Abstract
Influential scholars of corporate law have questioned previous federal interventions into corporate governance, calling it quackery. Invoking images of medical malpractice, these critiques have argued persuasively that Congress, in responding to crises, makes policy that disrupts efficient private rules and established state laws. This Article applies the Bootleggers and Baptists theory to show that Dodd–Frank’s hedge fund rules are more than just negligent or reckless, but designed to benefit special interests that compete with the hedge fund model. Those rules offer no solutions to any real or perceived risks arising from hedge fund investing, but might offer an advantage to competitors of hedge funds.
Recommended Citation
Jeremy Kidd, Quacks or Bootleggers: Who’s Really Regulating Hedge Funds?, 75 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 367 (2018).Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol75/iss1/5
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