Re-reading *Roe v. Wade*

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*Table of Contents*

I. Introduction ................................................................... 1025

II. The Opinion in *Roe v. Wade* .......................................... 1026

A. Weaknesses....................................................................... 1026
   1. Substantive Due Process ................................... 1027
   2. History ............................................................... 1030
   3. The Treatment of the Unborn in Other
      Areas of the Law ................................................ 1030
   4. Personhood.......................................................... 1031
   5. The Origins and Value of Human Life .............. 1031

B. De-emphasis on Women’s Rights .............................. 1032

C. Eugenics................................................................... 1033

D. Caution Is Surprising in Majority Opinion ............. 1036

E. Dissents Are Weak .................................................. 1037

III. Lessons from a Re-reading of *Roe v. Wade* ........... 1038

IV. Conclusion ...................................................................... 1046

**I. Introduction**

In January 2013, Linda Greenhouse published a comment² in
the *New York Times* marking the 40th anniversary of *Roe v.*

¹ This Article is an expanded version of a talk I presented on November
7, 2013 at the “*Roe at 40—The Controversy Continues*” Symposium at
Washington & Lee University School of Law. An earlier version of the paper was
presented on May 31, 2013 at the annual conference of University Faculty for
Life. I am grateful to the organizers of the Symposium for the invitation to
participate and for their gracious hospitality.

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23, 2013, 9:00 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01/23/mis
conceptions/?_r=0 (last visited Jan. 14, 2014) (discussing how perception of the
Wade. In the course of the comment, Greenhouse made the point that almost no one ever reads the Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade. I think there is a lot of truth to that observation. Roe has become a symbol—it was a great victory for women’s rights, it was an important part of a cultural transformation, it is perhaps the leading example of judicial excess, it is a manifestation of the culture of death. But I think it is true that people do not read the actual decision very often anymore.

After reading Greenhouse’s comment, I did re-read Roe v. Wade carefully. That re-reading of Roe v. Wade was a valuable experience. Scholars, and not just pro-life scholars, know that the opinion is deeply flawed. Re-reading the opinion, from a perspective of forty years, makes that even more apparent. Yet, I came away from that re-reading with a renewed confidence that the Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade will ultimately be overturned. In this Article, I will explain my reaction to this re-reading of Roe v. Wade.

II. The Opinion in Roe v. Wade

A. Weaknesses

I will begin with a few observations about the opinion. Most of the defects in Roe v. Wade were apparent from the very beginning and were explored in critical articles by John Hart Ely, Richard A. Epstein, and many others in the immediate aftermath of the Roe v. Wade decision has morphed over time) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).

4. See Greenhouse, supra note 2 (“To read the actual opinion, as almost no one ever does . . . ”).
7. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Substantive Due Process by Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 SUP. CT. REV. 159 (1973) (discussing the Court’s broad and innovative use of substantive due process).
decision. Some of these well-known errors are still notable on a fresh read. First, it is still striking how poor the opinion is, on so many levels. I will briefly discuss some of the most obvious examples.

1. Substantive Due Process

The Court’s treatment of substantive due process is startlingly shoddy. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”9 Although this clause sounds “procedural,” the Court has long used the doctrine of substantive due process to “hold[] unconstitutional state statutes that violate a ‘liberty’ interest the Court believes is protected by the clause, regardless of the manner in which the deprivation occurs.”10 This doctrine, “which affords constitutional protection to individual rights claims without a clear textual warrant,”11 has long been controversial.12

The Court had rejected all substantive review under the Due Process Clause as recently as 1963. In Ferguson v. Skrupa,13 eight Justices of the Supreme Court rejected any substantive review of legislation under the Due Process Clause.14 In Ferguson, Justice Black stated:

11. Id. at 557.
14. See id. at 730 (noting that use of the Due Process Clause to hold legislative acts unconstitutional when the Court believes “the legislature has acted unwisely” had been discarded).
The doctrine that prevailed in *Lochner*, *Coppage*, *Adkins*, *Burns*, and like cases—that due process authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitutional when they believe the legislature has acted unwisely—has long since been discarded. We have returned to the original constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws. . . . It is now settled that States “have power to legislate against what are found to be injurious practices in their internal commercial and business affairs, so long as their laws do not run afoul of some specific federal constitutional prohibition, or some valid federal law.”\(^{15}\)

