, but the agency cost theory does not entirely explain the discrepancy in the degree of opposition. The question is why managers reacted so differently to what appear to be similar threats to managerial independence.

While changes in the underlying political and economic environment played a role, this Article suggests that the divergent reactions can at least partly be attributed to the extent to which each particular proposal threatened an underlying norm of corporate behavior. In the case of reorganizations, Congress sought to influence transactions that were already regulated by both a corporation’s by-laws and the laws of the state of incorporation. All major acquisitions or sales were subject to unanimous shareholder approval in the early years of the corporation; by 1934, at least majority approval was still


20. There has been a recent explosion of interest among corporate law scholars in the field of norm theory. See generally Symposium: Norms & Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1607 (2001) (publishing papers from a symposium on norms and corporate law). The term "norms" in this literature is generally intended to denote non-legally enforceable conventions of behavior. But see Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Introduction, Symposium: Norms and Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1607, 1612–13 (2001) (suggesting that legal scholars have used the term to refer to both legally and non-legally enforceable arrangements and suggesting replacing the term norms with the phrase "nonlegally enforceable rules and standards" to end the confusion). In the context of this article, however, the use of the term norms is meant to convey non-tax law conventions governing the behavior of managers. Thus, it may mean both non-legally enforceable norms of manager behavior, such as those dictated by market expectations, as well as legally enforceable norms, such as judicial decisions or state and federal corporate laws governing corporate activity and manager discretion.
necessary. Moreover, federal antitrust laws served as an additional constraint on merger activity. Thus, there was no norm supporting a manager's unfettered discretion to engage in acquisitive transactions or to structure such transactions in the manner most suitable to the manager's needs. By contrast, dividends had always been a matter of discretion for a corporation's board of directors. While shareholders could seek redress for an abuse of that discretion, directors were given wide latitude. Under then-existing norms, it was considered prudent business practice to retain between thirty and fifty cents of every dollar earned.\textsuperscript{21} Although some larger corporations already distributed in excess of that amount and the undistributed profits tax as passed was designed to permit corporations to retain a significant percentage of profits before the penalty tax was imposed, businesses of all sizes were concerned about the threat to their control over corporate finances. Therefore, while both provisions were opposed in part because they were potentially adverse to manager interests, one reason the undistributed profits tax was resisted much more strongly was because it threatened the long-standing norm of managerial control over a corporation's finances.

This corporate norms-based explanation of managerial resistance provides valuable insights for the use of tax as a tool of corporate governance. The implication is that tax measures may reinforce existing norms, but are less likely to be successful in establishing new ones. This may explain the fact that while most modern provisions have been nullified by managerial opposition,\textsuperscript{22} some have been more accepted and therefore effective.\textsuperscript{23} Analyzing the underlying norms threatened may also help provide a more reasoned basis for further use of the Code as a tool to regulate corporate governance. In Parts II and III, this Article chronicles the development of the reorganization provision and undistributed profits tax proposals, respectively, considering both their legislative histories and the managerial resistance at each stage. In Part IV, this

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{21} See \textsc{Sergei Dobrovolsky}, \textit{Corporate Income Retention 1915-1943}, at 13 (1951) ("During the expansion years of the twenties the notion was rather widespread that sound financial policy required retention in the enterprise of 50 cents out of every dollar of net income. In the late thirties some large corporations considered the retention of 30 percent of net income an appropriate long-term policy.").
\item \textsuperscript{22} See Steven A. Bank, \textit{Devaluing Reform: The Derivatives Market and Executive Compensation}, 7 \textsc{DePaul Bus. L. J.} 301, 332 (1995) (stating that the congressional attempt to regulate the deductibility of executive compensation in I.R.C. § 162(m) ignores the derivatives market and advances an avenue of tax avoidance); Bruce A. Wolk, \textit{The Golden Parachute Provisions: Time for Repeal?}, 21 \textsc{Va. Tax Rev.} 125, 128 (2001) (stating that corporations have created "clever avoidance schemes" around the golden parachute provisions).
\item \textsuperscript{23} See \textsc{Schizer}, \textit{supra} note 8, at 466 (stating that "the most effective tax constraint on exercising options derives from tax rules for so-called nonqualified options, which were not fashioned with corporate governance in mind").
\end{itemize}
Article explores the possible reasons why the two provisions took such divergent paths. While acknowledging the political and economic changes between 1934 and 1936, this Article focuses on a previously unexplored phenomenon—the nature and status of the underlying corporate behavior each proposal sought to regulate. This Article concludes by examining the possible implications this analysis may have for modern attempts to use the Code to influence corporate behavior.

II. Tax-Free Reorganization Provisions

A. Early History

The tax treatment of the participants to a merger, consolidation, or other reorganization was an open question when the first post-Sixteenth Amendment income tax was adopted in 1913.24 Shareholders claimed that the exchange of stock in a business combination was a change in form rather than substance, but nothing in the 1913 Act precluded their taxation.25 Treasury officials initially appeared to side with shareholders,26 but soon issued regulations providing that exchanges of property for stock might be taxable under certain circumstances.27 Congress eventually resolved the issue as part of a general compromise over the timing of realization in property exchanges.28 Under section 202(b) of the


25. See RANDOLPH E. PAUL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION: THIRD SERIES 8 (1940) (suggesting that the regulations supported the possibility of taxing reorganizations); Homer Hendricks, Federal Income Tax: Definition of "Reorganization," 45 HARV. L. REV. 648, 648 n.1 (1931) (stating that although there were no special provisions in the Revenue Acts with regard to gain or loss on corporate reorganizations, the Supreme Court commonly held that full taxable gain was realized); Hugh Satterlee, The Income Tax Definition of Reorganization, 12 TAX MAG. 639, 639 (1934) (discussing history of taxation).

26. See GEORGE E. HOLMES, FEDERAL INCOME AND PROFITS TAXES 262 n.20 (1920) ("Where, upon a reorganization, new stock was acquired by a stockholder in exchange for the old stock, and both were of the same par value, no income arose at the time of the exchange, but when the new stock was sold, the gain was required to be based upon the cost of the old stock, or its value as of March 1, 1913.") (citing Letter from Treasury Dep't, Mar. 8, 1917; I.T.S. 1918, par. 1302).


28. The compromise was between proponents of the consumption and accretion models of taxation. The accretion model suggested annual taxation of increases in value, while the consumption model approved taxation only upon a sale in which the proceeds were not reinvested. Shareholders claimed that the former option would work an injustice because any gains realized were only "paper" gains, but Congress feared that the latter option would permit
Revenue Act of 1918, reorganizations were deemed realization events, but any gain or loss was deferred until a subsequent taxable sale.\textsuperscript{29} Although this established the principle of the tax-free reorganization, the provision was flawed in several respects.\textsuperscript{30} Most notably, nonrecognition treatment was limited to exchanges of stock having equal par values, and the provision failed to define the term "reorganization."\textsuperscript{31}

The deficiencies in the first reorganization provision greatly limited its usefulness. As one practitioner later recalled, "[t]he 1918 provisions were impracticable in operation; the then status of the law was such as to hamper necessary business adjustments."\textsuperscript{32} This problem did not escape Congress’s attention. In his testimony before the Senate Finance Committee in September of 1921, Dr. T.S. Adams, an economic advisor to the Treasury Department,\textsuperscript{33}

virtually indefinite deferral of taxation. The reorganization provisions struck a balance between these two approaches by acknowledging the paper gain problem, while recognizing that most types of property exchanges were taxable. See Steven A. Bank, Mergers, Taxes, and Historical Realism, 75 Tul. L. Rev. 1, 62–63 (2000) (describing the "realization compromise").

\textsuperscript{29} See Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, \S 202(b), 40 Stat. 1057, 1060 (1919) (concerning taxation of reorganizations). The Revenue Act of 1918 provides:

\begin{quote}
When in connection with the reorganization, merger, or consolidation of a corporation a person receives in place of stock or securities owned by him new stock or securities of no greater aggregate par or face value, no gain or loss shall be deemed to occur from the exchange, and the new stock or securities received shall be treated as taking the place of the stock, securities, or property exchanged.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{Id.}


\textsuperscript{31} See id. (analyzing the 1918 Act's reorganization provision and its flaws). Treasury attempted to address the latter flaw by issuing a regulation that outlined the types of transactions that were eligible for nonrecognition treatment under Section 202(b). Under Treasury Regulation Section 45, nonrecognition treatment was available for transactions "where two (or more) corporations unite their properties by either (a) the dissolution of corporation B and the sale of its assets to corporation A, or (b) the sale of its property by B to A and the dissolution of B, or (c) the sale of the stock of B to A and the dissolution of B, or (d) the merger of B into A, or (e) the consolidation of the corporations." T.D. 2831, 21 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 170, 395 (1919). This was consistent with the prevailing understanding of the term in the non-bankruptcy context. See Eric L. Kohler, Reorganizations and the Federal Income Tax Law, 4 Nat'l Income Tax Mag. 161, 161 (1926) ("The current use of the term is reflected in part by the definition offered seventeen years ago by Thomas W. Lamont: 'a decision brought about usually by a company's success, to enlarge it, to recapitalize it, or to amalgamate it with some other corporation or corporations.'").

\textsuperscript{32} Hendricks, supra note 25, at 648 n.1.

\textsuperscript{33} Adams, a professor of political economy at Yale, is sometimes called the "father of the 1921 Act." Ronald H. Jensen, Of Form and Substance: Tax-Free Incorporations and Other Transactions Under Section 331, 11 Va. Tax Rev. 349, 383 n.117 (1991) (citing Carlton Fox, Special Assistant to the Attorney General in 1936, for having given Adams that title). Adams
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noted that "the principal defect of the present law is in blocking desirable business readjustments." According to Adams, "[a]ll kinds of business readjustments had been stopped" due to the fear of being subject to taxation, and transaction activity would continue to stall without clarifying and liberalizing the reorganization provisions. In the context of a post-World War I economic downturn, the concerns about a threat to business reorganizations were understandable. A sharp drop in the artificially high wartime prices, especially in the agricultural sector, ushered in an economic downturn between 1920 and 1922 that has been referred to as "the last of the ‘depressions’ before the catastrophe of 1929 occurred." During 1921 alone, approximately 20,000 companies closed and almost five million individuals were unemployed. A House Ways and Means Committee Report remarked that "the exacting of the present excessive sums of taxes from the country contributes in no small degree to the depressing influences under which business and industry in general are staggering as an aftermath of the World War." The Committee explained that the financial ravages of war are felt most acutely "after the cessation of hostilities, at which time the demand for war supplies terminates, with a resulting shrinkage of values. The Nation is now passing through the trying period of liquidation and readjustment. The reduction of the tax burdens is essential to business recovery." Furthermore, merger activity began to slow during this economic downturn. Although the number and size of firms absorbed by merger increased steadily in 1919 and 1920, "the pace of merger activity subsided

was the principal Treasury spokesperson before Congress on tax legislation and was considered one of the foremost tax and public finance theorists of his day. See Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O’Hear, The "Original Intent" of U.S. International Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021, 1029–30 (1997) (stating that Adams served as tax advisor to the Treasury Department from 1917 until 1923 and was the Treasury’s spokesman before the House Ways and Means Committee and Senate Finance Committee whenever tax legislation was being formulated).

34. Hearings on H.R. 8245 Before the Senate Comm. on Fin., 67th Cong. 29 (1921) (statement of Dr. T.S. Adams, advisor to the Treasury Department).

35. Id.

36. CHARLES R. GEISST, WALL STREET: A HISTORY 155 (1997); see also CHARLES A. BEARD & MARY R. BEARD, I AMERICA IN MIDPASSAGE 28 (1939) (concerning the collapse of war prices in 1921); PAUL, supra note 25, at 21 (stating that there was a depression in 1920); Jensen, supra note 33, at 386 n.126 (stating that the country was experiencing a severe business recession in 1921).

37. Jensen, supra note 33, at 386 n.126.


39. Id.

40. See RALPH L. NELSON, MERGER MOVEMENTS IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY 1895–1956, at
somewhat in the depression of 1921.41 It did not truly resume its upward slope after this interruption until the mid-1920s.42 Sheldon Cohen, a former commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service, concluded that "[i]n this historical context it is not at all surprising that preferential treatment was accorded corporate mergers and consolidations on the assumption that the provisions would" encourage business reorganizations.43

Thus, in the Revenue Act of 1921,44 Congress amended the reorganization provision to address some of business's concerns.45 Under section 202(c)(2) of the 1921 Act, "reorganization" was defined to include:

[A] merger or consolidation (including the acquisition by one corporation of at least a majority of the voting stock and at least a majority of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock of another corporation, or of substantially all the properties of another corporation), recapitalization, or mere change in identity, form, or place of organization of a corporation (however effected).46

While this definition was itself flawed because it failed to specify the permissible consideration in such transactions,47 from the perspective of business it was a vast improvement over the 1918 version. As both the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees emphasized in their respective reports on the 1921 Act, the revised reorganization provision "will,

37 tbl. 14 (detailing the frequency and size of mergers).
42. See JOHN M. BLAIR, ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION: STRUCTURE, BEHAVIOR AND PUBLIC POLICY 264 (1972) (concerning the second wave of mergers in the mid-1920s).
45. During the debates on a proposed amendment to the reorganization provision, one Senator noted that "when so much reorganization is going on in the business world, it is thought by all those interested in the upbuilding of the industries of the country at this time that this is a very helpful provision." 61 CONG. REC. S6563 (Oct. 21, 1921) (statement of Sen. Watson) (regarding the removal of a provision requiring stock to be of equal par value to qualify for nonrecognition treatment).
46. Revenue Act of 1921 § 202(c)(2) (1921).
47. One commentator referred to this omission as a "blunder of draftsmanship." Valentine Brookes, The Continuity of Interest Test in Reorganizations—A Blessing or a Curse, 34 CAL. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (1946).
by removing a source of grave uncertainty . . . permit business to go forward with the readjustments required by existing conditions." 48

The liberalization of the reorganization provisions continued in subsequent revenue acts. 49 The Revenue Act of 1924 expanded the definition of reorganization to include spin-offs and split-offs. 50 One member of the House Ways and Means Committee explained to Congress that this amendment was inserted "to include other usual forms of corporate reorganization in the advance of business, such as the splitting of one corporation into two or more corporations, which I may say under the present law would not be permitted except by forming two entirely new corporations." 51 The 1924 Act also formally extended the exemption from taxation to corporations so that they received the benefit of nonrecognition of any gain. 52 Although a Treasury interpretation had concluded that corporations were exempt under the 1921 Act, the Senate Finance Committee explained that "[t]he present ruling of the Treasury Department on this question is of doubtful legality and a statutory provision is most necessary." 53 This expansion was designed to further remove


49. See Roswell Magill, Effect of Taxation on Corporate Policies, 72 U.S. L. REV. 637, 639 (1938) ("[I]n the early twenties, Congress regarded business reorganizations as frequently desirable and often necessary. Hence, successive revenue laws contained increasingly liberal provisions, to permit corporations and stockholders to carry through tax-free, not only the kinds of reorganizations which the Supreme Court had passed upon, but a number of other kinds."); Income Tax on Corporate Reorganization, 2 N.Y. L. REV. 387, 390 (1924) ("The present statute, as well as that of 1921, was obviously designed to promulgate a policy more liberal to the taxpayer.").

50. See Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, § 203(h)(1), 43 Stat. 253, 257 (1924) (defining "reorganization," in part, as "a transfer by a corporation of all or part of its assets to another corporation if immediately after the transfer the transferor or its stockholders or both are in control of the corporation to which the assets are transferred"). A "spin-off" involves a contribution by a corporation of some or all of its assets to another corporation, followed by a distribution of the stock of that corporation to all of the first corporation's existing shareholders as a dividend. A "split-off" is the same transaction as a spin-off except instead of distributing the new corporation's stock as a dividend, the stock is distributed to certain of the first corporation's shareholders in exchange for their stock in the original corporation. The result is two separate corporations with two separate groups of shareholders. See 2 MARTIN D. Ginsburg & Jack S. Levin, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Buyouts para. 1001 (2003) (concerning spin-offs).


52. See Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, § 203 (b)(3), 43 Stat. 253, 256 (1924) ("No gain or loss shall be recognized if a corporation a party to a reorganization exchanges property, in pursuance of the plan of reorganization, solely for stock or securities in another corporation a party to the reorganization.").

53. S. REP. NO. 398 (1924), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. at 276. See also Milton Sandberg, The Income Tax Subsidy to "Reorganizations", 38 COLUM. L. REV. 98, 102-03 (1938) ("In the
any limits placed on business readjustments by the tax law. The House Ways and Means Committee explained that nonrecognition treatment was granted in order to permit "ordinary business transactions" to go forward free from tax constraints and "[i]f it is necessary for this reason to exempt from tax the gain realized by the stockholders, it is even more necessary to exempt from tax the gain realized by the corporation." Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the 1924 Act refined the definition of reorganization to make it exclusive for tax purposes. This helped to provide the certainty businesses sought before engaging in reorganizations.

There were two problems with the liberalization of the reorganization provisions. First, it may have worked too well in encouraging businesses to combine. One practitioner noted that reorganizations became "almost, if not actually, a fetish with many business men and certain short-sighted, so-called tax counselors." This trend contributed to a marked increase in business combinations. Of the 92 active holding companies whose stock was listed on the New York Stock Exchange in 1928, 66 had been granted charters since 1910 and, of those companies, at least 34 had received their charters between 1923 and 1928. Furthermore, during 1928 and 1929, mergers were occurring at a far more rapid pace than at the beginning of the decade or at any time during the more famous merger movement at the turn-of-the-century. Of the 8500 acquisitions of formerly independent manufacturing and mining businesses between the end of World War I and the end of 1931, more than 4800 occurred between 1926 and 1930, and almost 2300 disappeared in 1928 and 1929 alone.

Economic concentration accompanied this revived period of merger and consolidation. Between 1922 and 1929, there were eight mergers valued at over $100 million and at least fourteen transactions in which the target

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Mellon Bill of 1924, the statutes were amended to enact into law a Treasury interpretation of the 1921 Act which was both clearly erroneous and highly advantageous to taxpayer interests.

