Abstract
A constitution can be remade without tearing it down, or even changing a single word. It is done by law. It is being done now—by the Supreme Court.
In each case, real people win, real people lose, real people suffer. Outcomes matter. But across the span of cases, the Court is tearing down our constitutional order of divided power—taking authority from the courts below, from Congress, the agencies, the states, and us, the people—and building a structure of unchecked power in itself.
Procedure and remedies are constitutive of the judicial power. In a time of authoritarian threat, they are the guardrails—and, on the Court’s own account, the limitations—by which a constitutional order holds power to law. Yet, the Supreme Court is taking these powers from every hand but its own. Worse, it is transforming them into weapons of aggrandizement.
Increasingly, the Court’s project proceeds this way: decisions issued without reasons, disregard for facts and trials, rules that bind everyone but the Court, its own choices announced as the law’s commands, and holdings fixed in constitutional law, where no election or act of Congress can reach. Each power grab, the instrument of the next. A reconstitution. Our architecture of divided power, our oldest check against tyranny, has always been most vulnerable to its chief steward.
A structure remade can be met only by reform of the same kind—not personnel changes, not stop-gaps. This Article takes up the problem, and needed responses, as an architectural matter. Procedure and remedies are the architecture of any institution’s authority—and now the tools of this Court’s reconstitution. Reform requires us to think not just institutionally about the Court, but structurally—about procedure, about remedies, about power.
This Article was written for a symposium held in March 2026 on procedure and remedies in the face of authoritarianism; the Court’s additional 2026 opinions bore out its theory of reconstitution.
Recommended Citation
J. Maria Glover, Reconstituting a Constitution, and a Republic: The Architecture of Authoritarian Rule, 83 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1077 (2026).Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol83/iss3/4
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