Despite that 1963 ruling, the modern era of substantive due process began just two years later in 1965 with the Court’s decision in *Griswold v. Connecticut*,\(^ {16}\) although the Court could not bring itself to actually endorse the doctrine.\(^ {17}\) In his concurring opinion in *Roe v. Wade*, Justice Stewart stated: “[i]n view of what had been so recently stated in *Skrupa*, the Court’s opinion in *Griswold* understandably did its best to avoid reliance on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as the ground for decision.”\(^ {18}\) But in 1973, in *Roe v. Wade*, the Court did forthrightly accept the doctrine of substantive due process.\(^ {19}\)

The Court’s acceptance of the doctrine of substantive due process in *Roe*, though, was almost casual. The Court did not even bother to explain why the Due Process Clause had a substantive component.\(^ {20}\) Even if one accepted the doctrine of substantive due

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17. *See id.* at 482 (declining to analyze the right of privacy under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).


19. *See id.* at 153

   This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District court determined, in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.

20. *See Griswold*, 381 U.S. at 482 (declining to analyze the right of privacy under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
process, the Court’s explanation for why the choice of an abortion is protected by that doctrine as a fundamental liberty is shockingly weak.21 The Court, without a hint of irony, even invoked Justice Holmes’s dissent in Lochner in which Holmes noted the need for judicial restraint.22 The Court concluded that a “right of privacy” does exist under the Constitution.23 The Court rejected the claim “that one has an unlimited right to do with one’s body as one pleases, . . . ”24 but “the Court provide[d] neither an alternative definition [of the general constitutional right involved] nor an account of why it [thought] privacy [was] involved.”25 The Roe Court did mention that the right of personal privacy “has some extension to activities relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education . . . .”26 As John Ely noted, in the end, the Court “simply announces that the right to privacy ‘is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.’”27

21. See Myers, Pope John Paul II, supra note 12, at 63 (noting that deciding whether the right involved is “fundamental” is usually the most important inquiry in substantive due process cases).

22. Roe, 410 U.S. at 116. Justice Blackmun expressed the need for the Court “to resolve the issue by constitutional measurement, free of emotion and predilection.” Id. Justice Blackmun later noted:

We bear in mind, too, Justice Holmes’ admonition in his now-vindicated dissent in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905): [The Constitution] is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar or novel and even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United States.

Id. at 117. Professor Epstein’s comment hit the nail on the head: “Anyone can quote Holmes in Lochner v. New York. But not everyone can apply the Holmes doctrine when his views are not embodied in the legislation under review.” Epstein, supra note 7, at 168 (footnote omitted).

23. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (“This right of privacy . . . is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”).

24. Id. at 154.

25. Ely, supra note 6, at 931.


27. Ely, supra note 6, at 932 (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 153).
2. History

The Court’s treatment of the history of abortion is an embarrassment. That treatment seemed designed to show that there had been some sort of a historical recognition of a right to an abortion. For example, Justice Blackmun stated:

It is thus apparent that at common law, at the time of the adoption of our Constitution, and throughout the major portion of the 19th century, abortion was viewed with less disfavor than under most American statutes currently in effect. Phrasing it another way, a woman enjoyed a substantially broader right to terminate a pregnancy than she does in most States today.\(^{28}\)

Many scholars have refuted the historical analysis in *Roe v. Wade*.\(^{29}\) As John Keown stated: “*Roe* was a radical break with the law’s historical protection of the unborn child and thereby with its adherence to the principle of the inviolability of human life.”\(^{30}\) In sum, despite the efforts of Justice Blackmun to argue to the contrary, “*Roe’s* invention of a constitutional right to abortion represented a radical rejection of America’s long-standing history and traditions.”\(^{31}\)

3. The Treatment of the Unborn in Other Areas of the Law

The Court’s treatment of how the unborn are regarded in other areas of the law was fundamentally flawed. An accurate account would have undermined the Court’s conclusions. Robert Byrn noted: “It is evident that the Court’s errors in [*Roe v.*] *Wade*

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31. *Id.* at 37.
are cumulative. From a distorted interpretation of the common law on abortion to a general misunderstanding of the status of the unborn in American law, the Court erected a flimsy house of cards, piling one error upon another. Moreover, the Court ignored the fact that, as Richard Epstein noted, “recent judicial trends have expanded, not limited,” the rights of the unborn.