55. The 1924 Act replaced the phrase "the word 'reorganization' includes . . . ," with the phrase "the word 'reorganization' means . . . ." Revenue Act of 1924, § 203(h)(1).
58. BUTTERS ET AL., supra note 41, at 292.
59. Id.
corporation had assets valued at over $50 million.60 By 1932, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means reported that "perhaps two-thirds of the industrial wealth of the country [has passed] from individual ownership to ownership by large, publicly-financed corporations."61 In his famous dissent in the *Louis K. Liggett* case, Justice Brandeis described the extent of this economic concentration: "200 nonbanking corporations, each with assets in excess of $90,000,000, control directly about one-fourth of all our national wealth."62 One study concluded that "the merger movement of the 1920s not only significantly increased over-all levels of concentration but did so to a substantial extent" in certain key industry groups.63

After the stock market crash in October of 1929, there was a tendency to place at least part of the blame for the ensuing economic crisis on the "excessive" business combinations and resulting economic concentration of the 1920s.64 As Paul Conkin reports, this blame was probably misplaced: "Numerous corporate consolidations increased efficiency even as they narrowed participation in key managerial choices."65 The broad impact of the crash, however, made the reality irrelevant for a Congress seeking to blunt its bitter effects: "The statutes which 'permitted necessary business adjustments' in 1921" became, from the post-Crash perspective of the 1930s, "one of the major and indispensable forces in the thrust towards economic concentration which characterized the 'twenties."66

Second, the liberalized reorganization provisions opened the door to reorganizations motivated primarily by a desire to reduce taxes. This movement was primarily due to poor drafting—the reorganization provisions were overly detailed and yet still ambiguous in important ways. Although the Revenue Act of 1921 included what legislators thought to be "comprehensive" reorganization provisions, taxpayers soon took advantage of the many deficiencies and gaps in drafting.67 After extensive study, Congress

60. *Id.* at 294.
63. *Butters et al., supra* note 41, at 299 (citing industry groups such as oil, steel, and copper).
64. See *Louis K. Liggett Co.*, 288 U.S. at 566–67 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("Other writers have shown that, coincident with the growth of these giant corporations, there has occurred a marked concentration of individual wealth; and that the resulting disparity in incomes is a major cause of the existing depression.").
concluded in 1924 that the relatively sparse reorganization provisions should be greatly expanded to specify the exact nature of each requirement for qualification under the statute. The resulting revenue act was called one of "the most detailed and precise statutes which had been evolved up to that time." Randolph Paul remarked that the reorganization provisions "on their face appeared sufficient to capture the most elusive quarry." The detail of the reorganization provisions proved a mirage for those eager to stop abuse. Creative tax practitioners located loopholes in even the most explicit of clauses and openly devised transactions that complied with the letter, if not the spirit, of the statute. One practitioner described the wide variety of reorganizations that were used to reduce taxable income:

New corporations were established out of old with the assurance of larger deductions for depreciation; corporations on the verge of liquidation were reorganized so that earned surplus and surplus to be earned upon dissolution might be absorbed in larger issues of stock, and then dissolved without taxable profit except possibly to stockholders. Elaborate projects were evolved whereby surplus cash was to be passed on to stockholders as a partial "liquidation" of their shares. Common law trusts were established by the score.

While the courts helped shut down a number of the schemes occasioned by loopholes and overly tight drafting, taxpayers won a fair number of the cases and even more probably went undetected.

68. Id. See also Satterlee, supra note 25, at 640 (stating that 1924 Act included an elaborate definition of corporate reorganization).


70. PAUL, supra note 25, at 37.

71. Kohler, supra note 31, at 180. See Ernestine Breisch, Using the Stepped-Up Basis on Corporate Reorganizations, 9 TAX MAG. 245, 245 (1931) (describing the possibility of acquiring cost rather than carryover basis in a reorganization).


73. See PAUL, supra note 25, at 37 (stating that "defeat piled upon defeat" for Treasury).
B. New Deal

1. Subcommittee Proposal

As Roosevelt settled into the presidency in 1933, Congress was in the process of investigating the causes of the stock market crash and Great Depression. During the highly publicized Pecora hearings before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, there were allegations of widespread misconduct and questionable actions by investment bankers and corporate managers. Some of these accusations related to the disabling of typical corporate governance mechanisms in connection with mergers and acquisitions. In one device, the Pennsylvania Railroad financed a holding company by issuing "voting trust certificates" rather than stock so it could amass the financial resources to engage in strategic acquisitions of smaller railroad lines without being subject to stockholder oversight. An investment banker involved in organizing the Pennsylvania Railroad holding company candidly testified that all such efforts to deprive stockholders of control were "inventions of the devil."

Other corporate governance practices highlighted during the Pecora hearings related to the impropriety of executive compensation or dividend declarations. With respect to the former issue, several Senators grilled Albert Wiggin, the former chairman of the board of directors at Chase National Bank, about the size and source of his income, noting that "[t]hey credited you with being responsible for some of their added profits in the good years" by paying large bonuses, but "[i]n bad years [they failed to] charge you in any way with responsibility for losses." As Wiggin later conceded under questioning, he alone determined his bonus, and the board served as little more than a rubber stamp. With respect to the latter issue,

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75. See LEFF, supra note 11, at 58–59 (referring to Ferdinand Pecora as the "unrelenting committee counsel"); ROE, supra note 6, at 110–11 (concerning the Pecora hearings); The Man Who Will Question Morgan, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1933, § 8, at 2 (profiling Ferdinand Pecora).
76. See FERDINAND PECORA, WALL STREET UNDER OATH 58–59 (1939) (detailing the structure of the holding company organized by Pennsylvania Railroad).
77. Id. at 59 (quoting Otto Kahn, of Kuhn, Loeb and Company).
79. See id. at 2337 (statement of Albert Wiggin) ("I think I made up that list with my name on it and the board always approved it."). When he later conceded that he had suggested his $100,000 retirement pay, "he unleashed a furious reaction from public and stockholder alike
Pecora questioned the director of Fox Film Corporation over its declaration of a $4 million dividend to its principal stockholder, the General Theaters Equipment, in a year when it sustained a loss of more than $5.5 million. Senator Couzens noted that this action was particularly suspicious given the "very close affiliation between the General Theaters Equipment and the management of the Fox Film Corporation" and the fact that Fox was heavily in debt at the time. While it is not entirely clear that the practice in either case was improper, the investigation into these cases and other similar incidents indicated Congress's heightened concern over the internal governance of the corporation.

This inquiry into Wall Street's contribution to the stock market crash and the ensuing Depression was accompanied by revelations of rampant tax evasion. According to one account, not only had the world-renowned financier J.P. Morgan paid no income taxes during 1931 and 1932, none of the partners in his investment house had either. While much of this behavior was perfectly legal, Congress was looking for scapegoats and the richer the better. Thus, against the backdrop of an investigation that "had whipped up public outrage against corporate abuses," the House authorized a thorough study of the internal revenue system in order to ferret out evasion and simplify the tax laws.
The resulting House Subcommittee report, issued in December of 1933, reflected these dual themes of tax avoidance and corporate excesses. At the press conference to announce the release of the Subcommittee report, the New York Times observed that the "[c]hanges sought are aimed principally at persons whose incomes are in the higher brackets, as well as at corporations now legally permitted to take advantage of what committee members said were 'unfair but legal' provisions of the revenue laws." One such apparently "unfair but legal" revenue law was the tax-free reorganization provisions. In its report, the Subcommittee recommended eliminating the tax-free reorganization in order to "close the door to one of the most prevalent methods of tax avoidance." Although nonrecognition treatment was premised on the principle that tax is deferred rather than exempted, the report noted that "the taxpayer is able to escape tax on these gains entirely by being permitted to elect the year in which he shall report such gain."

While the Subcommittee's report prominently cited the tax avoidance rationale, it also disclosed an underlying corporate governance motivation for its recommendation. In a separate memorandum attached to the report, the Subcommittee provided more detailed justification for repeal of the tax-free reorganization provisions. It acknowledged that one of the rationales for liberalizing the reorganization provisions during the early 1920s was to remove the obstacles to "normal business readjustments" but concluded that this rationale was no longer salient. "[T]he present provisions," the report observed, "have encouraged the injection into business structure of an unsavory stimulus, such as the organization of large holding companies and the overcapitalization of business." In effect, the Subcommittee report endorsed

87. Tax Plan Offered to Curb Evasions, Raise $237,000,000, N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1933, at 1.
88. 1933 Subcommittee Report, supra note 86, at 8.
89. Id.
90. See id. at 39-42 (providing eight hypothetical cases in which the reorganization provisions were then used to avoid taxes).
91. See id. at 37, exh. D (concerning the "Memorandum on Exchanges and Reorganizations").
92. Id. at 38. The rationale for the 1921 reforms has led at least one modern observer to conclude that the tax-free reorganization provisions are one "of the best examples of the Code's attempt not to let tax rules influence corporate governance." Paul B. Stephan, Disaggregation and Subchapter C: Rethinking Corporate Tax Reform, 76 Va. L. Rev. 655, 677 (1990). This analysis, however, ignores the corporate governance motivation for the later 1934 reforms.
withdrawing the reorganization provisions as a means of stemming the tide of business combination and economic concentration.

The characterization of the reorganization provisions as an "unsavory stimulus" to the creation of holding companies was part of a general attack on such forms of corporate organization. One of the Subcommittee's many recommendations was to eliminate the provisions permitting an affiliated group of corporations to file a consolidated federal income tax return. 94 As the report acknowledged, 95 this recommendation was the culmination of a continuing controversy in Congress over consolidated returns and the dangers of holding companies. Holding companies, or corporations whose assets consisted of the stock of subsidiary corporations, were often considered vehicles for the predatory activities of trusts and chain stores. 96 In 1932, after rejecting a similar proposal to abolish the consolidated return, 97 Congress levied a small tax on the privilege of filing as a consolidated group. 98 According to the Subcommittee, however, this surcharge was no longer sufficient to offset the tax advantages provided to corporate families under the consolidated return provisions:

In the past, when any corporation could carry forward a net loss from one year to another, the consolidated group did not have such a great advantage over the separate corporation. Now that this net-loss carry-over has been denied, the advantage of the consolidated return is much greater on a comparative basis. 99

Thus, the Subcommittee proposal to eliminate the consolidated return, like the proposal to abolish the tax-free reorganization, was an attack on the holding company system. 100

At the subsequent House Ways and Means Committee hearings, corporate managers opposed the Subcommittee's recommendations, 101 but they were

94. Id. at 10.
95. Id.
96. See 75 CONG. REC. H7125 (Mar. 30, 1932) (statement of Rep. Cannon) (suggesting that the consolidated return allows holding companies to reduce prices and undercut the competition in one location while allowing any tax losses suffered to be used to offset income from other more profitable locations).
97. See 1933 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 86, at 10 (concerning Congressional rejection of the proposal).
98. Id. The National Industrial Recovery Act subsequently increased this rate. See id. (concerning the increase in the tax rate).
99. Id.
100. Cf. Tax Bill Changes Offered by Borah, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1934, at 38 (characterizing Senator Borah's attempt to revive the original Subcommittee consolidated return proposal in the Senate as an effort "to strike at the holding company system").
noticeably muted in their reaction to the proposal to abolish the reorganization provisions. James Emery of the National Association of Manufacturers generically pleaded:

We venture particularly at this time the suggestion that the national tax policy, for the most practical reasons, should encourage new investment rather than discourage it by radical change. The development of new or the expansion of existing forms of business, means a new or enlarged contribution to the shrunken public purse.\(^{102}\)

Although this statement could be construed as an indictment of the proposal to eliminate the tax-free reorganization provisions, Emery made no mention of this proposal.\(^{103}\) Only the U.S. Chamber of Commerce specifically opposed the proposal to eliminate the reorganization provisions. It noted that:

- Exchanges, modifications of capital structure and consolidations undertaken in the interest of better operating conditions and as a means of expanding business activity should not be penalized but should be encouraged. This is especially true at the present time when many reorganizations are unescapable as a result of the depression. Reorganizations which are necessary to business recovery and increased employment will not be undertaken if an immediate tax liability is imposed.\(^{104}\)

Even this expression of opposition, however, was a part of a prepared statement submitted in lieu of live testimony.\(^{105}\) No speaker actually devoted any of his allotted time to the reorganization proposal.\(^{106}\)

Part of the silence on the reorganization provisions may have been due to the fact that Treasury was already doing most of the heavy labor in opposing

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101. See generally Opposes Taxation as Social Cure-All, N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1933, at 15 (concerning a hearing at which the proposal was under attack for seven hours); Railroads Oppose Income Tax Change, N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1933, at 5 (concerning statement submitted to the Committee by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce).

102. Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 73d Cong. 215 (1933) (statement of James A. Emery, Taxation Committee of the National Association of Manufacturers) [hereinafter 1933 House Hearings].

103. See id. (providing no mention of the tax-free reorganization provision).

104. Id. at 290–91 (statement of F.H. Clausen, Chairman of the Committee on Federal Taxation, Chamber of Commerce of the United States).

105. Id. at 287. Chester Leasure appeared on behalf of the Chamber because Fred Clausen, the Chamber's chief lobbyist on tax issues, was unable to attend. Id. The written statement was subsequently republished in edited form in the New York Times. See Opposes Taxation as Social Cure-All, supra note 101, at 15 (publishing Clausen's statement).

106. Because witnesses had a limited time to speak before the Committee, they presumably chose the most important issues to highlight during live testimony and reserved lesser issues for a written statement submitted sometime later.
the Subcommittee recommendations.\textsuperscript{107} Acting Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau issued a statement regarding the Subcommittee report at the start of the Ways and Means hearings.\textsuperscript{108} Morgenthau agreed with the Subcommittee that the reorganization provisions were both complex and "open to the serious objection of being overspecific,"\textsuperscript{109} but concluded that the provisions should be "completely redrafted" rather than abandoned entirely.\textsuperscript{110} Treasury believed that the elimination of the reorganization provisions would simply afford taxpayers an opportunity to claim losses, both immediately and over time in the form of higher bases for depreciation and depletion deductions, with the result that "the proposal would not only yield no additional revenue, but would result in a net loss.\textsuperscript{111} While corporate managers did not reference the Treasury statement in supporting their own testimony, it may have allowed them to focus on those recommendations the Treasury did not choose to contest.

The problem with this explanation is that business leaders questioned a number of the Subcommittee recommendations that the Treasury had already rejected in its own statement. For instance, the Treasury concluded that the Subcommittee proposal to abolish consolidated returns "might well be a backward step, which would result in little, if any, additional revenue."\textsuperscript{112} According to the Treasury, full recognition of intercompany transactions would be just as likely to result in deductible losses as gains and would incur considerable administrative expenses for both the government and the taxpayer.\textsuperscript{113} This strong repudiation of the Subcommittee recommendation, however, did not prevent a number of witnesses from raising the consolidated

\textsuperscript{107} The Treasury was apparently upset at its minimal role in the preparation of the Subcommittee report. See Leff, supra note 11, at 61 (quoting a business commentator as stating that Treasury's role amounted to "practically nothing").


\textsuperscript{109} Statement of the Acting Secretary of the Treasury, supra note 108, at 9.

\textsuperscript{110} Id. at 9–10.

\textsuperscript{111} Id. at 10. This argument was not as persuasive after Congress adopted limits on the ability to recognize capital losses in the Revenue Act of 1934 and thereby greatly reduced the ability to use a taxable reorganization as an avenue for recognizing losses. Sandberg, supra note 53, at 121.

\textsuperscript{112} Statement of the Acting Secretary of the Treasury, supra note 108, at 13.

\textsuperscript{113} Id.
return issue in their own testimony. The National Association of Manufacturers noted that the consolidated return "merely recognizes the separate corporate entities which are working parts of one business created for convenience and necessity, developed out of experience, and recognized by the States of the Union." 114 Similarly, M.L. Seidman of the New York Board of Trade protested that "[t]o shut one's eyes to the position of a particular company in a group, and to insist that every corporation in that group file separate returns, would be to encourage artificial business arrangements and to distort normal and natural intercompany accounting methods." 115

2. House

Despite the lack of public protest from business leaders and Subcommittee Chairman Hill's confident predictions that its recommendations would prevail, 116 the full House Ways and Means Committee sided with the Treasury on the reorganization question. In its report submitted in February of 1934, the Committee stated that "under present conditions, the wiser policy is to amend the provisions drastically to stop the known cases of tax avoidance, rather than to eliminate the sections completely. This decision will further avoid the period of litigation and uncertainty which would necessarily follow a complete reversal of the established policy." 117

This apparent victory for corporate managers did not mean that the Committee sought to continue encouraging reorganizations. In fact, under the Committee's proposal, the number of transactions in which reorganization status was available would be severely limited to "(1) statutory mergers and consolidations; (2) transfers to a controlled corporation, 'control' being defined as an 80 per cent ownership; and (3) changes in the

114. 1933 House Hearings, supra note 102, at 215 (statement of James A. Emery, Taxation Committee of the National Association of Manufacturers).

115. Id. at 173 (statement of M.L. Seidman, New York Board of Trade). See also id. at 290 (statement of F.H. Clausen, Chairman of the Committee on Federal Taxation, Chamber of Commerce of the United States) ("Elimination of consolidated returns would undoubtedly force corporate mergers and consolidations solely for the purpose of avoiding an unfair tax. Mergers should be consummated only for the economic reason of increasing business efficiency.").

116. See Stands by Committee, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1933, at 2 (quoting the Chairman that he did not expect significant changes as a result of Treasury's findings).

capital structure or form of organization." According to its report, "the definition of reorganization has been restricted so that the definition will conform more closely to the general requirements of corporation law." This admittedly "drastic" amendment to the reorganization provisions once again provoked little protest on the part of corporate managers. In the House, this lack of protest was partly because the Ways and Means Committee pushed for the passage of a special rule prohibiting all amendments other than those offered by members of the Committee. According to Representative Robert Doughton, the Chair of the Committee, "[i]t is the only practical way to bring out the bill . . . . It is a good bill, and if it is opened to amendments it won’t be as good when passed as it now is." The apparent rationale for the rule was to block any amendments seeking to scrap the whole income tax in favor of a sales tax, but the practical result was to secure passage of the bill with little debate on the floor of the House and shift protest on individual proposals to the Senate.

119. \textit{Id.}
120. \textit{See id.} (calling the amendment "drastic").
121. \textit{See} \textit{ROY G. BLAKEY \& GLADYS C. BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX} 356 (1940) (describing the rule limiting debate and amendments to those amendments proposed by the House Committee on Ways and Means); \textit{House Rule is Won to Speed Tax Bill}, \textit{N.Y. Times}, Feb. 14, 1934, at 1 (discussing the rule only allowing authors to propose amendments).
122. \textit{House Rule is Won to Speed Tax Bill}, supra note 121, at 1.
123. \textit{See $65,000,000 is Cut From New Tax Bill}, \textit{N.Y. Times}, Feb. 9, 1934, at 7 (concerning the rule blocking amendments to the bill). The article stated:

Under such procedure agreed upon [requesting a rule to limit amendments and debate], the only opportunity for a vote on a sales tax would be on a motion to send the whole bill back to the committee with instructions to insert that levy. Since only one motion to recommit will be proposed in the rule, it is not a certainty that a vote will be afforded on the sales tax levy at all.

