Abstract
This Article’s goal is to get a grip on reasoning about what federal judges cannot do, can do, must do, and the limits, if any, on congressional remedial mandates. Until recently, Justices have not been reductionist in reading Article III; they linked the “judicial Power” to the Constitution, prior decisions, the first Judiciary Act of 1789, other statutes, congressional purposes and intent, English practices from different times, treatises, perceived effects on federal court dockets and on state courts, and litigants’ needs. Majorities have since changed accounts of which sources are licit and acted as if doing so was conventional. Those opinions often explain themselves as ceding to Congress, as “Congress maximizers.” Nonetheless, the rulings are “Court maximizers”—expanding the Supreme Court’s power to limit (or not) federal judges’ authority as well as that of Congress. Examples include decisions about whether to dash to hear cases (instead of the slower certiorari route) and a host of merits rulings on remedies, standing, implied causes of action, and federalism.
To illuminate the underlying challenges in analyses of congressional and judicial power, I weave together a hypothetical statute licensing all sorts of remedies, the current statute addressing the Court’s original jurisdiction, an overview of hundreds of remedial directions found in a data search of federal statutes (none use the word “typical” in relationship to equitable remedies), the debate about whether the “judicial Power” obliges appellate courts to stop deeming decisions “not for precedent,” and the 2026 ruling in Hunter v. United States instructing lower courts to hear claims of a “miscarriage of justice” despite waivers of appellate review in plea agreements. I show the analytic relationships among ideas about the authority of lower courts (exemplified by the 2025 Trump v. CASA, Inc. decision), the power of both the Court and of Congress to alter original jurisdiction, the appellate practice of labeling eighty-five percent of opinions as “not for publication,” and the Court’s use of its authority to mandate access to appeal. After documenting judicial procedural-norm invention, I invite readers to think about the potential sources for all these choices, whether and why to characterize rulings as constitutional as compared to common law interpretations, and what they want the “judicial Power” to mean.
Recommended Citation
Judith Resnik, “The judicial Power shall extend . . .”: Exercises of Power—Equitable, Legal, or Not, 83 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 921 (2026).Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol83/iss3/3
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