4. Personhood

The Court’s treatment of the personhood issue was also incredibly weak. The Court held “that the word ‘person’, as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn.” The easiest way to understand the weakness of the Court’s treatment of the personhood issue is to compare the Roe opinion with the recent seventy-page article by Michael Paulsen entitled The Plausibility of Personhood. Paulsen concludes that “the clear plausibility of personhood suggests at the very least that Roe—on this point as on so many others—is indefensible.”

5. The Origins and Value of Human Life

The Court’s treatment of the origins and value of human life is also incredibly weak. The Court explained that it did not really

32. Byrn, supra note 8, at 849.
33. Epstein, supra note 7, at 175; see also Ely, supra note 6, at 925 (noting that the Court’s reliance on certain doctrines regarding the protection of fetuses undercut, rather than supports, its conclusion).
36. Id. at 72.
need to decide the issue of when life begins. Yet, the Court did decide the question, because as Joe Grano noted “the Court necessarily rejected the legislative judgment that fetal life deserves protection.” In the Court’s judgment, the unborn did not have any interest that the mother or the state was bound to respect. And here my allusion to Dred Scott is intentional.

B. De-emphasis on Women’s Rights

Second, the Court’s de-emphasis of abortion as a matter of a woman’s right is striking. That point was made in the Greenhouse comment I noted above. Greenhouse stated: “To read the actual opinion, as almost no one ever does, is to understand that the seven middle-aged to elderly men in the majority certainly didn’t think they were making a statement about women’s rights: women and their voices are nearly absent from the opinion.” That aspect of the decision has long been noted but it is still rather remarkable. The Court’s summary of its holding ignores the woman’s interest almost entirely. The Court noted in the first trimester that “the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending

38. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 159 (“We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins.”).
39. See Myers, Due Process, supra note 10, at 610 (“According to Justice White’s approach, for example, it is a serious mistake to regard Roe v. Wade as advancing a neutral position on the issue of abortion.”).
41. See Myers, Due Process, supra note 10, at 563 n.38 (noting the connection to the philosophy underlying the Dred Scott case); Paulsen, supra note 5, at 1018 (noting the close affinity of the pro-choice philosophical argument with the moral stance of Dred Scott).
42. Greenhouse, supra note 2.
After viability, the abortion decision is again assigned to “appropriate medical judgment.”

Here is the Court’s conclusion of the portion of the opinion summarizing the holding: The decision vindicates the right of the physician to administer medical treatment according to his professional judgment up to the points where important state interests provide compelling justifications for intervention. Up to those points, the abortion decision in all its aspects is inherently, and primarily, a medical decision, and basic responsibility for it must rest with the physician.

The errors in this thinking are obvious. As Richard Epstein stated long ago:

[The Court’s] result does not seem to be a fair implication of the right of privacy, the only suggested basis for the decision. The privacy to be protected must be that of the pregnant woman and not that of some attending physician. . . . [Moreover,] [i]t is either pretense or folly to assume that the decision to have an abortion will be made for the most part by physicians on the basis of ‘their best medical judgment.’ . . . [In nearly every instance,] there is no medical question, and hence no place for medical judgment.

This is not to say that Roe would have been a sound decision if it had forthrightly addressed whether women (as opposed to their physicians) had a constitutional right to an abortion; the focus on physicians in Justice Blackmun’s opinion is, though, further evidence of the disingenuousness of the opinion.