\textit{Id.}; \textit{see also} \textit{Manufacturers Association Urges Sales Tax and Flexible Liquor Levy at House Hearing}, \textit{Wall St. J.}, Dec. 19, 1933, at 1 (describing the growing impetus for a sales tax).

There was less discussion of the fundamental income tax sections than on any similar occasion. The few speeches made were in explanation of the changes. Perhaps the amendments were of such technical nature that they were not readily understood. Perhaps the members thought it futile to debate in view of the stress that had been placed on the profound study made by the subcommittee. Certainly, after the passage of the gag rule, there was no point in offering amendments.

\textit{Id.}
3. Senate

Passage of the House bill did stir corporate managers to protest, but the protest was still relatively limited. While the bill headed to the Senate Finance Committee, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce once again issued a statement decrying the proposed changes, including those changes to the reorganization provision. This statement, however, was only a slightly revised version of the one it submitted during the Ways and Means Committee hearings. According to the Chamber, "[n]o tax should be imposed on exchanges or reorganizations unless there is a clearly realized gain. Reorganization and mergers made necessary, in view of economic conditions, as a matter of good business policy, should not be discouraged or precluded by additional taxation." 125 The Chamber allowed for some possibility of minor changes, but argued against anything more radical: "The question of mergers and reorganizations in relation to Federal income taxes has always been a complex one. The present provisions have been in the law practically unchanged since 1918 and taken as a whole are sound. Any substantial change will result in confusion and uncertainty." 126

Corporate managers issued similar statements of opposition to the House bill's proposed treatment of reorganization provisions during the Senate Finance Committee Hearings. As in the House hearings, however, few witnesses addressed the issue, and most of those who did only did so in their written statements. 127 The one exception was David Gaskill speaking on behalf of the Cleveland Chamber of Commerce. 128 While he discussed a proposed limit on the deductibility of capital losses first, 129 he did raise the reorganization provision in his testimony. Gaskill stated that:

The bill, as passed by the House, took out the so-called "parenthetical clause," and limits the definition to statutory mergers and consolidations. We take the position that with that eliminated, the bill is now indefinite, and

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126. Id.
127. As in the House, speakers were asked to limit their presentations and submit as much as possible in a written statement. See Hearings on H.R. 7835 Before the Senate Comm. on Fin., 73d Cong. 1 (1934) (statement of Chairman Pat Harrison) (asking witnesses to be brief). Thus, issues presented in live testimony were likely to be deemed more important than those only presented in a written statement.
128. Id. (statement of David Gaskill).
129. See id. at 1–2 (discussing capital gains tax).
a substantial amount of litigation will be necessary in order to find out just what is and what is not a statutory consolidation or merger.\textsuperscript{130}

As Senator Harrison appeared to recognize when he questioned Gaskill about his claims,\textsuperscript{131} and the Cleveland Chamber of Commerce implied in its written statement,\textsuperscript{132} the predicted litigation would most likely result from managers' attempts to characterize stock and asset acquisitions—previously parenthetical clause transactions—as statutory mergers and consolidations.

Aside from the Cleveland Chamber of Commerce, no other party addressed the reorganization provision in their testimony. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce submitted both a prepared brief and report in which the House's reorganization provision was criticized, but much of this criticism was essentially a repeat of the objections raised by the Cleveland Chamber of Commerce. In its brief, the Chamber warned that "[t]he provision affecting mergers or consolidations of corporations will result in confusion, and will discourage mergers which, in the view of recent economic conditions should be made in the interests of good business policies, and because of the lessened number of mergers, revenues will probably decrease."\textsuperscript{133} Its accompanying report elaborated on such concerns, emphasizing the view that the House proposal would severely limit the tax-free reorganization: "The apparent effect of this amendment will be to eliminate perhaps the most usual and important form of reorganization, leaving only comparatively restricted and technical forms permissible without tax."\textsuperscript{134} According to the Chamber's report, the cause of the confusion would be that the meanings of the terms "merger" and "consolidation" would:

[H]ave to be determined in various instances by the laws of the particular State which might be applicable in the case. What would be a merger or consolidation in one State might not be in another. Instead, then, of having

\textsuperscript{130} Id. at 2–3.
\textsuperscript{131} See id. at 3 (statement of Chairman Pat Harrison) (asking if the witness did not think the provision simplifies any proportion of reorganization tax).
\textsuperscript{132} See id. at 7 (written statement of the Cleveland Chamber of Commerce) (arguing that "the changes proposed will prevent the consummation of transactions which are entirely proper and which are in fact necessary and advisable during a period of reconstruction"). The Cleveland Chamber of Commerce also stated that "[t]he prevention of such transactions does not produce any revenue for the Government and creates unreasonable interference with the proper transaction of legitimate business." Id.
\textsuperscript{133} Id. at 50 (brief of F.H. Clausen, Chairman of Special Committee on Federal Taxation, U.S. Chamber of Commerce).
\textsuperscript{134} Id. at 58 (report of the Committee of Federal Taxation, U.S. Chamber of Commerce).
uniform principles generally applicable to all corporations, there would be different standards applicable to different corporations.135

This latter argument proved to be convincing to the Senate Finance Committee—or at least it sounded reasonable enough to use as its official justification for the rejection of the House's more radical amendments. In its report, the Senate Finance Committee noted that it was "in complete agreement with the purposes of the House Bill," but indicated that "some modifications are recommended in order to bring about a more uniform application of the provisions in all 48 of the States. Not all of the States have adopted statutes providing for mergers or consolidations; and, moreover, a corporation of one State can not ordinarily merge with a corporation of another State."136 Because "some legitimate and desirable business readjustments would be prevented" by limiting nonrecognition treatment to statutory mergers, the Finance Committee proposed a broader definition of "reorganization."137 Thus, in addition to the statutory merger or consolidation and other transactions proposed under the House bill, the Senate Finance Committee proposed to include the following transaction within the definition of reorganization:

[T]he acquisition by one corporation in exchange solely for all or part of its voting stock: of at least 80 per centum of the voting stock and at least 80 per centum of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock of another corporation; or of substantially all the properties of another corporation.138

The Committee noted that "these transactions, when carried out as prescribed in this amendment, are in themselves sufficiently similar to mergers and consolidations as to be entitled to similar treatment."139

The Senate Finance Committee proposal provided for a more expansive reorganization definition than the one passed by the House, but contemporary

135. Id. at 59. The Chamber further explained by providing an example:

[1]f two corporations owned by different interests desire to consolidate and give their stockholders no cash or property, but only stock representing the same properties, they may apparently do so free of tax if they happen both to be in the same State and that State provides by law for procedure which can be called a "merger or consolidation," but if not, and if the transaction involves one of the corporations or a new corporation taking over the stocks or properties then a tax is seemingly payable based upon appraised or estimated values of the stocks.

Id. at 58–59.


137. Id. at 599.

138. Id. at 598.

139. Id.
observers still thought it had been "sharply modified" from the existing provisions.\footnote{140} As the Committee noted, it required the acquisition of eighty percent of the target corporation stock.\footnote{141} Ever since the parenthetical clause was inserted into the reorganization provision in the 1921 Act, Congress had only required the acquisition of a majority of the target corporation stock.\footnote{142} Moreover, both the asset and stock acquisitions would only be entitled to nonrecognition treatment if the property or stock were exchanged "solely for the voting stock of the acquiring corporation."\footnote{143} Not only had the former parenthetical clause not imposed a similar voting stock requirement, it had not specified the consideration at all. One commentator called this "[p]erhaps the most radical change" to the reorganization provisions.\footnote{144}

Notwithstanding the significant changes to emerge from the Senate Finance Committee, corporate managers made no protest and the measure sailed through the Senate.\footnote{145} Within a few weeks, the House conferees accepted the Senate proposal on the reorganization provisions. After little debate in either the House or the Senate over the Conference Report, the bill was signed into law in May of 1934.\footnote{146} Not only did the Revenue Act of 1934, or more specifically its changes to the reorganization provision, provoke little opposition on the part of corporate managers,\footnote{147} but most of its major statutory innovations have endured to this day.\footnote{148}

\footnote{140. Magill, supra note 49, at 639 n.9.}
\footnote{141. Id.}
\footnote{142. See Revenue Act of 1921, § 202(c)(2), ch. 136, 42 Stat. 227, 230 (1921) (concerning acquisition requirement).}
\footnote{143. 1934 Senate Report, supra note 136, at 599.}
\footnote{144. ROBERT S. HOLZMAN, CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS: THEIR FEDERAL TAX STATUS 66 (1948).}
\footnote{145. See 78 Cong. Rec. S6574 (1934) (voting with 53 in favor of the measure to 7 opposed with 36 not voting).}
\footnote{146. See BLAKEY & BLakey, supra note 121, at 362 (concerning the modest discussion of the conference report in the House and Senate prior to its passage).}
\footnote{147. See Revenue Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-216, § 112(g), 48 Stat. 680, 705 (1934) (defining "reorganization"). This statement does not mean that corporate managers expressed no displeasure about other aspects of the bill. See LEFF, supra note 11, at 66 (noting that one of the chief lobbyists for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce described the Act as an "ill-considered modified program").}
III. Undistributed Profits Tax

Just two years after the relatively mild reaction to a proposal to restrict a manager’s ability to do a tax-free merger, there was a very different reaction to a proposal to limit a manager’s discretion over dividend policy.

A. Early History

Ever since an income tax was first imposed during the Civil War and Reconstruction, Congress has struggled with how to reach the undistributed profits of a corporation. During the nineteenth century, undistributed profits were taxed as a way to ensure that corporations would not evade dividend taxes by simply accumulating, rather than distributing, their earnings. Thus, in 1864, Congress used an undistributed profits tax as an enforcement mechanism for its taxation of the dividends issued by corporations in certain industries. The House revived the undistributed profits tax in 1894 when it passed a bill imposing a dividends tax. Such efforts were not controversial, however, because the norm was for corporations to distribute virtually all of their profits as dividends.

149. See Act of June 30, 1864, Pub. L. No. 38-173, §§ 120–22, 13 Stat. 223, 283–85 (1865) (taxing businesses in certain specified industries, such as transportation, insurance, and banking, on dividends or interest paid, and on "undistributed sums, or sums made or added during the year to their surplus or contingent funds").

150. Section 59 of the House Bill provided, in relevant part:

That there shall be levied and collected a tax of 2 per cent on all dividends in scrip or money thereafter declared due, wherever and whenever the same be declared payable to stockholders, policy holders, or depositors or parties whatsoever, including nonresidents, whether citizens or aliens, as part of the earnings, income or gains of any bank, trust company, savings institution, and of any fire, marine, life, inland insurance company, either stock or mutual, under whatever name or style known or called in the United States or Territories, whether specially incorporated or existing under general laws, and on all undistributed sums, or sums made or added during the year to their surplus or contingent funds.

26 Cong. Rec. H6831 (June 26, 1894). As passed, the 1894 Act taxed corporations directly, but the Supreme Court struck down the income tax as an unconstitutional direct tax. The corporate tax was never implemented. See Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 583 (1895) (“We are of opinion that the law in question, so far as it levies a tax on the rents or income of real estate, is in violation of the Constitution, and is invalid.”).

After passage of the Sixteenth Amendment, Congress once again employed the undistributed profits tax concept, but only as a penalty provision. Under the Tariff Act of 1913, shareholders were subject to a tax on their undistributed profits when the corporation was found to have unreasonably accumulated profits for the purpose of evading the high surtax rates on individual income. This pass-through undistributed profits tax remained in place until it was deemed to be unconstitutional under the realization requirement announced in *Eisner v. Macomber*. In subsequent years, the undistributed profits tax was applied directly to the corporation when the purpose of the accumulation was to evade the surtaxes on individual income or when the corporation was formed for the purpose of evading the surtaxes. Because of the tax’s intent requirement, however, the provision was often not enforced during the early years of the income tax.

Perhaps recognizing the inherent problems with the use of the undistributed profits tax as a penalty provision, various individuals and groups forwarded proposals to broaden the tax’s scope. In 1917, Senator Andrieus Jones of New Mexico proposed to tax corporations on a certain percentage of their undistributed profits regardless of the purpose for the retention. While a bill introduced by the Senate Finance Committee to

152. *See U.S. Const.* amend. XVI ("The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several states, and without regard to any census or enumeration.").


154. *See id.* § II(A)(2), 38 Stat. at 166–67 (stating that holding beyond reasonable needs is prima facie evidence of fraudulent purpose). At the time, all individual income was subject to a flat normal tax, but incomes above a certain level were subject to an additional surtax at gradually increasing rates.


156. *See John B. Martin, Jr., Taxation of Undistributed Corporate Profits*, 35 Mich. L. Rev. 44, 49 (1936) (stating that in 1934 the Act "was made applicable where the corporation is formed or employed for the purpose of preventing the imposition of the surtax upon its shareholders or upon those of any other corporation through the device of allowing gains and profits to accumulate instead of being distributed").


158. *See id.* at 274 (stating the proposal advanced by Senator Jones); Martin, *supra* note 156, at 44 (concerning the proposal of Senator Jones).
adopt this proposal was rejected, the Senate eventually adopted something similar to Jones's original suggestion in an amendment to the Revenue Act of 1924 before it was removed in the House.159 In 1928, the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation revived the undistributed profits tax proposal, but Congress rejected it amid concerns about making such a radical change during a period of business expansion.160

B. Revenue Act of 1936

1. Prelude to an Undistributed Profits Tax

Even before he was elected for the first time in 1932, President Roosevelt's advisors had urged him to consider the possibility of an undistributed profits tax. As he was campaigning for the presidency, Roosevelt's small circle of policy advisors—the "Brain Trust" as they came to be called—were hard at work developing methods of stabilizing the economy and preventing a repeat of the 1929 stock market crash.161 In a memorandum to then-Governor Roosevelt, the Brain Trust outlined what would become the foundation for the New Deal.162 Although the memorandum identified many culprits for the Depression, it laid much of the blame on the unreasonable

159. See Lambert, supra note 157, at 274 (stating that the proposal was adopted in the Senate, but rejected by the House after protests poured in from the business community); Note, The Surtax on Undistributed Profits, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 332, 332 n.2 (1936) (stating that the Senate passed an amendment to the Revenue Act of 1924 adopting the surtax on undistributed profits).

160. See Blakey & Blakey, supra note 121, at 405 (discussing members' concern that the tax would have a negative effect on small businesses and that the tax yield would be less than under the usual tax on income); Lambert, supra note 157, at 274 (stating there was concern the measure would slow down business expansion).

161. See Daniel R. Fusfeld, The Economic Thought of Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Origins of the New Deal 207 (1954) (analyzing the organization and role of the Brain Trust); Raymond Moley, After Seven Years 21–22 (1939) (concerning the origins of the Brain Trust).

162. See Memorandum from Raymond Moley and others, to Franklin Delano Roosevelt (May 19, 1932) (in Box 282, Folder 3, Raymond Moley Papers, Hoover Institution Library and Archives, Stanford University) (outlining the policy proposals of the Brain Trust) [hereinafter Memorandum of May 19, 1932]. The May 19 memorandum was written in response to a request by Roosevelt to keep him updated during his pre-campaign vacation trip to Warm Springs. It became the opportunity to prepare a series of specific recommendations for various aspects of the economic crisis and was the foundation of many of Roosevelt's campaign speeches and eventually his acceptance speech. See Fusfeld, supra note 161, at 219 (concerning the Brain Trust); Moley, supra note 161, at 21–22 (discussing the origins of the Brain Trust).
accumulation of corporate profits. According to the memorandum, the prosperity of the Twenties led to "a greater accumulation of surpluses than were ever before realized in economic history." This practice of "corporate hoarding," the memorandum charged, "upset the balance of production and consumption" and contributed both to the crash and the ensuing Depression. Roosevelt’s advisors recommended a "tax on undistributed surplus income of corporations" as a means of "forcing undistributed surplus into the general market for capital."

While Roosevelt clearly endorsed the basic principles underlying the recommendation, he did not push for the enactment of an undistributed profits tax until two events prompted a budgetary crisis at the end of his first term of office. First, the Supreme Court struck down the Agricultural Adjustment Act and consequently invalidated the processing taxes Roosevelt had counted on to finance the Act’s operations. Second, Congress overrode a presidential veto to accelerate payment on World War I veterans’ bonuses from 1945 to 1936. The combined result of these two events was a $620 million shortfall in the president’s budget. To address this shortfall, Roosevelt and his advisors once again turned to the undistributed profits tax.

163. Memorandum of May 19, 1932, supra note 162, at 1.
164. Id. at 2–3.
165. Id. at 3–4.
166. In his July 1932 acceptance speech at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago, for example, he attributed the Depression to heavy "corporate surpluses" used to finance "unnecessary plants" and rampant pre-crash stock market speculation. July 2, 1932 Speech, in 1 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 651 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1938). He did not even suggest the possibility of enacting the specific proposal, however, until later in his term. In his message to Congress on June 19, 1935, Roosevelt declared that ultimately we might need to use taxation to "discourage unwieldy and unnecessary corporate surpluses." ALFRED G. BUEHLER, THE UNDISTRIBUTED PROFITS TAX 19 n.1 (1937).
167. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68 (1936) ("[The Act] is a statutory plan to regulate and control agricultural production, a matter beyond the powers delegated to the federal government. The tax, the appropriation of the funds raised, and the direction for the disbursement, are but parts of the plan. They are but means to an unconstitutional end."). Under the Act, the Secretary of Agriculture was empowered to pay farmers not to produce a particular commodity when prices for that commodity fell to dangerously low levels. Id. at 88–90.
168. LEFF, supra note 11, at 170. Although this decision meant an immediate cash payment of almost $2 billion, the real cost of this payment was the $120 million annual carrying charge on financing the bonuses. Id.
169. See BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 121, at 401 (discussing the budget shortfall); SIDNEY RATNER, TAXATION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 472 (photo. reprint 1980) (1967) (same).
On March 3, Roosevelt addressed Congress in a supplemental budget message.\footnote{A Supplemental Budget Message to Congress (March 3, 1936), in 5 The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt 102 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1938).} Ostensibly, the message was merely to announce the need for an additional $620 million in revenue to replace the processing taxes and fund the veterans' bonuses. Roosevelt made a point of acknowledging Congress's discretion to determine the appropriate means to raise such revenue.\footnote{See id. at 104–05 ("I leave, of course, to the discretion of the Congress the formulation of the appropriate taxes for the needed permanent revenue.")}. His true aim, however, was to push his proposal for an undistributed profits tax.\footnote{Id. at 105–06.} In advocating for the undistributed profits tax, Roosevelt did not mention its potential as a check on corporate managers and a stimulus to the economy. Roosevelt instead emphasized its two tax policy benefits:\footnote{LEFF, supra note 11, at 175–77.} (1) its ability to equalize the treatment of all business owners, and (2) its promise to "stop 'leaks' in present surtaxes."\footnote{Id. at 105–06.} One particularly novel aspect of Roosevelt's proposal was that it was designed not to serve as a penalty tax, as it had in the past, but rather as a replacement for the corporate income tax.\footnote{LEFF, supra note 11, at 175–77.} Distributed income would be subject to one layer of tax, while retained income would bear both a corporate and shareholder-level tax.

