Abstract
Johnson & Johnson’s market cap is twice the GDP of Oklahoma. So, when Oklahoma hauled Johnson & Johnson and other behemoth pharmaceutical companies into state court for their participation in the opioid epidemic, Big Pharma’s resources created a David v. Goliath situation. Against all odds, Oklahoma stood toe-to-toe with Big Pharma and brought home more than $650 million in settlement funds.
Oklahoma’s success would be otherwise impossible without the assistance of three private law firms serving the role of “private attorneys general.” The State signed contingency fee arrangements with the firms, transferring the financial burden of litigation from the State to the firms, with the promise of a share of any recovery.
Critics argue that state attorneys general contracting with private law firms is akin to making a deal with the Devil. State attorneys general, sworn to public servitude, are thought to use litigation solely as a tool to protect citizens of their state. While private law firms are seen as businesses with the monolithic goal of increasing profit and maximizing shareholder value. The private attorney general model creates the natural concern that the underlying profit motive incentivizes law firms to litigate in a way that guarantees the highest recovery, not in the way that guarantees the most just outcome.
This Note analyzes Oklahoma’s bout with Big Pharma and the efficacy of the private attorney general model by reviewing every publicly available settlement and calculating the contingency fee awarded to the private law firms. The Note sets aside the black and white analysis of state attorneys general as purely altruistic actors and private law firms as purely money-hungry entities. In the end, this Note concludes that the private attorney general model can be exploited by corrupt players on either side but, with the appropriate safeguards, can produce massive rewards for states willing to accept the risk.
Recommended Citation
Nathan Heastie, Leveling the Playing Field? Exploring the Moral Ambiguity of the Private Attorney General Model, 83 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. Online 125 (2025), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr-online/vol83/iss2/2
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