C. Eugenics

Third, the eugenic statements in Justice Blackmun’s opinion are noteworthy. In one of the earliest sentences in the opinion, Justice Blackmun noted that “population growth, pollution, poverty, and racial overtones tend to complicate and not to simplify
the problem.”48 His conclusion emphasized that the Court’s holding was consistent “with the demands of the profound problems of the present day.”49 While Justice Blackmun did not explicitly endorse the ugly, eugenic history of the demand for abortion rights,50 re-reading those statements is instructive. The issue surfaced in 2009 in comments made by Justice Ginsburg who stated: “Frankly I had thought that at the time Roe was decided, there was concern about population growth and particularly growth in populations that we do not want to have too many of.”51 Justice Ginsburg’s comments created a firestorm52 and three years later she made some clarifying comments53 that did very little to allay the concerns that many had about her comments.54

49. Id. at 165.
The eugenics aspects of this issue are complex, but revealing. Eugenics typically involves efforts to improve the human species, and often involves efforts to eliminate the unfit. (It is worth recalling Justice Holmes’s statement from Buck v. Bell that “three generations of imbeciles are enough.”) These efforts carry with them a rejection of the idea that human beings have equal dignity. They reject the traditional Western sanctity of life ethic and focus rather on quality of life. That is why some have expressed concerns about some phrases in Justice Ginsburg’s clarifying statements in the Slate article (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).

55. See Mary Ziegler, Roe’s Race: The Supreme Court, Population Control and Reproductive Justice (Sept. 17, 2012) (unpublished St. Louis U. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2012-26), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2148055 (discussing the historical context of race and abortion) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Professor Ziegler recognizes the linkages between population control efforts and the push for abortion rights but cautions against simply equating the views of population control advocates and more modern advocates of abortion rights who emphasize women’s rights. I agree with her that it is not appropriate to argue that every person who favored the legalization of abortion (or who now is in favor of the right to abortion) is in favor of population control or eugenics. My broader point, though, is a theoretical point: as explained in the text, there is a linkage between eugenics and those who favor abortion rights: both deny the idea of basic human equality.


58. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).

59. Id. at 207.

60. See Keown, supra note 56, at 115 (noting that laws protecting against homicide or the killing of human beings recognize the equality in dignity of human beings).

Blackmun’s opinion in Roe. Justice Blackmun’s opinion contained the following infamous passage: “In short, the unborn have never been regarded in the law as persons in the whole sense.” The Court’s subsequent statement just a few paragraphs later in support of its viability line of reasoning—that viability was the point at which “the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother’s womb”—further supported the charge that the Court was adopting a “quality of life” orientation. So, the stakes here are quite large.

D. Caution Is Surprising in Majority Opinion

Fourth, the Court’s cautious, diffident approach is surprising. For example, the Court, as I mentioned above, invoked (with

62. See infra notes 65–66 (discussing the “quality of life” orientation).


64. Id. at 163; see also supra notes 37–41 and accompanying text (discussing the analysis of viability in Roe v. Wade).


66. Then-Cardinal Ratzinger describes these risks clearly:

One understands, then, how a state which arrogates to itself the prerogative of defining which human beings are or are not the subject of rights and which consequently grants to some the power to violate others’ fundamental right to life, contradicts the democratic ideal to which it continues to appeal and undermines the very foundations on which it is built. By allowing the rights of the weakest to be violated, the state also allows the law of force to prevail over the force of law. One sees, then, that the idea of an absolute tolerance of freedom of choice for some destroys the very foundation of a just life for men together. The separation of politics from any natural content of right, which is the inalienable patrimony of everyone’s moral conscience, deprives social life of its ethical substance and leaves it defenseless before the will of the strongest.


approval) Justice Holmes’s famous comment in his dissent in *Lochner* in which Holmes stated that “[the Constitution] is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions natural or familiar or novel and even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United States.” Yet, Justice Rehnquist noted that “while the Court’s opinion quotes from the dissent of Mr. Justice Holmes in *Lochner v. New York*, the result it reaches is more closely attuned to the majority opinion of Mr. Justice Peckham in that case.” The Court’s false gesture of humility with regard to the origins of human life is similar. These statements were a complete smokescreen but they did seem to reflect a Court that was uneasy about its role. Of course, that feature of Justice Blackmun’s opinion-writing was all gone by the time of his subsequent opinions in *Webster v. Reproductive Health Services* and *Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey*.