Unlike the proposal to abolish the reorganization provisions in 1934, the undistributed profits tax proposal aroused "deep opposition" on the part of corporate managers.\footnote{Arthur Krock, Opposition is Divided Over President's Tax Proposal, N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1936, at 20.} Alfred Buehler reported, "[t]he business world . . . was aghast at the proposal and shuddered at the consequences if it were adopted."\footnote{BUEHLER, supra note 166, at 23.} Under then-prevailing dividend practices, the tax could not possibly raise the required $620 million in revenue.\footnote{See The New Tax Schedule, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1936, at 20 (stating that if the tax rates had no influence on dividend policy they would bring in less money than the government now receives).} Thus, the rates would have to be set high enough to "compel[] corporations radically to alter their present dividend
policy" in order to reach its revenue goals. This policy would force many corporations to rely more heavily on expensive and intrusive external financing sources, something managers are generally disinclined to do, especially when the alternative is simply to dip into retained earnings. Managers were perhaps most offended by the fact that a forced change in dividend policy would substitute "the blanket judgment of Congress and the Treasury Department, based on a general theory" for the "individual judgment of business managers, based on their direct knowledge of the needs of their particular company."

2. House

Corporate managers were initially restrained in their public responses to the President's message, but this reaction quickly changed as the undistributed profits tax concept was transformed into a concrete proposal. Under the bill as it was presented to the House Ways and Means Committee, the corporate income tax would be replaced by an undistributed profits tax graduated according to the percentage of net income retained. For corporations with annual net income of $10,000 or less, the rates ranged from 1% on the first 10% of undistributed net income to 29.7% on undistributed net income of 70.3% or more. For corporations with annual income in excess of $10,000, the bill proposed rates ranging from 4% on the first 10% of

180. *Id.*

181. *See Jensen, supra* note 19, at 323 ("Financing projects internally avoids this monitoring and the possibility the funds will be unavailable or available only at high explicit prices.").


183. *See George B. Bryant, Jr., Reform Motive in Tax Program, BARRON'S, Mar. 30, 1936, at 13* (concerning the lack of opposition). Bryant wrote:

> The remarkable lack of visible opposition to the proposal to date can be explained easily. It does not necessarily mean that business and industry will accept it without question and opposition. The scheme, thus far, has been in a purely formulative stage, and its effects upon the interests most vitally concerned cannot be definitely appraised.

*Id.; see also Trade Groups Study Tax Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1936, at 30* ("Organized business groups are reserving any public criticism of the President's plan for taxing corporate surpluses until later, it developed in a canvas of association offices yesterday . . . . Advises received . . . are to the effect that opposition to the measure will develop within the coming ten days.").


185. *Id.* at 5–6.
undistributed net income to a maximum of 42.5% on undistributed net income of 57.5% or more. 186 "Undistributed net income" was defined to include adjusted net income less taxable dividends and the undistributed profits tax itself. 187 The bill exempted or provided special treatment for banks, insurance companies, corporations in receivership, foreign corporations, and corporations that were contractually or legally prohibited from paying dividends. 188 Finally, the bill subjected dividends to the normal tax on individuals. 189

Despite Internal Revenue Commissioner Guy Helvering's declaration that "[t]here is no intention or desire whatever to interfere with the internal management of business enterprises," 190 corporate managers showed up in force at the Ways and Means hearings to testify against the proposal. Unlike in 1934, however, the large trade associations presented oral testimony against the undistributed profits tax rather than reserving the issue for their written statements. 191 Moreover, these trade groups often sent multiple representatives to testify against different aspects of the proposal. Three speakers, for example, represented the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, with their combined testimony consuming more than seventy-five pages of the transcribed hearings. 192 While this does not speak to the question of whether behind-the-scenes lobbying was any different in 1936 than 1934, such a public display of protest does suggest that business believed its views would stand up to public scrutiny.

Not only did the national trade associations devote a substantial portion of their allotted time to the undistributed profits tax proposal, they were harsh in their criticism. Noel Sargent, secretary of the National Association of Manufacturers, argued that the retention of corporate profits produced benefits ranging from an increase in stockholder value and industrial employment from the expansion of plant operations to the preservation of working capital and the protection against depression. 193 Fred Clausen of the U.S. Chamber of

186. Id. at 6.
187. Id. at 5.
188. Id. at 6-11.
189. Id. at 9.
190. Id. at 22.
191. This practice was in part due to the fact that the 1936 hearings were primarily devoted to the undistributed profits tax issue, and, therefore, the trade groups did not have to pick and choose among the issues. Nevertheless, corporate managers thought it was important to testify in person against the proposed undistributed profits tax rather than send in written statements.
192. See 1936 House Hearings, supra note 184, at 735 (reporting statement of Fred Clausen); id. at 760 (reporting statement of Roy Osgood); id. at 803 (reporting statement of E.C. Alvord).
193. See id. at 203, 206-10 (statement of Noel Sargent, Secretary, National Association of Manufacturers) (concerning benefits of profit retention).
Commerce was even more candid in his opposition, warning that "[t]his proposal would cause corporate management to be controlled, in its decisions on fiscal policy, by fear of government exactions rather than by good business judgment."\textsuperscript{194} Clausen predicted that the tax:

\begin{quote}
[W]ould engender such uncertainties concerning the sound course to pursue as to subject the management to grave difficulties with shareholders and creditors . . . . You can well imagine the difficulties facing managers and the board of directors in a company as to how to meet a situation which would exist if this proposal becomes the law of the land.\textsuperscript{195}
\end{quote}

According to Clausen, "[i]t presents the danger that corporate management would be subject to serious criticism and even law suits if liberal dividend policies were followed to escape taxes and gave rise to charges of dissipation of assets."\textsuperscript{196}

Many smaller national, regional, and local trade groups joined the National Association of Manufacturers and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in testifying against the tax. A representative of the National Retail Dry Goods Association warned of the "grave danger that the present highly capitalized organizations will have a continuing advantage over these smaller corporations" by virtue of the imposition of the tax.\textsuperscript{197} R.C. Fulbright of the Southern Pine Association echoed this charge, stating that "[w]e consider that it would be a very great detriment to our smaller companies unless some what can be found to protect the company that is heavily indebted or the company that must in order to keep going make needed improvements."\textsuperscript{198} As a representative of the Detroit Board of Commerce summarized, "a tried system of taxation is much better than a new system of taxation."\textsuperscript{199}

Perhaps more significant than the trade association testimony was that, unlike in 1934, business was not content to let its representatives speak for it. A parade of individual businessmen appeared before the Ways and Means Committee to testify against the tax. Some of these witnesses were from small

\textsuperscript{194} \textit{Id.} at 737 (statement of Fred H. Clausen, Chairman of the Committee on Federal Finance, U.S. Chamber of Commerce).

\textsuperscript{195} \textit{Id.} at 739–40.

\textsuperscript{196} \textit{Id.} at 740.

\textsuperscript{197} \textit{Id.} at 352 (statement of Harold R. Young, National Retail Dry Goods Association).

\textsuperscript{198} \textit{Id.} at 468 (statement of R.C. Fulbright, Southern Pine Association).

\textsuperscript{199} \textit{Id.} at 841 (statement of Raymond H. Berry, Detroit Board of Commerce). See \textit{id.} at 857 (statement of John W. O'Leary, President, Machinery and Allied Products Institute) ("The radical change in form of taxation suggested, and the serious effect of the proposed system on recovery and employment, prompts us to urge your committee to explore the effects and results with great care, giving full consideration to both practice and theory.").
businesses that felt threatened by the tax. The president of a bridge corporation testified that "[t]he smaller companies have only grown by using their earned surplus in the building of larger facilities and in increasing their working capital the necessary amount to take care of the increased capacity." Not only were such companies concerned about their ability to grow, but they also argued that the tax would prevent them from repaying their existing bank indebtedness.

Other witnesses appeared to represent the concerns of larger companies. One attorney noted that "[s]ince 70 percent of the earnings of [publicly owned companies] are distributed without regard to the tax brackets of the stockholders, and since the earnings of [privately owned companies] are distributed only after careful consideration of the tax brackets of its stockholders," the Committee should distinguish between public and private corporations in applying the tax.

During their testimony, Treasury representatives attempted to allay corporate managers' fears. First, they pointed out that the tax would still permit accumulation of a fairly significant surplus. According to Herman Oliphant, General Counsel of the Treasury Department, corporations might be able to retain twenty to thirty percent of their earnings under the proposal.

200. Id. at 146 (statement of Clyde G. Conley, President, Mount Vernon Bridge Company).
201. See id. at 177 (statement of Dean Alfange, general counsel, Axton-Fisher Tobacco Company) ("Under the tax recommended by the committee, corporations financed by banks and those that have weathered the depression by means of bank loans would be severely penalize [sic] in applying their earnings to the liquidation of these loans.").
202. Id. at 92 (statement of Albert Hubschman, Hubschman & Walsh).
203. Herman Oliphant, General Counsel for the Treasury Department, emphasized that:
[1]t is not for anybody in Washington to tell business executives how much of their earnings they shall keep back and how much they shall distribute. That is not the Government's business . . . . But it is the Government's business to see to it that those administering the affairs of a corporation shall not use it, nor permit it to be used for avoiding the surtaxes which everybody else has to pay. That is what this does.
204. See 1936 House Hearings, supra note 184, at 581 (statement of Arthur H. Kent, Acting Chief Counsel, Bureau of Internal Revenue) (stating that it "is continually overlooked that the measure will permit retention of a substantial fraction . . . without a corporate tax burden equal to or in excess of the burden imposed by the present law").
205. Id. at 649 (statement of Herman Oliphant, General Counsel, Treasury Department). See also id. at 582 (statement of Arthur H. Kent, Acting Chief Counsel, Bureau of Internal
Second, Treasury officials suggested corporations could satisfy their capital needs through debt and equity financing, or, where those methods were unavailable, by retaining funds through the issuance of taxable stock dividends. Recent judicial decisions had confirmed the possibility that a corporation could issue a type of stock dividend that would be considered taxable to the stockholder but would permit the corporation to retain the underlying funds.

The Treasury’s responses appeared sufficient to satisfy any lingering concerns on the part of most Committee members. Despite opponents’ urgings to proceed slowly before pursuing such a "radical change" in the system of taxing corporate income, the undistributed profits tax emerged from the Committee and quickly passed in the House with surprisingly little dissent. Much of this apparent lack of interest was due to the Republicans’ decision to avoid prolonging consideration of an issue that was likely to face stiffer opposition in the Senate.

Revenue) (estimating that a corporation might be able to retain as a high as forty percent of earnings without exceeding its previous income tax liability).

206. See, e.g., id. at 761 (statement of Roy Osgood, U.S. Chamber of Commerce) (suggesting that small corporations lacked access to the debt and equity markets).

207. See id. at 582 (concerning alternatives available).

208. See id. at 593 (citing court decisions). In 1935, for instance, the Sixth Circuit held that a dividend of common stock to preferred stockholders constituted a taxable stock dividend because it meaningfully changed the preferred stockholders’ interest in the corporation. See Commissioner v. Tillotson Mfg. Co., 76 F.2d 189, 190 (6th Cir. 1935) (holding that proportionate interest of stockholders was materially altered).

209. Id. at 857 (statement of John W. O’Leary, President, Machinery and Allied Products Institute). See also id. at 841 (statement of Raymond H. Berry, Detroit Board of Commerce) (“I believe a tried system of taxation is much better than a new system of taxation, which to me presents many difficulties.”).

210. See Turner Catledge, $803,000,000 Tax Bill Wins by Vote of 267–93 in House; Business Attacks New Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1936, at 1 (stating that House passed bill by vote of 267 to 93); see also House Gets New Tax Bill, But Yield is Still in Doubt; Quick Passage Forecast, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1936, at 1 (stating that the House Ways and Means Committee voted 15 to 8 in favor of reporting the bill to the full House). At times, fewer than ten percent of the Representatives were present for the debates over the bill, and, according to the New York Times, “not more than half [of those present] were listening to the discussion.” Turner Catledge, Democrat Lines Up With Tax Bill Foies in Attack in House, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1936, at 1. See also 80 CONG. REC. H6009 (Apr. 23, 1936) (statement of Rep. Rich) (stating that only forty members of the House were present).

211. See Republicans Bar Tax Amendments, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1936, at 12 (stating that the Republican leadership decided to vote "no" on the measure and not offer amendments).
Although opponents were initially emboldened by reports that even pro-
Administration members of the Senate Finance Committee were dissatisfied
with the House bill, the overwhelming approval of the bill in the House
caused such optimism to waver. Thus, even before the Senate Finance
Committee began hearings on the proposed undistributed profits tax, corporate
managers and their representatives redoubled their efforts to oppose the bill.
The Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York issued a report sharply
condemning the tax: "In practice this proposed tax involves serious Federal
interference with business management. It is a scheme to force the distribution
of corporate profits regardless of the policy dictated by sound business
judgment." Similarly strong statements emerged from the annual meeting of
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, during which it adopted a resolution decrying
the undistributed profits tax as an attempt "to regulate the management of
corporations."

Once the Senate Finance Committee hearings began, business leaders
appeared in even greater numbers than during the House Ways and Means

212. See Alfred F. Flynn, Finance Committee Questions Tax Bill on Two Grounds, WALL
        ST. J., Apr. 24, 1936, at 1 (stating that Administration forces indicated a desire to change
        the House bill to provide for greater revenue and to simplify its administrative features).

213. See George B. Bryant, Jr., Tax Bill Speeded as Opposition Wanes in Senate, WALL ST.
        J., Apr. 29, 1936, at 1 (concerning waning Senate opposition in the wake of House approval);
        Catledge, supra note 210, at I (discussing the effect of the overwhelming vote in the House).
        Catledge wrote:

        Because of the tremendous House majority in today's vote and the ease with which
        the bill was shoved through the amending stages in that body yesterday, prospective
        opposition in the Senate was felt to be cooling perceptibly. Republican senators
        indicated they might follow the lead of their House colleagues and merely make
        their record against the whole new tax proposal, without attempting to amend it.

        Id.

214. New Tax Law Unsound Says the Chamber, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1936, at 37. See also
        Chamber Attacks Tax Bill, WALL ST. J., Apr. 28, 1936, at 2 (concerning report issued by the
        New York State Chamber of Commerce charging that the tax will "retard the growth of industry,
        injure labor and jeopardize financial security").

215. Thrust at Tax Bill Winds up Chamber, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1936, at 1. The
        Chamber's annual meeting was widely covered in the press, and its rhetoric was portrayed as a
        symbol of business's growing distrust of the New Deal. See Felix Belair, Jr., Business and the
        New Deal Still Far Apart, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1936, § 4, at 3 (stating differences between
        the Administration and businesses); Chamber Speakers Assail Profits Tax, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30,
        1936, at 10 (attacking Roosevelt's policies); Chamber Talks Caustic, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30,
        1936, at 1 (concerning opposition to Roosevelt's policies); Wide Riff Shown Between Business
        and New Deal, WALL ST. J., Apr. 29, 1936, at 2 (discussing annual meeting of U.S. Chamber of
        Commerce).
Committee hearings to testify against the undistributed profits tax. Whereas fifty-one nongovernmental speakers testified on the bill during the House hearings, nearly double that number—ninety-four—testified before the Senate Finance Committee. The Senate Finance Committee also received letters from another forty-three individuals or organizations, while the House Ways and Means Committee received only fourteen such written statements or letters. Some of the increase in the number of people testifying on the bill was attributable to the Senate's consideration of a proposal to impose a new processing tax. Nevertheless, the primary topic for most witnesses was the undistributed profits tax. Although they advocated relegating the tax to a subordinate role if Congress insisted on adopting it, they maintained a steadfast opposition to the entire concept. The principal complaint was that the tax would interfere with normal business operations. Managers' concerns ranged from the specific concern that the tax would upset the "regularity of dividend" to the more general worry "over the uncertainty produced by the constant changing of our tax laws." The U.S. Chamber of Commerce summarized such complaints:

The plan would tend to provide substitution of public control for private management in important fiscal operations of business. It would promote improvident and unstable dividend policies in many companies. In others it would engender such uncertainties concerning the sound course to pursue


217. Compare 1936 House Hearings, supra note 184, at IV (listing statements submitted to the House) with 1936 Senate Hearings, supra note 216, at V-VI (listing statements submitted to the Senate).

218. See 1936 Senate Hearings, supra note 216, at 3 (statement of Henry Morgenthau, Secretary of the Treasury) (urging consideration of the President's proposed new processing tax, which was not considered by the House, to replace the one struck down by the Court).

219. One particularly effective argument in this respect was to question the tax's ability to raise the necessary revenue by itself. See id. at 682 (statement of James A. Emery, general counsel, National Association of Manufacturers) ("It is not . . . a reliable source of revenue, for it is subject to the variations of business policy rather than the net income of the business itself"); see also id. at 221 (statement of Fred H. Clausen, U.S. Chamber of Commerce) ("The added revenue to be derived is highly uncertain and insufficient. It is less than the budgeted increase in ordinary expenditures for the next fiscal year.").

220. Id. at 79 (statement of Franklin Spencer Edmonds, Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce); id. at 101 (Statement of M.L. Seidman, New York Board of Trade). See also id. at 143 (statement of Paul H. Wilson, Gratton & Knight Company) (registering concern about replacing a system we have had for many years for one "that we do not know what it will produce").
as to subject the management to grave difficulties with shareholders and creditors. It presents the danger that corporate management would be subject to serious criticism and even lawsuits if liberal dividend policies, followed to escape taxes, give rise to charges of dissipation of assets.\footnote{221}

The constant themes running throughout managers' testimony was that the tax constituted an unwarranted interference with their ability to run the corporation.