**E. Dissents Are Weak**

Fifth, it is a bit surprising to note the weakness of the dissents. As John Hart Ely noted just after the decisions, “[w]ere the dissents adequate, this comment would be unnecessary. But each is so brief as to signal no particular conviction that *Roe* represents an important, or unusually dangerous, constitutional

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70. The Court stated: We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of man’s knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer. *Id.* at 159 (majority opinion). This was, of course, false, for the Court did in fact decide the issue (as a legal matter). See *supra* notes 37–41 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s default decision regarding when life begins).
development. The dissents, by Justices White and Rehnquist, do contain some effective points and some of the stronger passages in those opinions are still quoted today. For example, Justice White noted that “[t]he Court simply fashions and announces a new constitutional right for pregnant mothers and, with scarcely any reason or authority for its action, invests that right with sufficient substance to override most existing state abortion statutes.” His critique of the activism of the Court’s opinion was also made effectively. In perhaps the most-quoted portion of the dissents, Justice White noted: “As an exercise of raw judicial power, the Court perhaps has the authority to do what it does today; but in my view its judgment is an improvident and extravagant exercise of the power of judicial review that the Constitution extends to this Court.” But on the whole the dissents were weak and did not do justice to the magnitude of the Court’s decisions or to the issues involved. It is interesting to imagine the dissent that Justice Scalia might have written had he been on the Court in 1973.

III. Lessons from a Re-reading of Roe v. Wade

In this section of the Article, I will offer some reflections on the principal lessons that can be learned from a re-reading of Roe.

First, one of the strongest impressions one gets from re-reading Roe v. Wade is of the weakness of Justice Blackmun’s opinion. That point—the weakness of Justice Blackmun’s opinion—is well understood, but it is even more striking on a fresh

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73. Ely, supra note 6, at 920 n.3; see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, Comments from the Contributors, in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION’S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS RETHINK AMERICA’S MOST CONTROVERSIAL DECISION 239 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005) (describing the inadequacies of the dissents to Roe v. Wade).


75. Id. at 222.

76. See Paulsen, supra note 73, at 239 (describing the inadequacies of the dissents to Roe v. Wade).

77. See Paulsen, supra note 5, at 1022 (comparing the Roe dissents to Justice Scalia’s “impassioned dissents” in Casey); cf. Casey, 505 U.S. at 979–1002 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (explaining thoroughly his disagreement with the Casey decision).
reading of the opinion. I think that is an important reason for believing that Roe will ultimately be overturned. The judicial rationale for a nearly unlimited right to an abortion was deeply flawed from the outset. That has become clearer with the passage of years. Advocates for the right to an abortion have been re-writing the opinion for years in an effort to place the decision on a firmer foundation.\(^78\) These efforts have floundered over the years and that too (the realization that no one alternative explanation has really taken hold) suggests that Roe v. Wade will eventually be overturned.

Second, the continuing controversy about Roe (this Symposium is just one of many examples), which is driven in part by the easy target that the opinion presents, indicates that Roe is still in play.\(^79\) I do not think we reflect often enough about how unusual that is.\(^80\) In other areas of constitutional law, we do not often encounter this sort of ongoing critique of decisions that are, in theory, settled law. So, for example, the sex discrimination decisions of the Burger Court in the early- and mid-1970s (precisely the time of Roe v. Wade) were enormously controversial.\(^81\) These decisions made significant changes in equal

\(^{78}\) See generally What Roe v. Wade Should Have Said: The Nation’s Top Legal Experts Rewrite America’s Most Controversial Decision (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005) (collecting comments and re-written opinions of how Roe should have been decided).

\(^{79}\) Although Roe was modified in some respects by Casey, the right to abortion was not drastically cut back, as is sometimes claimed. See infra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing how Casey modified Roe). The main import of Roe (that there is a right to abortion at any point during pregnancy for any reason) is still the law. See infra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing how Casey modified Roe); Paulsen, supra note 5, at 996 n.4 (discussing the larger differences between Casey and Roe in detail).