Not only were there more people protesting the undistributed profits tax bill, but they were also more direct in complaining about the potential interference with corporate management. Noel Sargent of the National Association of Manufacturers warned that "[a]ny attempt to substitute the judgment of commissions or legislators for that of industrial executives as to the percentage of earnings which can be properly distributed as dividends is economically unsound and fraught with dangers alike to employees, stockholders, and the public."\footnote{222} Herman Lind of the National Machine-Tool Builders Association echoed such concerns, suggesting that the conflict between management and shareholders, and other conflicts, engendered by the tax "will deflect the energies of management from the aggressive production and sale of goods and services which are its main function, to attempts to cope with a tangled mass of administration problems and uncertainties."\footnote{223}

Although managers preferred to cut the undistributed profits tax out of the bill entirely, they tried to influence the Finance Committee's consideration of several compromise proposals. In one prepared with the substantial assistance of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the undistributed profits tax would become a mere temporary supplement to the corporate income tax.\footnote{224} In another, the undistributed profits tax rate would be set at exactly the same rate as the normal tax on dividends, thereby effectively nullifying its effect on dividend policy.\footnote{225} When the Senate Finance

\footnote{221. \textit{Id.} at 225 (statement of Fred H. Clausen, U.S. Chamber of Commerce).

222. \textit{Id.} at 651 (statement of Noel Sargent, National Association of Manufacturers).

223. \textit{Id.} at 520 (statement of Herman H. Lind, General Manager, National Machine-Tool Builders Association). \textit{See also id.} at 724 (statement of H.W. Story, Allis Chalmers Manufacturing Company) ("But with the normal pressure upon management by stockholders for the payment of larger dividends, it would become more difficult for management to pursue a conservative policy of utilizing a large proportion of it earnings for the purpose of promoting the growth of the company.").

224. \textit{See Senate Group Plans Complete Tax Bill Revision, WALL ST. J.,} May 9, 1936, at 1 (concerning proposed revisions). Under this proposal, the corporate income tax would be retained at rates ranging from 17.5% to 20% and dividends would be subject to the normal tax, but the undistributed profits tax would remain a part of the bill for only three years. \textit{Id.} at 1.

225. \textit{See Editorial, A Compromise Tax Bill, N.Y. TIMES,} May 15, 1936, at 18 (stating alternative proposal).}
Committee Chair, Pat Harrison, proposed a modest three percent spread between the normal (four percent) and undistributed profits tax (seven percent) rates, corporate managers howled, but it was eventually adopted by both the Committee and the full Senate.

As the bill proceeded to a conference committee to resolve the differences between the radically different House and Senate versions, corporate managers took their case to shareholders directly and to the public at large. The president of General Motors, Alfred Sloan, sent a letter to shareholders with the regular quarterly dividend in which he warned that it "would be little short of a catastrophe" for the government to interfere with "the employment of accumulated profits by aggressive and intelligent management." The National Association of Manufacturers issued a statement declaring:

Both the Senate Finance Committee and House bills accept the principle of taxation of undistributed profits . . . . Such a proposal is economically unsound, since it repudiates the policy of industrial reinvestment of earnings upon which expansion and employment have been based for over 100 years, and because it seeks to substitute government judgment as to the desirable amount of corporate reserves for that of directors elected by corporate stockholders.

Managers hoped that these public relations efforts would pressure Congress to abandon the undistributed profits tax entirely, but they ultimately proved unsuccessful. The conference committee successfully pushed through a compromise proposal. Thus, under the Revenue Act of 1936, Congress retained the corporate income tax, subjected dividends to the normal tax, and imposed an undistributed profits tax at rates ranging from seven percent to twenty-seven percent.

226. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce issued a statement denouncing Harrison's compromise. See Turner Catledge, New Tax Program is Held Adequate by the Treasury, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1936, at 1 (quoting the Chamber as stating, "[t]he introduction of that principle [the undistributed profits tax] into our tax system in any form whatever is opposed by business on the justifiable ground, among others, that it would inject government into the management of private enterprise").

227. See Turner Catledge, 18% Corporate Income Tax and 7% on Undivided Profit Agreed on by Senate Group, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1936, at 1 (passing Senate Committee by 18 to 1 vote); Tax Bill is Passed by Senate, 38 to 24; Conference to Act, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1936, at 1 (concerning passage by the Senate).

228. Decreed Dividends Opposed by Sloan, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1936, at 33.


C. The Campaign to Repeal the Tax in the Revenue Act of 1938

1. Aftermath of the 1936 Act

In the immediate aftermath of the passage of the 1936 Act, business opposition to the undistributed profits tax did not subside. According to Alfred Buehler, national and regional business associations "continued to direct broadsides of criticism against the measure because of its alleged complexities, inequalities, and unfortunate effects on corporations."231 John Morton Blum recounted that, "[b]ecause that tax tended to return to stockholders the decision about how to spend or invest their money, it challenged the power of professional managers of large corporations. These managers, their lawyers, and accountants, in all an able, articulate, and influential group, were aggressive opponents of the tax."232 Republicans also helped sustain opposition by highlighting it, during the 1936 election campaign, as an example of the Administration's antibusiness stance.233 Alf Landon, the Republican candidate for president, vowed to eliminate "this vicious method of taxation," calling the undistributed profits tax "the most cockeyed piece of tax legislation ever imposed in a modern country."234

When managers were forced to increase their dividend distributions as a result of the 1936 Act,235 they used it as another opportunity to publicly assail

231. BUEHLER, supra note 166, at 35. See LAMBERT, supra note 157, at 409 ("Business representatives continued to complain that the law impaired the financial strength of corporations, imposed unreasonable penalties upon expansion, and retarded economic recovery. Business executives, lawyers, and economists gloomily predicted that the levy on undivided corporate surpluses would lead to industrial stagnation, increased unemployment, and a financial collapse."). For a typical expression of such sentiments, see Executives Sound Confident Keynote, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1937, at 55 (concerning year-end statement of W.G. Carey, president of Yale & Towne Manufacturing Company, assailing undistributed profit tax).

232. BLUM, supra note 170, at 321.

233. See BUEHLER, supra note 166, at 36 (concerning criticism of the tax by Republicans, including Alfred M. Landon and Herbert Hoover); HAWLEY, supra note 84, at 356 (stating that Republican orators "leveled many a barrage at it during the campaign of 1936").


235. See GEORGE E. LENT, THE IMPACT OF THE UNDISTIBUTED PROFITS TAX 1936–1937, at 33 (1948) (concluding that the undistributed profits tax was responsible for an increase of dividends by one-third); E.J.H., Jr., Some Economic Aspects of the Surtax on Undistributed Profits of Corporations, 25 GEO. L.J. 423, 435 (1937) (discussing the large amount of dividend announcements). The author wrote:

During the last few weeks of 1936 announcements have been made of extra dividends, of bonuses, and of wage increases, running into millions of dollars. Each day brings announcement of further actions of this character, and when the statistics are finally compiled for the calendar year 1936, the total of these
the undistributed profits tax. The National Association of Manufacturers spearheaded a campaign to send letters to shareholders explaining that a desire to avoid the tax, and not the exercise of business judgment, forced the extra dividends. In one example, a prominent oil company declared a special dividend with an accompanying explanation:

This special dividend declaration is made in order to reduce the company’s liability for the new Federal tax on undistributed earnings. Because of the company’s needs for capital expenditures and debt payments, the directors would prefer to retain in the business the cash represented by this special dividend. In any event, they would not ordinarily declare any dividend at this time with respect to earnings for the present calendar year, as such earnings cannot be known with sufficient exactness in the usual course of business for some time after year’s end.

Similar statements accompanied announcements of other changes necessitated by the undistributed profits tax. For example, the president of a public electric company explained that the directors voted in favor of a stock split with a reduction in stated par value because the tax would potentially interfere with plans for capital expenditures, and a steel corporation executive sent a letter to stockholders blaming the undistributed profits tax "for abandoning its old policy of financing expansion and improvements out of earnings."

Some corporate managers complemented their public activism against the tax by passively resisting its underlying principles. Thus, they continued retaining profits either by resorting to taxable stock dividends or by agreeing to incur the undistributed profits tax penalty. The former method, although specifically recommended by Treasury officials during the hearings, was only used by a miniscule percent of the companies subject to the tax because of legal uncertainties. By contrast, a substantial number of managers simply chose to

Id.

236. See Leff, supra note 11, at 249 (noting the advent of "NAM sponsored shareholder letters in 1936").

237. M.L. Seidman, The Stockholder Holds the Bag, 59 Mag. of Wall St. 156, 157 (1936). For other examples, see Profits-Tax Levy Avoided By Trust, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1937, at 31 ("Distribution of extra and special dividends before the end of 1936 enabled Supervised Shares, Inc., to avoid liabilities under the tax on undistributed profits, Merrill Griswold, chairman, and Mahlon E. Traylor, president, said in a quarterly report issued yesterday.").

238. See Will Balance Effect of Federal Surtax, N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1937, at 23 (concerning request to authorize stock split).


240. See supra notes 203–07 and accompanying text (discussing the 1936 House hearings).

241. See William G. Christie & Vikram Nanda, Free Cash Flow, Shareholder Value, and
pay the tax rather than distribute their free cash flow. According to one recent study, a surprisingly high percentage of corporations paid marginal rates of twenty-two percent or more under the tax. Thus, managers in these corporations chose to incur the penalty either because of the deficiencies of shareholder monitoring or because shareholders implicitly or explicitly consented.

2. Recession of 1937

In the spring of 1937, a severe economic downturn opened a window of opportunity for managers to begin a campaign to repeal the undistributed profits tax. Critics blamed the tax either partially or completely for a variety of economic ills, including: the decline of retail credit; delay and termination of expansion plans; lagging employment; the onset and aggravation of stock market volatility; and what the president of General Tire

the Undistributed Profits Tax of 1936 and 1937, 49 J. Fin. 1727, 1753 n.19 (1994) (noting that one-third of one percent of all corporations subject to the tax issued taxable stock dividends); Godfrey N. Nelson, Law Still is Hazy on Stock Dividends, N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1936, § III, at 1 (concerning the unsettled law).


243. "Before the economy picked up in the late spring of 1938," Mark Leff observed, "industrial production fell by a third, durable-goods production and stock prices slipped by half, and profits skidded to one-fifth their 1937 highs. Unemployment, always a tragic embarrassment to the New Deal, shot up by nearly 4 million." Leff, supra note 11, at 209.

244. Another tax provision cited as a cause of the economic downturn was the capital gains tax. See Tax Modification Asked as Trade Aid, N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1937, at 28 (concerning statement by Consumer Goods Industries Committee).


248. See A Tax Theory Demolished, WALL ST. J., Oct. 22, 1937, at 4 (stating that the stock market explosion was a demonstration of a basic weakness in theory upon which the undistributed profits tax was created); Ballantine Finds New Deal Harmful, N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1937, at 10 (highlighting the undistributed profits tax among New Deal programs "as responsible for the current stock market slump"); Our Taxes Too High, Periling Business, Tremaine Asserts, N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1937, at 1 ("[New York State Controller] Tremaine blamed the stock market slump directly upon the Federal Capital Gains and Losses Tax, and the Undistributed Profits Tax.").
and Rubber Company called "strikes by capital," where a lull in business confidence caused both large- and small-time capitalists, as well as corporate financiers, to keep their money on the sidelines rather than to invest in business.\textsuperscript{249} Horace Stoneham, the president of the New York Giants professional baseball team, even went so far as to blame the undistributed profits tax for his team's inability to sign a high profile star like Joe Medwick of the St. Louis Cardinals.\textsuperscript{250}

Although economists refuted claims that the undistributed profits tax was responsible for starting the recession,\textsuperscript{251} corporate managers blamed the tax for creating "a climate of fear and uncertainty" that both contributed to the recession and made recovery more difficult.\textsuperscript{252} Prominent business leaders such as the president of Chemical Bank advocated repeal "as a means of restoring confidence among business men."\textsuperscript{253} The American Institute of Accountants issued a report declaring that for business "to face the future confidently," Congress must return to "fixed principles of Federal income taxation" and abandon the failed undistributed profits tax.\textsuperscript{254}

3. Revenue Act of 1938

The combination of the recession and the steady campaign against the tax sealed its fate. The only question in 1938 was whether it would be repealed outright

\textsuperscript{249} Capital 'Strikes' Laid to Tax Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1937, at 25. See also Profits Tax Held Bar to Confidence, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1937, at 33 (concerning New York Board of Trade position urging repeal of Undistributed Profits Tax).

\textsuperscript{250} Unfair to Baseball, BUS. WEEK, Dec. 11, 1937, at 44. According to Stoneham:

If you wanted to spend your surplus on ball players, the government would step in and stop you. That sort of thing is inimical to baseball. If you make a lot of money you want to make more by strengthening your club. But you cannot do what you please. You've got to distribute a large part of your profits to stockholders.

\textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{251} See Eased Income Tax Urged By Tremaine, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1937, at 12 ("Dr. Willard L. Thorp, director of economic research for Dun & Bradstreet, said there was 'danger in saying that the undistributed profits tax was responsible for the recession.' He declared there would have been a slump if there had been no such tax.").

\textsuperscript{252} LAMBERT, supra note 157, at 414. See Lewis H. Kimmel, Experience Under the Undistributed Profits Tax, 11 CONF. BOARD BULL. 105, 105–15 (1937) (survey of 360 corporate executives revealed that many corporate expansion plans were delayed by fear of the tax's effect on surpluses); Godfrey N. Nelson, Loss of Confidence Laid to Tax of 1936, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1938, §III, at 1 ("T]he results of research show that the undistributed-profits tax is one of the major causes of the loss of business confidence.").

\textsuperscript{253} F.K. Houston Urges Repeal of Two Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1937, at 33.

\textsuperscript{254} Taxation Found 'Bugaboo' of Corporations; Accountants Advocate Nonpartisan Study, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1937, at 41.
or merely nullified by reducing its rate so low that it no longer acted as an incentive to distribute profits. Although Congress initially aimed for the latter option,255 business leaders were not satisfied. They argued that maintaining even the nominal undistributed profits tax proposed in the subcommittee report was unacceptable. During hearings before the House Ways and Means Committee in January of 1938, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce recommended "[r]epeal[ing] the thoroughly discredited undistributed profits tax and openly abandon[ing] the 'principle.'"256 As one railroad executive noted, nothing short of repeal would be sufficient:

The continuation of this tax, even in the modified form proposed, will continue to hamper business and destroy the confidence of business management in its ability to look ahead and to plan and enter into long-time commitments, which constitutes the very essence of recovery. This tax should be repealed in its entirety.257

While corporate managers spoke of the hardships still imposed under the revised tax, the principal concern appeared to be that retaining the principle would invite the reintroduction of more meaningful rates in subsequent years.258

The proposal to retain the undistributed profits tax received an equally chilly reception in the hearings before the Senate Finance Committee. The chair of the Committee, Senator Pat Harrison, issued a statement announcing his intent to secure the tax’s repeal: "While the House retained only the skeleton of the undistributed profits tax . . . the remains will haunt business, and its complete removal and return to a sufficient flat corporation tax is preferable."259 This statement

255. A subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee proposed merging the undistributed profits tax with the corporate income tax so that the corporate rate would range between 16% and 20% depending upon the percentage of profits distributed. See Steven A. Bank, Corporate Managers, Agency Costs, and the Rise of Double Taxation, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 167, 239-40 (2002) (describing the subcommittee plan). The net effect would be to make the 4% pressure to distribute identical to the 4% tax on dividends, and thus create pressure not to distribute.

256. Revision of Revenue Laws 1938: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 75th Cong. 485 (1938) (prepared statement of Ellsworth C. Alvord, U.S. Chamber of Commerce). See also id. at 155 (statement of M.L. Seidman, New York Board of Trade) ("The undistributed profits tax stands before the country today thoroughly convicted as an undesirable tax and as harmful to business and to confidence. It has earned its execution. Let it die.").

257. Id. at 417 (statement of George Houston, President, Baldwin Locomotive Works).

258. See, e.g., Tax Bill Sent to Conference, House Not Yielding on Changes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1938, at 1 (reporting that Representative Lamneck of Ohio "declared that the business interests were absolutely opposed to the undistributed profits tax theory, as retained in the House bill, 'not because it is going to levy a high tax on them, but because they fear we may use the principle to raise the rates and change the schedule.'").

echoed the sentiments of most business leaders. A representative of the Brooklyn Chamber of Commerce warned that retaining the principle would make it "an ever-constant threat," while M.L. Seidman of the New York Board of Trade predicted that "it would remain to haunt business, not only for what it is, but also for what it may eventually grow into if permitted to remain as a permanent part of our tax structure." Ellsworth Alvord of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce asked, "If you impose 3½ percent this year... what is there to assure a businessman that you will not boost that penalty to 42½ percent as was proposed two years ago?"

As expected, both the Senate Finance Committee and the Senate heeded business's complaints and overwhelmingly voted to repeal the undistributed profits tax altogether. Only a last-ditch effort by President Roosevelt led to what one conferee called a "face-saver" in the Conference Committee. The tax was retained at the very low rate of 2.5 percent, but it was scheduled to expire after 1939. While Roosevelt hoped to revive it at a later date, the opposition was too great. As Robert La Follette, the lone senator who publicly challenged the repeal, observed that the undistributed profits tax "has been the object of one of the most widely organized and most successful propaganda campaigns in the history of tax legislation."

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261. Id. at 257 (statement of M.L. Seidman, Chairman of Taxation Committee, New York Board of Trade).

262. Id. at 469 (statement of Ellsworth Alvord, U.S. Chamber of Commerce); see also id. at 19 (statement of Henry H. Heimann, National Association of Credit Men) (testifying in favor of repeal of the undistributed profits tax). According to Heimann:

We think that the present undistributed-profits tax will not constitute the menace, the penalty that it has in the past, but nevertheless we still believe the principle of the tax is dangerous, and there is no assurance at any time that the law may not be changed with respect to rates so that the same danger that was inherent in the 1936 bill will again become included in the bill.

Id.

263. See Lauren D. Lyman, Profit Tax Eliminated, Gains Levy is Modified by Senate Finance Group, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1938, at 1 (declaring that the repeal passed Senate Finance Committee by 17 to 4 vote); Senate Approves Most of Tax Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1938, at 3 (stating that bill passed the Senate by 41 to 27 vote).


265. Modified Surplus Tax for Two Years Retained in Senate-House Compromise, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1938, at 1.

266. 1938 Senate Hearings, supra note 260, at 4932 (statement of Sen. La Follette). La Follette's Investigating Committee in the Senate found that the National Association of Manufacturers had spent almost $1 million a year fighting the undistributed profits tax since its
IV. A Corporate Norms-Based Explanation

What accounts for the difference in corporate managers' reactions to the two proposals? Both appeared to be attempts to restrict behavior in ways that under traditional agency cost theory analysis managers were likely to oppose. In the case of tax-free reorganizations, the elimination or restriction of this option would likely decrease a manager's ability to expand his empire and pursue pet projects. In the case of the undistributed profits tax, the crimp on managerial discretion over dividend policy and resulting decline in free cash flow would either reduce managers' ability to pursue individual projects or force them to be subjected to the scrutiny of the capital markets.