\(^{81}\) See Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De facto ERA, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 1323, 1323 (2006) (exploring how equal protection doctrine relating to sex discrimination was forged through social movement conflicts during the time of the defeat of the Equal Rights Amendment).
protection law. The Court elevated the level of scrutiny it used in sex discrimination cases from the lowest level of scrutiny to a form of heightened scrutiny that resulted in the invalidation of many laws that contained classifications based on sex. These decisions were criticized as examples of judicial activism. There was little support for the Court’s approach in the text, history, or prior judicial interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause. The decisions came at a time of sweeping cultural changes on matters of sexual equality. Yet, today there is almost no controversy at all about these decisions. The Court’s decisions are widely accepted. No one holds conferences reassessing Craig v. Boren.

The contrast with Roe v. Wade could not be more striking. Roe was controversial in 1973 and it is still controversial. In addition to the withering critiques of Roe as an exercise of constitutional interpretation, there is the profoundly significant matter that Roe has not been accepted in the broader culture. Moreover, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.

82. See Deborah L. Brake, Sex as a Suspect Class: An Argument for Applying Strict Scrutiny to Gender Discrimination, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 953, 953–56 (1996) (providing a brief history of the Supreme Court’s development of the standard of review for analyzing sex discrimination).

83. See Siegel, supra note 81, at 1335 (“The core precepts of sex discrimination law are now canonical.”).

84. 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (determining that sex discrimination was subject to intermediate scrutiny).

85. This next paragraph is drawn from an earlier paper of mine. See Myers, supra note 80, at 9 (discussing the contrast with Roe v. Wade).

86. See FORSYTHE, supra note 56, at 289–309 (noting broad agreement in American culture about the issue of abortion); Clarke D. Forsythe & Stephen B. Presser, The Tragic Failure of Roe v. Wade: Why Abortion Should be Returned to the States, 10 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 85, 164–67 (2005) (discussing the Court’s abortion jurisprudence and public opinion). In his recent book, Clarke Forsythe summarized the point in this fashion:

What makes abortion uniquely controversial is that the Justices have sided with a small sect—7 percent of Americans—who support abortion for any reason at any time. And the Justices have for forty years prevented the 60–70 percent of Americans in the middle from deciding differently. The conflict between public opinion and the Supreme Court’s nationwide policy is one key reason why Roe is uniquely controversial.

FORSYTHE, supra note 56, at 296.
RE-READING ROE V. WADE

Casey is not really accepted either. There is constant resistance to Roe v. Wade among judges, legislators, academics, and in the broader culture. Increasing pro-life sentiment makes it clear that Roe and Casey are not sufficiently well accepted to remove the issue from broader public debate. Roe and Casey have not been accepted, or at least not to the degree of the Court’s sex discrimination decisions from the same era.

Third, a re-reading of Roe v. Wade prompts the realization that the decision is not in reality the landmark that its reputation would seem to suggest. Roe was, in certain respects, a momentous

88. See Forsythe & Presser, supra note 86, at 164–67 (discussing the Court’s abortion jurisprudence and public opinion). Casey did modify Roe in certain respects but the degree of the changes was not as dramatic as some suggest. Casey itself stated that it preserved “the central holding of Roe v. Wade.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 879. Under Casey, states have more freedom to regulate abortion but still no power to prohibit abortion at any point during pregnancy. See generally Richard S. Myers, Reflections on the Twentieth Anniversary of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, in LIFE AND LEARNING XXII: THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-SECOND UNIVERSITY FACULTY FOR LIFE CONFERENCE (Joseph W. Koterski ed.) (forthcoming), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2150241 (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
93. See supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text (discussing the broad acceptance of the Supreme Court’s sex discrimination decisions).
decision. It has had an enormous impact in opening the door to a staggering number of abortions over the last forty years. Of course, many of these abortions would have happened without Roe, but it is important and tragic that these over 50 million abortions have occurred with the imprimatur of the United States Supreme Court.