Some of the differences in reaction may have been the result of the peculiar political and economic circumstances of the day. During President Roosevelt's first term, when the Revenue Act of 1934 was introduced and the stock market crash was still a recent memory, business may have been inclined to be more cooperative in its dealings with the Administration. By the time

passage. In conjunction with the efforts of other groups such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce:

[E]very known medium of reaching the public with their propaganda has been used, including advertising in the daily and weekly newspapers, and colored news articles. The [La Follette Investigating Committee] records show they have also used direct mail, booklets, leaflets, bulletin board posters, 24 sheet posters for outdoor boards, pay envelope slips, sound slide films, moving picture slides, plant publications and house organ service, nation-wide radio programs, including the 'American Family Robinson' cartoon service and the 'Uncle Abner' series and under many other names.


267. See BEARD & BEARD, supra note 36, at 244 (observing that during the spring and summer of 1933, "[p]owerful business leaders cooperated with the administration in a spirit of cheerful compliance contrasting sharply with the hostility which they had displayed toward Bryanism, Progressivism, and the New Freedom"); LEFF, supra note 11, at 133 ("Earlier in the New Deal, with economic survival and political stability hanging in the balance, businessmen had good reason to go along with the New Deal's 'concert of interests' theme."). This conciliatory position may have been adopted out of necessity. As Richard Hofstadter observed:

[T]he coming of the depression and the revelation of some of the less palatable business practices of the 1920's brought about a climate of opinion in which the leadership of business, and particularly of big business, was profoundly distrusted and bitterly resented. Its position certainly was, in these respects, considerably weaker than it had been twenty-five years before.

RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 312 (1955). Business also may have been more muted because one of its major lobbying organizations—The National Association of Manufacturers—was in a period of reorganization between 1933 and 1934. See Philip H. Burch, Jr., *The NAM as an Interest Group*, 4 POL. & SOC'Y. 97, 102 n.16 (1973) (describing the
the undistributed profits tax was enacted, however, the political climate had changed. Roosevelt was perhaps at the height of his power in 1936, but in reaching that point he had sabotaged any possibility of working together with business.\footnote{268 See CONKIN, supra note 65, at 81 (describing Roosevelt's campaign for the presidency in 1936 as "a much more aggressive, even provocative campaign than in 1932, with angry jabs at economic autocracy, organized money, economic tyranny, and forces of selfishness and of lust for power").}
The fact that Roosevelt himself had initiated the undistributed profits tax proposal, while the recommendation to abolish the tax-free reorganization came from a congressional subcommittee, may have heightened the stakes from the perspective of business leaders. By 1937, when the country was in the throes of another economic downturn, the tide had turned and business leaders had more leverage to use in the fight against purportedly antibusiness measures.\footnote{269 See LEFF, supra note 11, at 231 ("Until 1937, the Roosevelt administration set the terms of debate on taxation. But the recession changed that, allowing the business community to take charge.").}

While the timing factor is not insignificant, it should not be overstated. Business started to criticize the Administration as early as the fall of 1933 and the beginning of 1934.\footnote{270 See BEARD & BEARD, supra note 36, at 245 (stating that by late autumn 1933 an opposition began to emerge); HAWLEY, supra note 84, at 151 (stating that the "first major wave of business criticism had come in the fall of 1933 and the first part of 1934"). Business power was not weaker during this period. Despite its reorganizations in 1933, or perhaps because of it, the National Association of Manufacturers succeeded in blocking or securing concessions on several bills unfavorable to business in 1934. Richard W. Gable, NAM: Influential Policy or Kiss of Death?, 15 J. Pol. 254, 268 (1953).}

Moreover, even if business leaders had resisted opposing the reform because of their pledge to cooperate with the recovery program, it should not have prevented them from seeking the repeal of the restrictions once they felt their compact with the Administration had been broken. They did this not only in their battle over the undistributed profits tax but also in reversing the abolition of the consolidated return.\footnote{271 See HAWLEY, supra note 84, at 153 (stating that business leaders, following the elections of 1934, did seem willing to make peace).}


Starting in 1918, corporations that were considered "affiliated" under the tax laws because of their common stock ownership or parent-subsidiary relationship were permitted to file a single return that reflected the consolidated income of the group. In 1932, Congress began to impose an additional tax for the privilege of filing a consolidated return, and in 1934, the consolidated return was abolished completely except for railroads. See TWENTIETH CENTURY
It is also possible that the difference in reaction was in part a reflection of the extent of the underlying changes in the current tax law. Ever since 1918, managers had been subject to a fairly strict set of requirements in order to qualify their transactions as tax-free reorganizations. Moreover, the final changes enacted by Congress, while considered substantial by tax practitioners, still left intact the basic scheme for such transactions. In that sense, the changes might not be described as "revolutionary." By contrast, no undistributed profits tax existed prior to 1936. President Roosevelt's proposal to eliminate the corporate income tax and the dividend exemption, while subjecting undistributed profits to a high levy, would have been a sharp change from the corporate tax system that had developed during the preceding two decades.

Cutting against the merit of a degree of change-based argument is that the undistributed profits tax also was not altogether new. From the beginning of the income tax in 1913, managers had been subject to an accumulated earnings tax on earnings retained for the purpose of evading the surtax rates. While this provision was often not enforced because of the difficulty of proving intent, its use had been upheld in a 1936 Board of Tax Appeals case,273 which was eventually affirmed by the Supreme Court in 1938.274 In 1934, Congress adopted a personal holding company tax for smaller companies that omitted an intent requirement.275 While neither of these provisions approached the expansive reach of the undistributed profits tax proposal,276 they did introduce corporate managers to the concept of a tax limitation on dividend policy.

The full legislative histories of the two provisions further weaken the substantive argument regarding the extent of the change. From an ex ante perspective, the original proposal to abolish the reorganization provisions was just as radical as the undistributed profits tax proposal, yet it was not subject to

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FUND, supra note 11, at 177–78 (describing the history of taxation on consolidated returns). This repeal was justified as part of an attack on the holding company structure. See Daniel C. Schaffer, The Income Tax on Intercorporate Dividends, 33 Tax Law. 161, 165 (1979) (stating that it was hoped the proposal would help to eliminate holding companies); Tax Bill Changes Offered by Borah, N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1934, at 38 (proposing elimination of consolidated and affiliated returns in the present law). By 1942, Congress revived the consolidated return, although it still subjected the return to an additional tax. Schaffer, supra, at 168–69.

273. See Nat'l Grocery Co. v. Commissioner, 35 B.T.A. 163, 167 (1936) (finding that petitioner failed to rebut the prima facie presumption that the accumulation of earnings was for the purpose of preventing the imposition of the surtax upon its sole stockholder).

274. See Helvering v. Nat'l Grocery Co., 304 U.S. 282, 295 (1938) (stating that it was error for the Court of Appeals to reverse the Board's decision).


nearly as much active opposition from business leaders. Moreover, from an ex post perspective, business leaders were eager to eliminate all traces of the undistributed profits tax in 1938, notwithstanding the reduction of the rate to a level that would make it a non-factor in dividend decisions, while there was no similar attempt to further reduce the restrictions on tax-free reorganizations after the 1934 Act was passed.

Thus, while a variety of historical and statute-specific factors may have influenced the different reactions to the two proposals, they do not, either individually or in the aggregate, offer a complete explanation. There is one potential factor, however, that has not been explored—the underlying norms that governed the behavior Congress sought to regulate through the tax laws. In the case of reorganizations, mergers and acquisitions were historically subject to the oversight of both shareholders and the state legislature, and managers were not accustomed to free rein in this area. By contrast, dividend policy had always been the exclusive province of directors. This distinction may have affected managerial attitudes toward the government’s attempt to regulate those areas through the tax laws.

A. Mergers and Acquisitions

During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, managers were subject to heavy constraints on their ability to engage in a merger or acquisition. First, such transactions were subject to a shareholder vote, often one that required unanimous or near unanimous consent. Second, for most fundamental corporate changes such as mergers and consolidations, managers had to secure the approval of the state, either by statute or via a provision in their corporate charter. Third, the passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890 introduced federal oversight of mergers and combinations. The combined effect of these constraints was to undercut any notion of managerial primacy on the issue of mergers and acquisitions. Thus, it is not surprising that managers responded to the proposed changes with relatively muted rhetoric.

1. Shareholder Approval

There is a long tradition of shareholder primacy in the context of a fundamental corporate change. During the mid-to-late nineteenth century, almost all courts required the unanimous consent of shareholders before a corporation could pursue transactions such as a merger, acquisition, or sale of
assets. Thus, while corporate managers could initiate these and other similar transactions, shareholders were empowered with the ability to block such transactions simply by withholding their consent.

The theory underlying the unanimous consent requirement was that a fundamental corporate change constituted a breach of the shareholder’s contract and a violation of his property rights. As to the former justification for unanimity, the argument was that a shareholder entered into a contract with the corporation when he purchased its stock. This contract, deriving some of its content from the ultra vires doctrine, implied that the corporation had a duty to continue in operation under roughly the same terms as it had done at the time of purchase. By merging with another corporation or selling all of its assets, the corporation effectively abandoned its former charter and thereby breached the contract. As to the latter justification for unanimity, the concern was that the shareholder’s property interest in the business’s assets would be taken through a transfer of the assets.

In 1890, the U.S. Supreme Court relied on the unanimous consent requirement to invalidate a transaction in Mason v. Pewabic Mining Company. In Mason, the taxpayer’s charter had expired, and the company was in the process of winding up

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277. See Kean v. Cent. R.R. Co., 9 N.J. Eq. 401, 422–23 (N.J. Ch. 1853) (holding that the consent of all stockholders of the Elizabethtown and Somerville Railroad Company was required before the purchases authorized by that act become valid); GEORGE W. FIELD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 168 (1877) (concerning acts not within the scope of director’s powers); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960, at 87 (1992) (discussing merger requirements in the 1880s); VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 54, at 49 (1882) (stating that it is well settled that corporations cannot be consolidated without the unanimous consent of their shareholders).

278. See HORWITZ, supra note 277, at 87 (describing the reason for the unanimous consent rule).

279. See id. at 86–87 (concerning "ultra vires" attacks on the "pool" as a form of merger).

280. See, e.g., Kean, 9 N.J. Eq. at 414 (concerning the breach of contract through merger). The court stated:

That the majority should have the power claimed for them, does not seem to me to be the contract between the stockholders, for there is a contract, as already shown in the case of every corporation, between them. That contract is, that their joint funds shall, under the care of specified persons, generally called directors, be employed, and that for certain specified purposes.

Id. The modern concept of a dissenter’s right to the value of his shares was not considered satisfactory under the unanimous consent requirement. In Kean, the court stated:

It can hardly, therefore, I think, be argued with justice, that a majority of the stockholders had a right, upon principle, to sell out all the property of the company from which its profits were to be realized and abandon the business, and that the minority’s rights are satisfied by a division to them of the value of their stock.

Id. at 414–15.

its affairs. The directors and a majority of the stockholders sought to transfer the assets to a new corporation, of which they would be directors and stockholders, in exchange for shares of stock in the new corporation or their equivalent value. The Court upheld the dissenting stockholders’ right to block the transfer. According to the Court:

[T]here is no superior right in two or three men in the old company, who may hold a preponderance of the stock, to acquire an absolute control of the whole of it, in the way which they may think to be to their interest, or which they may think to be for the interest of the whole . . . . [W]e know of no reason or authority why those holding a majority of the stock can place a value upon it at which a dissenting minority must sell, or do something else which they think is against their interest, more than a minority can do.

This principle of unanimity continued to be the common law rule well into the twentieth century. According to the 1927 edition of a contemporary treatise, "[i]n the absence of statutory authority the consent of every stockholder is absolutely essential to a consolidation; and dissenting stockholders can not be compelled to give their assent." Even when a charter provided that in the absence of specific direction the company shall have the greatest rights and privileges accorded to a corporation of its type, the courts refused to approve a consolidation with less than unanimous shareholder approval.

While the unanimous consent requirement could be and was relaxed by state statute in some jurisdictions by the 1930s, directors were still subordinated to the shareholders on the issue of fundamental corporate change. As William Meade Fletcher explained in the 1919 edition of his Cyclopaedia on the Law of Private Corporations, "[c]onsolidation cannot be effected by the action of the boards of directors but must be consented to by at least a majority

282. Id. at 51.
283. Id. at 51–52.
284. Id. at 59.
285. The use of the phrase "common law" here is not to suggest that the merger was possible under the common law, but rather that, in the absence of statutory direction in a jurisdiction where a merger was permitted, unanimous consent was required.
287. See id. at 95 (concerning power to consolidate and citing Botts v. Simpsonville & Buck Creek Tpk. Rd. Co., 10 S.W. 134 (Ky. 1888)).
288. See HORWITZ, supra note 277, at 88 (citing Delaware, New York, and New Jersey among those states permitting mergers with less than unanimous consent). The requirement had actually been relaxed by statute in some jurisdictions early in the nineteenth century. See, e.g., 1849 Mass. Acts 223, § 11 (allowing transfer of stock on majority vote); 1831 N.J. Laws 124 (allowing consolidation on seven-eighths vote); 1856 Pa. Laws 197 (permitting consolidation on two-thirds vote).
of the stockholders." The same rules were in place for a sale of all of the assets of a corporation, where, according to one contemporary commentator, nearly half of the state statutes had abandoned the unanimous consent requirement, but all still required at least a majority. Sometimes this rule meant a majority of the stock ownership, so that in practice a few stockholders could still control the decisions, although occasionally it simply meant a majority or more of the stockholders present at a duly called meeting in which at least a quorum was present. Typically, the requirement for "majority" approval meant considerably more than that, often requiring two-thirds or even three-quarters or four-fifths of the shareholders to consent to the transaction. When there were multiple classes of voting stock present, each class was required to approve the transaction by the minimum percentage.

Even where the decision to merge was approved by the required percentage, the merger could still be overturned by the courts if it was deemed unfair to the minority. In New Jersey, for example, the court of chancery enjoined the merger of five public utility companies into the Public Service Electric and Gas Company, despite the fact that Public Service owned more than two-thirds of the capital stock of the merging companies and could, as a result, satisfy New Jersey's minimum approval requirement. The minority shareholders complained that the preferred stock they were to receive in

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291. Fletcher, supra note 289, at 8329 ("[W]here each share of stock is entitled to one vote the per cent is to be figured on the number of shares and not the number of holders.").

292. Under the Michigan statute, for example, directors needed to secure the consent of two-thirds of the stockholders constituting a quorum. See Thompson & Thompson, supra note 286, at 95 (concerning the Michigan statute); Comment, Statutory Merger and Consolidation of Corporations, 45 Yale L.J. 105, 113 n.43 (1935) [hereinafter Statutory Merger] ("As a general rule the required proportion must be of the total capital stock outstanding, though the Virginia statute seems to require only that there be approval by a majority of the votes cast.").

293. See Robert S. Stevens & Arthur Larson, Cases and Materials on the Law of Corporations 985 (1947) (stating that the "majority" required is usually more than a simple majority—often two-thirds, sometimes 75%); Field, supra note 290, at 230 ("The most common requirement is that the holders of two-thirds of the outstanding stock vote in favor of the consolidation; but there is no uniformity from state to state—the amounts varying from a mere majority of the votes cast to 100 per cent of the stock outstanding."); Statutory Merger, supra note 292, at 107 n.8 ("At the present time statutory provisions in forty states authorize sales of entire corporate assets on the consent of proportions of stockholders varying from a majority to four-fifths.").


exchange for their common stock was actually less secure than their previous holdings. The court held that:

[T]he merger, in effect, is nothing less than a forced sale by the majority stockholders to itself at a price fixed by it and payable at its pleasure. The preferred stock is but the equivalent of a 6 per cent. promissory note payable in three years at the option of the buyer. The merger legislation countenances no such perversion of the contractual obligations of stockholders inter sese. Continued membership, until dissolution, is an inherent property right in corporate existence.296

The court thus effectively limited the majority’s right to engage in a "freeze out" merger.297

2. Legislative Approval

Although corporations could generally sell and acquire large amounts of assets under the common law,298 there was no implied right to merge or consolidate with another company.299 Corporations needed to secure the consent of the legislature in order to engage in a merger or consolidation.300 As William Meade Fletcher put it, "[l]egislative authority is just as essential to a

296. Id. at 731.

297. See CHESTER ROHRICH, LAW AND PRACTICE IN CORPORATE CONTROL 137 (1933) (stating that the "statutory power to dissolve given to the majority may not be used to 'freeze out' the minority").

298. See Field, supra note 290, at 242 ("In the absence of express restrictions, business corporations have the implied power to convey any or all of their real or personal property."). Some authorities suggested that such a right was limited to a sale required by the exigencies of the business. See HENRY WINTHROP BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS 209 (1927) (stating that there is a right to sell, if required by exigencies of the business). Ballantine wrote:

A purely private business corporation, like a manufacturing or trading company, which is not given the right of eminent domain, and which owes no special duties to the public, may sell and convey absolutely the whole of its property, when the exigencies of its business require it to do so, or when the circumstances are such that it can no longer profitably continue its business.

Id.; see also WILLIAM W. COOK, THE PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATION LAW 437 (1925) ("Neither the directors nor the majority of the stockholders have power to sell all the corporate property as against the dissent of a single stockholder, unless the corporation is in a failing condition.").

299. See FIELD, supra note 277, at 461 (stating that there is no inherent power to amalgamate or consolidate with other companies); FLETCHER, supra note 289, at 8313 (stating the general rule that a corporation has no implied power to purchase stock in another corporation).

300. See WILLIAM L. CLARK, JR., HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 191 (I. Maurice Wormser ed., 3d ed. 1916) ("A corporation has no power to consolidate with another corporation, unless the power is expressly conferred upon it.").
valid consolidation or merger of existing corporations as it is to the creation of a corporation in the first instance."\textsuperscript{301} This could either come from a specific grant of authority in the corporation's original charter or via a general grant of authority by state statute.\textsuperscript{302}

In many states, the principal problem was that there was no merger or consolidation statute that blessed such transactions. At the time that the tax-free reorganization provision was being considered in 1934, only thirty-three states and the Territory of Hawaii had general statutes authorizing corporations to merge or consolidate.\textsuperscript{303} The fourteen remaining states, plus Alaska, the District of Columbia, the Philippine Islands, and Puerto Rico, had no special provisions for conferring such authority.\textsuperscript{304} Thus, in the absence of a charter provision or special act of the legislature, corporations in those states were not eligible to participate in such transactions.\textsuperscript{305}

Even where a state merger statute existed, it was often limited in scope. Most of the early state law merger statutes restricted mergers based on the powers granted to the corporations under their respective charters. The concern appeared to be that an activity that would be ultra vires under the charter of one corporation would suddenly become acceptable by virtue of the more permissive charter of the combined enterprise. For example, in New Jersey, the right to merge or consolidate was restricted to corporations organized to undertake "any kind of business of the same or similar nature," the nature of the business being determined by the charter or certificate of incorporation.\textsuperscript{306} Under this provision, the New Jersey courts denied permission for the consolidation of the United States Leather Company and the Central Leather Company because, even though the companies were generally engaged in the same line of business, the charter of one contained broader powers than the charter of the other.\textsuperscript{307}

\textsuperscript{301} Fletcher, supra note 289, at 8313.
\textsuperscript{302} See Clark, supra note 300, at 191–92 (discussing the power to consolidate); Fletcher, supra note 289, at 8315 (concerning how authority may be conferred).
\textsuperscript{303} Bank, supra note 72, at 1355.
\textsuperscript{304} Id.
\textsuperscript{305} As one commentator noted, parties frequently got around this limitation by engaging in a sale or similar transaction that had the same result as a merger or consolidation. Statutory Merger, supra note 292, at 110 n.24. The transaction would still be subject to the restrictions governing shareholder approval of fundamental corporate changes and to other restrictions on sales of assets. See infra note 299 and accompanying text (stating that there was no implied right to merge or consolidate with another company).
\textsuperscript{306} Fletcher, supra note 289, at 8322.
During this same period, there were other similar examples of purpose and geographical restrictions. New York only permitted the consolidation of corporations incorporated "for kindred purposes." Connecticut limited its statute to parties "carrying on business of the same or a similar nature." Illinois only permitted consolidation of "corporations of the same kind and engaged in the same general business and carrying on their business in the same vicinity." Moreover, while most such purpose restrictions had been removed or weakened by the 1930s, many statutes still restricted a corporation's ability to merge or consolidate with a corporation from another state, either by denying the power to engage in the transaction altogether or by a requirement that the surviving party be a domestic corporation. In some cases, the merger or consolidation even had to be approved by a state regulatory board or corporation commission to be effective.

While sales of large amounts of corporate assets were permitted under the common law, they were often subject to many of the same statutory restrictions as mergers or consolidations. According to one contemporary commentator:

Although merger and consolidation is strictly statutory and a sale of assets is essentially contractual, as a practical matter in a given case it may be extremely difficult to decide whether the device employed was merger and consolidation or a sale of assets inasmuch as today, the latter also usually follows a statutory procedure.

3. Federal Oversight

In addition to the oversight exercised by state legislatures, fundamental corporate changes were subject to federal oversight. The earliest and most

308. See Fletcher, supra note 289, at 8323 (citing the requirements for merger in New York).
310. 1895 Ill. Laws 31.
311. See Statutory Merger, supra note 292, at 110 (commenting that such business restrictions had largely disappeared, but they were still relevant for public utilities, insurance companies, banks, and trust companies).
312. See Bank, supra note 72, at 1355 (describing merger restrictions).
313. See Statutory Merger, supra note 292, at 114 (stating that is not infrequent, "particularly in respect to public utility and railroad companies, to make the approval of some state regulatory board or commission a condition precedent").
314. Id. at 107 (noting, however, that the statutes governing sales of entire corporate assets differed in form and substance from those governing mergers or consolidations). See also Ballantine, supra note 298, at 210 ("In recent years statutes authorizing such disposition [of the entire property of the corporation] by the consent of a majority, or two-thirds or three-quarters of the stockholders of a solvent, going concern have become common.").
prominent source of this oversight was the Sherman Antitrust Act. Adopted in 1890, this Act held that "every contract, combination, in the form of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states or with foreign nations" was illegal. Vague language, the failure to provide for an agency to implement the Act, and the Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of the law hampered its effectiveness, but it provided the basis for later federal challenges of merger activity during Theodore Roosevelt's administration.

In 1902, Roosevelt directed his attorney general to revive the then-dormant Sherman Act by pursuing an antitrust action against the Northern Securities Company. Two years later, the Court ordered the company's dissolution. Emboldened by his success, which earned him the "trust-buster" label, Roosevelt set his sights on even bigger targets. Thus, Roosevelt brought separate federal antitrust actions against the Standard Oil Company and the American Tobacco Company. After protracted litigation, in 1911 the Supreme Court issued opinions ordering that both Standard Oil and American Tobacco be broken up into several smaller companies. While these victories were far from complete, they did mark a departure from "the uncritical approval of business expansion" that characterized the early-to-mid nineteenth century.

Perhaps more importantly, the results may have chilled some transactions. According to one 1913 edition of a practitioner's treatise, "[t]he general result of the federal decisions in the Tobacco, Standard Oil, and other similar cases has been to leave the situation in perplexing uncertainty. At the present time it is not possible for counsel to advise what can be safely done in forming industrial combinations." The same treatise noted that:

316. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 465 (1985) (discussing the deficiencies of the Sherman Act); GEISST, supra note 36, at 104–05 (stating that the Sherman Act had "few teeth"); HORWITZ, supra note 277, at 84 (concerning the Supreme Court's decision that the Act could not constitutionally reach manufacturing); JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY: A SHORT HISTORY OF A REVOLUTIONARY IDEA 73 (2003) (stating that the Sherman Antitrust Act failed to set out many ways of punishing or preventing monopolies). The Supreme Court held that the Sherman Act was inapplicable to manufacturing companies because they did not engage in "commerce." United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 7 (1895).
320. HEILBRONER & SINGER, supra note 317, at 213.
At present few new combinations are being formed. The Sherman Antitrust Law, after many years of more or less innocuous desuetude, finally became a live law. The business world, which had considered its provisions negligible, was dismayed to find that it really meant something and that it could be enforced against the largest and most firmly entrenched combinations.\textsuperscript{322}

Soon after the resolution of the Standard Oil and American Tobacco cases, Congress enacted the Clayton Antitrust Act in 1916 to further buttress federal oversight in this area.\textsuperscript{323} By outlawing interlocking directorates, Congress sought to prevent indirect combinations of companies that were in restraint of trade.\textsuperscript{324} Unlike the Sherman Act, this measure was accompanied by the creation of an enforcement agency, the Federal Trade Commission, which served to investigate unfair trade practices and issue cease and desist orders.\textsuperscript{325} While neither the Sherman Act nor the Clayton Act posed serious obstacles to business combinations,\textsuperscript{326} they had established the specter of federal oversight. The threat of antitrust enforcement action meant that even directors of corporations with willing shareholders and permissive state merger statutes did not have a free hand to engage in transactions as they saw fit.

\textbf{B. Dividend Policies}

While managers were accustomed to strict limitations on their abilities to engage in mergers, acquisitions, and other fundamental corporate changes, it was a different story when it came to dividend policy. There were some limitations on the source of a dividend payment, but these limitations related to the source of funds rather than the decision to issue a dividend. The decision of whether to issue a dividend or retain the profits for other uses was committed to the discretion of the board of directors by well-established law. Moreover, this legal right to retain earnings was buttressed by the business custom, which took hold around the turn of the century, of retaining a significant percentage of

\textsuperscript{322} Id. at 357.
\textsuperscript{324} See GEISST, supra note 36, at 143–44 (discussing passage of the Clayton Act).
\textsuperscript{326} Indeed, the great merger movement at the turn of the century followed the passage of the Sherman Act.
earnings each year. Thus, it should not be surprising that corporate managers mounted an all-out assault against the undistributed profits tax and its threat to their continued discretion over dividend policy.

1. Early History

In the infancy of the corporation, dividends were essentially unregulated. This policy was in part because during the days of the joint stock trading company, a corporation would distribute all of its assets at the completion of each voyage. There was little need to impose significant limits on the distribution of profits in these essentially single-purpose enterprises. This era of unregulated dividends, however, soon came to an end because of two developments in corporate law and finance. First, the advent of the concept of fixed, or permanent, capital from which a corporation's earnings would flow meant that there had to be some method of distinguishing between that part of the corporation's assets that was available for distribution as a dividend and that part of the assets that constituted its capital and would remain within the corporation. Second, the development of limited liability for corporate stockholders elevated the importance of both the distinction between capital and income and the distinction between the assets in the hands of the corporation and the assets in the hands of its stockholders. The former was important because under a system of limited liability creditors would often decide to extend credit based upon the value and availability of the fixed or permanent property of the corporation. If this property was subject to division prior to the liquidation of the corporation, the creditors would have virtually no protection at all. The latter was important because, unlike the general partnership where partners remained personally liable for the partnership debts even after a distribution, the creditor's only recourse for repayment of the debts was to look to the assets held in the corporation. A dividend would permanently remove those assets from the corporate solution. These two

327. See Donald Kehl, The Origin and Early Development of American Dividend Law, 53 HARV. L. REV. 36, 37 (1939) ("The earliest English joint-stock-company charters contained no provisions regulating the declaration of dividends.").

328. Id. at 37-38 ("[T]he practice, peculiar to the first joint-stock trading companies, of raising a separate joint stock for each voyage made dividend regulation unnecessary, since under this system there were no limitations upon the fund from which dividends could be paid."). This practice was true even in the colonies, where a non-chartered joint stock company, Plymouth Adventurers, provided that after seven years "the capitall [sic] and profits, viz. the houses, lands, goods and chattels be equally divided amongst the adventurers." Id. at 43 (citation omitted).
developments led to a spate of statutory and non-statutory limitations on the distribution of profits in a corporation.

2. Dividends Paid Out of "Profits"

The first limitation on dividends was the requirement that dividends be paid exclusively from the profits of the corporation, as distinct from the "capital," or the money originally contributed by the stockholders. Initially, companies followed such a rule by custom. Thus, after the British East India Company established a permanent joint stock in 1657, dividends were henceforth issued "out of profits leaving the capital untouched." Before long, however, the Crown began to impose such a "profits" limitation through the charters of the corporations it authorized. The 1694 charter of the Bank of England provided that:

[N]o dividend shall at any time be made by the said governor and company save only out of the interest, profit or produce arising by or out of the said capital stock, or fund, or by such dealing as is allowed by Act of Parliament.

This type of limitation continued during the special charter era in America, although the provisions tended to be ad hoc in nature. In 1825, New York enacted the first general dividend statute in the country, which limited dividends to "surplus profits arising from the business of such corporations."

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329. See VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 435 (2d ed. 1886) ("It is a fundamental rule, that dividends can be paid only out of profits or the net increase of the capital of a corporation, and cannot be drawn upon the capital contributed by the shareholders for the purpose of carrying on the company's business."); Cyrus LaRue Munson, Dividends, 1 YALE L.J. 193, 193 (1891) (concerning payment of dividends). Munson wrote:

It is fundamental that dividends are payable only from the profits of the corporation, and that they cannot be paid from any portion of the capital stock, from compensation for property taken under the power of eminent domain, from a penalty recovered from a contractor for a failure to complete his work, or from the sale of forfeited stock.

Id.

330. Kehl, supra note 327, at 38 nn.12–13 (citing COURT MINUTES OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY 1660–1663, at xx–xxi, 131 (1922)).


332. Kehl, supra note 327, at 43–51 ("[T]he development of American dividend law prior to 1825, when New York enacted the first general dividend regulation statute, is the history of ad hoc legislation by special charters granted to individual corporations.").

333. 1825 N.Y. Laws 325.
This statute became the model for nineteenth century general corporation law provisions governing dividends.\textsuperscript{334} There was still little agreement as to how to distinguish between profits and capital, but it was well established that such a distinction itself was important.\textsuperscript{335}

3. Penalties for Dividends Paid Out of Capital

A second rule imposed penalties on the directors and stockholders for any distribution of dividends out of capital. When Parliament authorized an increase in the capital stock of the Bank of England in 1697, it provided that if the corporation issued a dividend that reduced its capital stock without first reducing its outstanding debt, the stockholders "shall be severally liable" to any creditors of the Bank.\textsuperscript{336} A similar rule was imported to America, where a commonly cited Massachusetts statute provided that "[i]f the directors of any such company shall declare and pay any dividend, when the company is insolvent or any dividend, the payment of which would render it insolvent, they shall be jointly and severally liable for all the debts of the company" in an amount not to exceed the amount of the dividend.\textsuperscript{337} The New York statute was even broader, imposing liability on the directors if a dividend reduced the capital stock of the company, even if it did not induce insolvency.\textsuperscript{338} By the end of the century, New York had gone one step further, making it a misdemeanor to declare a dividend out of the capital stock of the corporation.\textsuperscript{339} In general, these director liability statutes were made necessary by the conferral of limited liability on corporate stockholders. As one early observer noted, "if limited liability was to survive, a rule against impairment of corporate capital by dividends or other repayments to stockholders was inevitable."\textsuperscript{340}

\textsuperscript{334} Kehl, supra note 327, at 61 ("With these fundamental dividend limitations established in the general corporate laws of New York and Massachusetts, other states began the process of copying them.").

\textsuperscript{335} See Morawetz, supra note 329, §§ 437–39 (concerning capital versus net profits distinction).

\textsuperscript{336} Kehl, supra note 327, at 42.

\textsuperscript{337} 1836 Mass. Acts 38.

\textsuperscript{338} See 1825 N.Y. Laws 325 (making it unlawful to reduce capital stock).

\textsuperscript{339} Munson, supra note 329, at 193.

\textsuperscript{340} Kehl, supra note 327, at 41.
4. Dividends Under the Sole Discretion of the Board of Directors

A third rule, which followed naturally from the first two, was that a corporation's directors had the sole discretion to determine whether to declare a dividend. This rule was made clear early on in the development of dividend limitations in this country. Alexander Hamilton drafted a charter for the Bank of North America that authorized the directors to "make from time to time such dividends, out of the profits, as they may think proper." A similar provision in the charter of the Bank of the United States permitted as much dividends out of profits "as shall appear to the directors advisable." As one commentator affirmed, by the early 1890s there was little doubt as to the board of directors' power over whether to declare a dividend: "The directors, being the agents of the corporation, alone have the power to determine the amount and to declare a dividend from its earnings—a power resting in their honest discretion, uncontrollable by the courts, when not exercised illegally, wantonly or oppressively."

Under this highly developed legal infrastructure, a stockholder had little legal recourse in the event the directors of a corporation chose not to distribute a dividend. There were some cases that appeared to support a stockholder's right to petition for the division of surplus profits, but

341. Id. at 46 (emphasis added).
342. Id.
343. Munson, supra note 329, at 196. There were occasional exceptions, but these were rare. Arthur Stone Dewing explained:

In rare cases the dividends are declared by the stockholders, in accordance with a provision of the bylaws. Among early corporations the stockholders' control over dividend disbursement was quite usual. Such a reservation of power is now very rare; it runs counter to the generally accepted theory of the powers and responsibilities of directors.

344. See Smith v. Prattville Mfg. Co., 29 Ala. 503, 507-08 (1857) (concerning the directors' discretion to distribute dividends). The court wrote:

They may be compelled to exercise that discretion, if they improperly fail or refuse to exercise it. But when they have exercised it, without any violation of the charter or constitution of the company, their action cannot be disregarded or controlled by any court, at the instance of a stockholder, unless it is shown to have been a willful abuse of their discretion, or the result of bad faith, or of a willful neglect or breach of a known duty.

Id.; see also Scott v. Eagle Fire Co., 7 Paige Ch. 198, 203 (N.Y. Ch. 1838) ("[S]hould they without reasonable cause refuse to divide what is actually surplus profits, the stockholders are not without remedy, if they apply to the proper tribunal, before the corporation has become insolvent.").
these cases relied primarily on exceptions, rather than alternatives, to the rule. Henry Ballantine wrote that "there must be bad faith or a clear abuse of discretion on their part to justify a court of equity in interfering" in the directors' determination of dividend policy. The right to a dividend was, in effect, not a right at all. As one contemporary commentator described it, "[t]he right of a stockholder to share in the surplus of profits is in the nature of an inchoate right, until a distribution or dividend has been actually declared by the proper officers of the corporation." Justice Thomas Cooley, writing on behalf of the Michigan Supreme Court, explained "[u]ntil that time [when the dividend is declared] the dividend is only something that may possibly come into existence."

5. Business Custom

Corporate managers used their legal discretion to justify adherence to a corporate finance norm favoring retained earnings. While the conventional wisdom during much of the nineteenth century had been to distribute all or almost all of a corporation's earnings as dividends and raise expansion capital through the debt or equity markets, by World War I the conventional wisdom was that a corporation should "plow back" a substantial percentage of its earnings to fund expansion, protect against downturns, maintain regular dividend policies, and provide for unexpected expenses. In his 1917 treatise on business finance, William Lough noted that "[i]t is generally agreed that

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345. BALLANTINE, supra note 298, at 507. Ballantine further explained:

The mere fact that a corporation has surplus profits out of which a dividend might lawfully be declared is not of itself sufficient ground for a court of equity to compel the directors to make a dividend, for they have a right to use surplus profits to extend the business of the corporation, or to make improvements, and to establish various reserves, if it is to the interests of the corporation to do so, and a court of equity will not interfere with or control their discretion in determining what the interests of the corporation require in this respect, unless there is a clear abuse of discretion.

Id.


349. KENNETH S. VAN STRUM, INVESTING IN PURCHASING POWER 24 (1926) ("A corporation often invests a part of its income in new plants and in equipment, which means that instead of paying out all of its income in dividends it 'plows back' into the company some of its earnings for the future benefit of the stockholder.").
regular dividends combined with large—or at least adequate—savings out of annual income should be features of the financial management of most corporations."  A few years later, one observer reported that "[t]oday it is taken for granted that no corporation shall pay out more than a fraction of its earnings."  

The available data suggests that this development in corporate finance theory was followed by a majority of companies. While dividends hovered around 80% to 90% of earnings prior to the turn of the century, they had dropped to approximately 50% to 60% of earnings during the first few decades of the twentieth century.  According to one study, the majority of companies retained as much as 55% of their earnings during the period between 1922 and 1930. This retained earnings norm was bolstered by a corresponding norm in favor of regular dividends, rather than dividends that fluctuated with earnings. In the 1926 edition of his corporate finance treatise, Arthur Dewing noted that "[t]he regularity of dividend payments helps the corporation in two very important respects. It creates a loyal group of stockholders who hold their stock for investment and not for speculation. It also creates a strong credit to be utilized for borrowing in the open market." 