But Roe has always seemed more than that. In reality, however, the opinion is an outlier. That is true in many areas. Although women still have a nearly unlimited right to an abortion, in many other areas of the law, unborn children have increasingly been accorded legal protection. The federal Unborn Victims of Violence Act (and various state counterparts) and the federal Born-Alive Infants Protection Act are two important examples. The Alabama Supreme Court decision in Ex Parte Ankrom is another prominent example. In that case, the court held that Alabama’s chemical endangerment statute protected unborn children. Justice Parker’s special concurrence concluded

The decision of this Court today is in keeping with the widespread legal recognition that unborn children are persons with rights that should be protected by law. Today, the only major area in which unborn children are denied legal protection is abortion, and that denial is only because of the dictates of Roe

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98. See id. at *60 (“[T]he Court of Criminal Appeals correctly held that the plain meaning of the word ‘child’ in the chemical-endangerment statute includes an unborn child . . . [and we] reject the Court of Criminal Appeals’ reasoning insofar as it limits the application of the chemical-endangerment statute to a viable unborn child.”).
[v. Wade.] *Roe* has become increasingly isolated on this point, as on many others.99

*Roe* is thought of, along with *Griswold v. Connecticut*,100 as representative of the modern approach to substantive due process. Yet, here too *Roe* is somewhat of an outlier. It seemed that *Roe* and *Casey* might support a fundamental right to assisted suicide,101 but in *Washington v. Glucksberg*102 the Supreme Court rejected that expansion of substantive due process, in part it seemed because the Court was reticent about constitutionalizing another area of social life.103 And more importantly the Court in *Glucksberg* set forth an approach to substantive due process that amounted to a rejection of the approach the Court had used in *Roe v. Wade*.104 As I noted in a prior article, “Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion [in *Glucksberg*] was all about judicial restraint and deference to history and tradition.”105 The notable exception to this analysis is the Court’s decision in *Lawrence v. Texas*,106 in which the Court held unconstitutional a Texas statute prohibiting homosexual sodomy.107 *Lawrence* though, despite its expansive language, was modest in the sense that the Court was invalidating a law that existed in only a relative handful of states. *Lawrence*, as scholars such as Cass Sunstein have noted,108 is similar in this respect to

99. *Id.* at *89 (Parker, J., concurring specially).
100. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
103. See *id.* at 719–23 (finding that a protection to commit suicide is not included in the Due Process Clause and that to find such a thing would reverse “centuries of legal doctrine and practice”).
104. See Myers, *supra* note 101, at 349 (comparing the Court’s analysis in *Glucksberg* to that in *Roe* and *Casey*).
107. See *id.* at 578 (“The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.”).
Griswold v. Connecticut in which the Court struck down a law that existed in only one state in the Union.\textsuperscript{109} Roe, in which the Court effectively invalidated the abortion laws of every state, is exceptional.\textsuperscript{110} Moreover, Lawrence is in many respects more reflective of the importance of equality than it is a full endorsement of individual autonomy,\textsuperscript{111} although there is of course language in Lawrence to support the autonomy reading.\textsuperscript{112} And Lawrence, despite the predictions of Justice Scalia’s dissent, has not led to a wholesale invalidation of morals legislation.\textsuperscript{113}

Fourth, as noted above, from a perspective of forty years, Roe’s almost complete neglect of equality themes is striking. As suggested in my discussion of Lawrence v. Texas, that is where the action is today. It is intriguing that the discussion about same-sex marriage has primarily been about “marriage equality” and not about a right to marriage.\textsuperscript{114} I think that is in part because we seem to lack the moral vocabulary to discuss basic moral issues directly. I think this focus on equality suggests the importance of pro-life efforts to focus on and to prevent the harms to women from abortion,\textsuperscript{115} and on efforts to combat the equality arguments in desuetude, of laws lapsing over time, and comparing Griswold and Lawrence on this ground).

\textsuperscript{109} See Calabresi, supra note 108, at 1525 (noting that Lawrence, like Griswold, changed very few state laws).

\textsuperscript{110} See id. at 1524 (“Whereas Griswold struck down the law of one state, a law which was not even being enforced, Roe struck down the abortion laws of all fifty states.”).

\textsuperscript{111} See Myers, supra note 88, at 13 (noting an expansive understanding of liberty in Lawrence).

\textsuperscript{112} See id. at 12 (discussing Justice Scalia’s prediction regarding the end of all morals legislation); Myers, Pope John Paul II, supra note 12, at 74–77 (discussing the “moral relativism” of Lawrence).