The demand for regular or level dividends was in part a byproduct of the introduction of preferred stock. The early American corporation only had one class of stock, and each shareholder had the same right to dividends as any other shareholder. Starting around the middle of the nineteenth century, however, transportation companies, particularly in the railroad industry, began to offer a preferred level of stock as a method of attracting equity capital.

350. WILLIAM H. LOUGH, BUSINESS FINANCE 477 (1917).
351. Oswald W. Knauth, The Place of Corporate Surplus in the National Income, 18 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N 157, 164 (June 1922).
353. See O.J. Curry, Utilization of Corporate Profits in Prosperity and Depression, 9 MICH. BUS. STUD. 1, 35 (1941) (stating that the sample size was 72 companies).
355. See George Heberton Evans, Jr., The Early History of Preferred Stock in the United States, 19 AM. ECON. REV. 43, 43 (1929) [hereinafter Evans, Early History of Preferred Stock] ("During the earliest days of the corporation in the United States the holder of each share of stock received the same dividend as the holder of any other share in the same company.").
356. See JONATHON BARRON BASKIN & PAUL J. MIRANTI, JR., A HISTORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 152 (1997) (explaining that preferred stock developed as a financial innovation in
These securities had characteristics of both debt and equity. They provided for guaranteed dividend rates similar to interest payments on debt, but the holder could not foreclose on the instrument if his dividends fell in arrears. Toward the end of the century, the preferred stock method expanded to industrial securities, where the guaranteed dividend rate was attractive in unregulated industries with little or no financial disclosure. For the individual who formerly invested exclusively in debt securities, preferred stock was a middle ground between the risk of common stock and the relative certainty of debt.

Although a board of directors could refuse to issue any preferred dividend at all, there was significant pressure to distribute the promised amount. The fact that most early preferred stocks appeared to have been issued on a cumulative basis only increased this pressure. The cumulative feature meant a board of directors deciding in favor of declaring a dividend in a particular

Britain as a means to raise capital to complete construction of financially troubled canals and railroads); Evans, Early History of Preferred Stock, supra note 355, at 43 (stating that the condition started to disappear in the transportation industry, and railroads and canals); George Heberton Evans, Jr., Preferred Stock in the United States 1850–1878, 21 AM. ECON. REV. 56, 56 (1931) (noting that preferred stock was generally confined to railroad and canal companies).

357. See Baskin & Miranti, supra note 356, at 152 ("[A] corporation could not be forced into receivership if dividends, unlike bond interest, fell in arrears."). Some corporations even allowed the preferred stock holder to participate in dividends beyond the guaranteed rate, but this was the exception rather than the rule. See id. (stating that preference shares, if the shares were participating, could receive dividends in excess of the guaranteed rate); W.H.S. Stevens, Stockholders' Participations in Profits. I, 9 J. BUS. U. Cm. 114, 121-22 (1936) (noting with respect to a 1902 issuance of preferred stock by the American Brake Shoe and Foundry Company in which the preferred stock received all the residual profits after the common stock was paid a fixed dividend, that "[t]his type of issue is so rare, however, as to constitute something of a curiosity, although one would be rash to assert that no other such issues have been made").

358. See George Heberton Evans, Jr., Early Industrial Preferred Stocks in the United States, 40 J. POL. ECON. 227, 227 (1932) (stating that during the third quarter of the nineteenth century preferred stock developed into a distinct type with many special rights and privileges, mainly for railroad financing); Thomas R. Navin & Marian V. Sears, The Rise of a Market for Industrial Securities, 1887–1902, 29 BUS. HIST. REV. 105, 116 (1955) ("The type of security that was to play a key role in the emerging market for industrials was the preferred stock.").

359. See Baskin & Miranti, supra note 356, at 152 (noting that preferred stock combined the features of both fixed-income and equity securities).

360. See Arthur Stone Dewing, The Financial Policy of Corporations 124 (1919) (noting that while early preferred stock was often non-cumulative because of the speculative nature of industrial enterprises, by 1897, when many businesses were on more stable ground, the preferred dividend rate was commonly made cumulative); Evans, Early History of Preferred Stock, supra note 355, at 56 (concerning issuance of preferred stocks on cumulative basis). Even when a charter was ambiguous on this point, courts generally found the preferred stock to be cumulative on the grounds that the preferred stockholder implicitly contracted for a certain rate of dividends, regardless of the profits of the corporation. Evans, Early History of Preferred Stock, supra note 355, at 61–62.
year first would have to pay the preferred stockholders for all past and current dividends due before paying any dividend to the common stockholders. While this provision helped attract capital by making the equity instrument seem more debt-like, it further increased the pressure to meet the preferred dividend payment. Managers could avoid the binding nature of the cumulative provision by inducing the preferred shareholders to agree to a recapitalization, but in practice they paid dividends whenever possible.

The advent of preferred stock not only introduced the notion of a guaranteed dividend rate for preferred stockholders, but it also created the climate for a quasi-guaranteed, regular dividend for all stockholders. Although a corporation could continue to pay the preferred dividend while choosing to pass on dividends for holders of the common stock, discriminating between the classes of stock was often difficult. This was especially true when promoters had promised that the common stockholders would receive a regular dividend. One observer noted that:

"To the holders of common stock it seemed unreasonable and unjust that, in such prosperous times, a discrimination should be made in favor of the preferred stock. The reputation of the management of many of the industrial combinations was seriously injured by their failure to redeem their promises of dividends on the common stock."

361. As one commentator noted in chronicling the rise of the United States Steel Corporation:

No matter how necessary the passing of their early dividends and accumulation of large reserves by the steel trusts may be judged to have been, so far as the preferred stock was concerned, in view of the cumulative provisions included in the contract with this class of stockholders, it was impossible.


362. See DEWING, supra note 360, at 125–26 ("[i]f a considerable amount of the unpaid dividends accumulate, and the company meets with more prosperous conditions, the managers, who probably control the common stock, will often try to induce the preferred shareholders to surrender their claims on the plea of some equitable adjustment.").

363. Id. at 125. Dewing writes:

If the corporations earns the dividend on the preferred it will probably be paid; if it does not earn the dividend and the directors 'adjust' the books so that they may pay the dividend, lest the obligation accumulate, the preferred stockholders are not only deceived, but also have lasting injury done to their interests.

Id.; see also Meade, supra note 361, at 524 (concerning management's reluctance to allow preferred stock to accumulate).

364. Meade, supra note 361, at 525.
As stock ownership spread, the demand for regularity in dividend payments increased.\textsuperscript{365} Whereas fewer than 4.5 million individuals owned stock in 1900, more than triple that number—almost 14.5 million—owned shares by 1922.\textsuperscript{366} The growth in stock ownership not only increased the size of the stockholding population, it changed the face of the typical stockholder. For example, by World War I, stock ownership had spread to middle income individuals.\textsuperscript{367} This new type of stockholder viewed dividends as one of his or her primary sources of income. One economist, writing in 1924, noted that over the last quarter century, "[t]he tendency toward a more democratic distribution of beneficiary interests in the corporations of the country has been attended by an increase in the number of people who are getting a portion of their income from their accumulated savings."\textsuperscript{368} Although stockholders may have been worse off in the long term with the more conservative dividend policies,\textsuperscript{369} regularity was important both for stockholders who depended upon the dividends for monthly expenses and for those who saw dividends as a signal of a stable financial company.

Corporations took advantage of this demand for regularity by publicly announcing their shifts in dividend policy.\textsuperscript{370} The United States Rubber Company, for example, had been characterized by wildly erratic earnings and

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\item See Donald E. Wilbur, \textit{A Study of the Policy of Dividend Stabilization}, 10 Harv. Bus. Rev. 373, 373 (1932) ("With the expansion of the stock market and the wide distribution of equities among the American public, new significance has been placed upon the importance of maintaining regular dividends year in and year out.").
\item H.T. Warshow, \textit{The Distribution of Corporate Ownership in the United States}, 39 Q. J. Econ. 15, 16 (1924).
\item See \textit{id.} at 16–17 (stating that there has been a shift of ownership of corporations from the wealthier classes to those of moderate and small means). It had also spread to new demographic groups, such as women. See Lough, \textit{supra} note 350, at 441 (noting, for example, that "[a]pproximately half the stockholders of the New Haven Railroad are women").
\item Warshow, \textit{supra} note 366, at 15. Joseph Kennedy, writing a few years later, concurred in this assessment, observing that "millions of people have become investors in securities and count upon continuity of their dividend returns in budgeting their living expenses. Anything that would interrupt the continuous flow of dividends will rob the thrifty American investor of part of his livelihood." Joseph P. Kennedy, \textit{Big Business, What Now?}, \textit{Saturday Evening Post}, Jan. 16, 1937, at 80.
\item See Benjamin Graham & David L. Dodd, \textit{Security Analysis: Principles and Technique} 375–76 (2d ed. 1940) (concerning the disadvantages of preferred stocks); Curry, \textit{supra} note 353, at 17 ("Earning withheld for corporate purposes naturally strengthen the corporation temporarily. Whether the action proves profitable to the stockholder depends upon subsequent events generally and timely action of the individual stockholder in selling his stock.").
\item In 1907, for example, the American Telephone and Telegraph Company announced an $8 per year regular dividend. See Dewing, \textit{supra} note 343, at 763 n. ee (discussing the American Telephone and Telegraph Company dividend).
\end{enumerate}
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dividends since its founding in 1892.\footnote{See DEWING, supra note 354, at 548 n. j (describing the dividend policy of the United States Rubber Company).} In 1911, after an eleven-year drought in dividend payments, the company announced that it would commence paying a four percent regular annual dividend on its common stock.\footnote{See Dividend on Rubber Common, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1911, at 15 (concerning the company's payment of an annual dividend). In an announcement regarding the move, the company's president explained "notwithstanding the fact that for some years past the surplus net earnings have been considerably in excess of the sum required for dividends upon the preferred stocks, the Directors have felt it for the best interests of the company to defer payments on the common." Id. He attributed the current move to a substantial gain from its automobile tire line. Id.} As a result of this move, United States Rubber's stock rose twelve points in less than two weeks, underscoring the importance of regularity for common stockholders.\footnote{Id.}

The problem with regular dividends was that the earnings of all companies fluctuated to some extent. During down years, a corporation would not be able to pay out the dividend, and the goal of regularity would be defeated. As Dewing observed, "A regularity in dividend payments must therefore be superimposed on an irregularity of earnings."\footnote{DEWING, supra note 354, at 547.} To achieve this result, experts advised companies to retain a certain amount of their earnings each year as a cushion. Lough warned that "dividends must not be allowed to rise, even in the most prosperous periods, above a conservative estimate of the minimum earnings of the company."\footnote{LOUGH, supra note 350, at 444.} While corporations did sometimes deviate from this conservative dividend policy to distribute additional amounts in a particularly profitable year, they maintained a policy of regularity by referring to such amounts as an "extra" or "special" dividend paid on top of the regular dividend.\footnote{See, e.g., Dividends, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1907, at 13 ("At a meeting of the Board of Directors of the New York Produce Exchange Bank, held this day, a semi-annual dividend of Three (3\%) Per Cent was declared and an extra dividend of One (1\%) Per Cent payable April 15th."). See also DEWING, supra note 354, at 561 (noting that the dividend is called an "extra" dividend to signal to the shareholders that it is not permanent).}

\textbf{V. Conclusion}

The influence of legal and non-legal norms of corporate behavior on the fate of corporate tax initiatives may have significant relevance for modern tax policy. In the New Deal examples described in this paper, corporate managers
fiercely resisted a measure that attempted to impose a new norm of corporate behavior—a norm of higher dividends and limited managerial discretion over dividend policy. By contrast, corporate managers only offered minimal resistance to a measure that merely reinforced an existing norm of corporate behavior—the norm of state, federal, and shareholder oversight for mergers and acquisitions—and those changes have essentially endured to the modern day. While there is no evidence whether either tax measure did have, or could have had, the effect on the underlying corporate behavior that Congress intended, the difference in the fate of each measure is a cautionary tale for corporate reformers seeking to enact governance measures through the tax code. If the New Deal examples are not atypical—an important qualifier in determining the modern relevance of any historical study—the implication is that Congress can reinforce existing norms through the Code, but it will have more difficulty if it seeks to initiate such norms through the tax laws.

Far from being atypical, the New Deal examples studied in this piece have modern analogies. For instance, the corporate norms-based explanation may help explain the outcome of recent attempts to use the tax code to regulate corporate governance in the area of executive compensation. In 1993, Congress enacted section 162(m) in an attempt to control excessive executive compensation. 377 Under this provision, corporations are subject to a one million dollar cap on the deductibility of compensation provided to any of its top five executives, subject to an exception for "any remuneration payable solely on account of the attainment of one or more performance goals." 378 In this case, the exception was designed to swallow the rule. As one Treasury official explained, section 162(m) "was not intended to be a revenue raising provision, but a behavior-shaping provision. The exception for performance-based compensation 'is not a loophole.'" 379 The intention was to encourage corporations to switch from guaranteed salary arrangements to more performance-based executive compensation packages, including those centered on company stock and stock options in order to better align pay with performance. 380

While section 162(m) has survived, it has been undermined through managerial resistance and avoidance. According to one observer, the rule is

"completely inoperative" as a limit on executive compensation. It has failed to stem the growth of executive compensation packages, and business leaders and tax lawyers believe that it has actually "encouraged bloated executive pay" by creating a one million dollar minimum wage for executives and a push for large stock option grants. According to one report:

"[E]xecutive pay actually rose at a 29 percent faster rate in the first year after the law took effect than in the previous 14 years the service had collected comparable information." From 1994 to 1995, corporate deductions for executive pay increased more than 9.1%, compared with an average increase of 7% between 1980 and 1994.

Moreover, early on, corporate managers found ways to subvert the original goal of aligning pay with performance by resorting to the derivatives market. Many prominent investors and former government officials have now admitted defeat and are calling for the provision's repeal.

When viewed from the perspective of the underlying corporate norm at stake, this outcome should have been quite predictable. While early charters sometimes fixed the corporate managers' salaries or made them subject to a vote of a majority of the stockholders, executive compensation has long been the exclusive province of the board of directors. As the author of one treatise observed in 1933, "Salaries paid to officers must bear some reasonable relation to the value of their services. But courts will not review salaries voted by the board unless they are so clearly excessive as to amount a fraud upon the


382. Id.; see also John A. Byrne, That Eye-Popping Executive Pay, Bus. Wk., Apr. 25, 1994, at 57 (concerning CEO salaries).


384. See Bank, supra note 22, at 320–23 (describing how the equity swap was used in response to the dilemma). Some of these attempts were subsequently limited by tax and securities law provisions. See Schizer, supra note 8, at 466 (stating that "the most effective tax constraint on exercising options derives from tax rules for so-called nonqualified options").

385. See Herman, supra note 381 (citing Warren Buffett, former Federal Reserve Board Chair Paul Volcker, former SEC Chair Arthur Levitt, and former Commerce Secretary Peter Peterson as calling for the law's speedy demise).

386. See Thomas Conyngton, The Modern Corporation: Its Mechanism, Methods, Formation and Management 67 (3d ed. 1908) (stating that regulations usually limited the amount to be paid in salaries, but some flexibility was generally given to these regulations by a provision that the limits set could be exceeded with the consent of some specified majority of the stockholders).
corporation. Recently, securities laws have attempted to impose various disclosure requirements for executive compensation, but shareholders still have no say in the compensation process under state laws. They also tend to remain quite passive even when the information is disclosed. Thus, managers are likely to resist attempts to indirectly control compensation through the tax code, and shareholders are not going to view such resistance as a violation of existing norms.

This attempt to override existing corporate norms is what distinguishes tax provisions such as section 162(m) from those tax provisions that have been praised for their corporate governance benefits by modern scholars. David Schizer, for instance, has argued that taxation is an ally in the corporate governance arena by providing constraints on executives seeking to reduce the incentive effects of their options to purchase employer stock. Through rules governing exit strategies with respect to options, such as the disincentive to exercise under section 83 and the disincentives to hedging resulting from both the constructive sale rules and the mismatch between capital and ordinary rates in a hedge, the tax system helps to bolster the incentive effects. Schizer conceded, however, that "[a]lthough Congress sometimes deliberately uses the tax code to pursue corporate governance objectives, the tax constraints on exercising and hedging options do not fall into this category." Some of the advantage in this case may be that the rules in question did not appear to constitute a threat, but the distinction runs deeper.

The corporate benefits in this case may be more than a mere indirect benefit of provisions adopted on tax policy grounds; they may be the direct benefit of tax provisions that support existing corporate norms of behavior, rather than trying to install new ones. In the case of hedging, Schizer found

387. ROHRICH, supra note 297, at 116; see BALLANTINE, supra note 298, at 408 (noting that while directors cannot fix their own salaries, "[i]t is within the powers of the directors to fix the salaries of other officers appointed by them, although from their own number, unless there is some provision to the contrary, and to fix the compensation to be paid officers for extraordinary services which they engage or authorize").


389. See id. at 481–82 (stating that the SEC's rules overstep the boundaries between the federal and state regulatory spheres and that the theory of rational shareholder apathy predicts that most shareholders prefer to be passive investors).

390. See Schizer, supra note 8, at 466 ("[T]he most effective tax constraint on exercising options derives from tax rules for so-called nonqualified options, which were not fashioned with corporate governance in mind.").

391. See id. at 466–94 (describing the various tax barriers to exercising and hedging).

392. Id. at 466.
that firms either banned the practice directly or raised its costs indirectly by preventing executives from pledging their option grants. While Schizer considered such constraints to be ineffective or incomplete, they suggest that executive hedging of option grants is disfavored under corporate law and practice. Schizer confirmed this by predicting that if the tax limitations were repealed, shareholders and executives would likely cooperate in erecting contract and securities law barriers to fill the gap. Thus, the use of tax law in this instance was merely to reinforce the existing norm of corporate behavior rather than to change it altogether. This theory appears to help explain why tax may have been an ally of corporate governance measures in limiting executive hedging, while being either ineffective or counterproductive in controlling executive compensation more generally.

Thus, at least in these examples, norms appear to have some relevance in distinguishing between corporate governance-oriented tax provisions. While more study may be beneficial on this point, the basic premise is intuitively appealing. Provisions that help reinforce existing norms may be better received, which will aid in their prospects for long-term success. By contrast, those provisions designed to initiate new norms or overturn existing ones are much more likely to face opposition and fail. The implication of the historical evidence seems clear: Tax can be considered an ally of corporate governance, but not a de facto system of federal corporate law.

393. Id. at 460.
394. Id.
395. Id. at 495.