\textsuperscript{113} See Myers, supra note 88, at 12 (discussing Justice Scalia’s prediction regarding the end of all morals legislation); Myers, Pope John Paul II, supra note 12, at 74–77 (discussing the “moral relativism” of Lawrence).

\textsuperscript{114} It is noteworthy that the early challenges to the constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act, see, e.g., Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (M.D. Fla. 2005), prominently featured arguments that bans on same-sex marriage violated the right to marry. By the time of the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), the arguments were nearly exclusively framed in terms of equal protection.

\textsuperscript{115} See Forsythe, supra note 56, at 245–68 (discussing the danger that an abortion poses to a woman’s health); Richard S. Myers, The Supreme Court and
favor of abortion rights. The equality arguments in favor of abortion rights (which have surfaced in certain judicial opinions and in the literature) are not securely rooted in the text of the Constitution or in established legal doctrine. In addition, efforts to ban abortion for reasons of sex selection also may be important because they turn this equality argument against the right to an abortion. Moreover, the reaction of abortion rights advocates to efforts to ban abortion for reasons of sex selection indicates that the issue is more about autonomy (about the power to make decisions) and not about equality. When faced with a conflict between equality and autonomy, autonomy wins every time.

Fifth, the Court’s relatively cursory treatment of the origins and value of human life is noteworthy and creates an opening. The Court’s humility in claiming that it “need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins[,]” was obviously false. But this false gesture of humility may make it easier for people to avoid the reality that abortion takes the life of a human being. As Michael Paulsen has stated:

I doubt that more than a small percentage of Americans, if pressed on the point, would dispute the fact that abortion is the

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118. See Paulsen, *supra* note 5, at 1010 n.35 (discussing instances where the pro-abortion reasoning may be controverted).

119. For an extensive treatment of the issue, see, for example, Robert P. George & Christopher Tollefson, *Embryo: A Defense of Human Life* (2d ed. 2011) (arguing “that embryonic human beings deserve full moral respect”).

killing of a human life in its prenatal state and that, outside of a few truly extreme situations, such killing is morally unjustifiable. But nobody really wants to be pressed on the point.\textsuperscript{121}

For those opposed to the \textit{Roe v. Wade} decision, it is important to continue to make the scientific and moral case for the protection of the unborn.\textsuperscript{122} This is why efforts such as ultrasound laws are so important.\textsuperscript{123} Even efforts that do not purport to save many lives, such as bans on partial birth abortion and bans on abortion for reasons of fetal pain, may help to serve an educational function.\textsuperscript{124} Efforts to build a reverence for the value of human life in other areas—such as in debates about assisted suicide or infanticide—are also important.\textsuperscript{125}

\textbf{IV. Conclusion}

In sum, the overwhelming sense that comes through a re-reading of \textit{Roe} is that Justice Blackmun authored an incredibly weak opinion. I think that portends the decision's ultimate reversal. The Supreme Court and the American system do have the capacity for self-correction and the deep flaws in the key case establishing a nearly unlimited right to an abortion suggest that the ultimate reversal of \textit{Roe v. Wade} is likely.

\textsuperscript{121} Paulsen, supra note 5, at 1041.
\textsuperscript{122} See, \textit{e.g.}, \textsc{George & Tollefson}, supra note 119, at 1–25 (detailing the importance of understanding that a human being is a human being from the beginning of development).
\textsuperscript{123} See \textsc{Scott W. Gaylord} & \textsc{Thomas J. Molony}, \textit{Casey and a Woman's Right to Know: Ultrasounds, Informed Consent, and the First Amendment}, 45 \textsc{Conn. L. Rev.} 595, 595 (2012) (discussing a split between courts about the constitutionality of various state statutes requiring display and explanation of an ultrasound to a woman prior to an abortion).
\textsuperscript{124} See \textsc{Myers}, supra note 115, at 122 (discussing this aspect of bans on partial birth abortion).
\textsuperscript{125} See \textsc{Richard S. Myers}, \textit{Reflections on the Terri-Schindler Schiavo Case}, \textit{in Life and Learning XIV; The Proceedings of the Fourteenth University Faculty for Life Conference} 27, 40–41 (Joseph W. Koterski ed., 2005) (noting the need to focus on this broader point).